

DISSIMILAR VALUE COMMITMENTS AND THE DYNAMICS OF DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION*

by D. Brian Marson**

For more than twenty years social scientists have been collecting case studies of "successful" and "unsuccessful" programs and projects, in an attempt to establish operational guidelines for development planners and technicians, who have the difficult task of introducing new technologies into specific cultural settings.¹ Most of these studies stress the importance of recognizing value differences between innovating agents and client groups. However, although many studies have been made of village level projects, surprisingly few studies have been made of large-scale programs involving foreign personnel and funds.² Moreover, little use has been made of the official files of donor and recipient governments to try to isolate the role of value differences in the dynamics of the development planning-implementation process. The information that has come to light, however, indicates that the recognition of value differences and of the requirement for non-economic social science inputs into development administration is still largely missing, despite the knowledge that has been accumulated by anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists and political scientists over the past twenty years.

Thus, a thorough review by the author of project reports in A.I.D. files covering the Southeast Asian region resulted in the conclusion that many of the key actors involved in the planning and implementation of development programs are still not sensitive to cross-cultural

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**D. Brian Marson, Department of Political Science, Harvard University.

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¹ Important collections include: *Health, Culture and Community* by Benjamin Paul; *A Casebook of Social Change* by Arthur Niehoff; *Traditional Cultures: the Impact of Technological Change* by George M. Foster; *The Politics of Foreign Aid* by John D. Montgomery; *International Aid to Thailand: The New Colonialism?* by Ronald C. Nairn; and *Development Projects Observed* by Albert O. Hirschman.

² Exceptions include *Development Projects Observed* by Hirschman, and *International Aid to Thailand* by Nairn.

value differences which may cause sub-optimal project outcomes, or outright project failure. Moreover, those who are aware of the potential for value conflict in programs do not routinely include a review of such questions in project design, implementation and evaluation. It would appear that even social scientists (other than anthropologists and sociologists) engaged in project evaluation are often unaware of their own cultural values and the values of the host culture or client group. Thus, frustrations encountered in program negotiation or implementation are normally perceived as resulting from "poor management", "red tape", "poor motivation", "insufficient training", "uncooperative counterparts" etc., although these may merely be symptoms of underlying value differences between actors. Moreover, even when a project is considered "successful", seldom is the impact of the innovative technology on the value system of the client group systematically examined and recorded.

If we are to study the dynamics of development administration in situations where value differences lead to the frustration of project goals, it is vital that the actors involved first recognize the value differences which lie behind their problems. However, recognition itself seems still to be lacking if studies of A.I.D. projects are to be taken as a guide; and without recognition, solutions to value-difference problems will not likely be achieved. An examination of actual case histories provides ample evidence of the continuing lack of sensitivity to value difference problems.

Cooperatives in Thailand

Most social scientists would recognize that, as a development institution, cooperatives may "fit" some cultures more than others, and that successful cooperatives require certain values and patterns of behaviour from the participants. (This fact apparently escaped Senator Frank Church when he argued in the United States Senate that "They have been good in this country. I think they would be good in other countries.")³ Thus, when the introduction of cooperatives into a rural development program results in problems and frustrations, it would seem logical for development administrators to examine and compare the value content of the new institution with the values of the client group to see whether value differences are in part responsible for the difficulties. However, a recent evaluation by a U.S. university team of the problems of the A.I.D. assisted cooperative movement in Thailand included only slight attention to such factors. After thoroughly analyzing rural Thai cooperatives, the team concluded that the main causes of failure in the cooperative program included: 1. Lack of adequate feasibility studies. 2. Inadequate agricultural extension and research support services. 3. Lack of trained, competent management personnel. 4. Inadequate concern and responsibility by members due to a poor understanding of how successful cooperatives operate. 5. Lack of good cooperative practices such as bargaining

³ Cited by Ralph Braibanti in *Political and Administrative Development* (Durham N.C.: Duke University Press, 1969), p. 9.

for better prices. 6. Small memberships and overdependence on government financing. 7. The lack of a unified credit system for cooperatives.⁴

Thus, the reasons suggested by this study for the failure of the cooperatives are largely practical, technical questions. Yet someone familiar with Thai culture might see many of these shortcomings as mere manifestations of value differences between the cooperative as an institution and the Thai farmer. Thus, one American anthropologist familiar with rural Thailand has pointed out that,

*"Life revolves around an associational rather than an organizational principle. Life problems are resolved and goals achieved mainly through intimate personal relationships rather than formal organization."*⁵

On the other hand, the western cultures, which generated the cooperative as an institutional form, are geared very strongly to associational principles, and the westerner is very much the "organization man". It is not surprising, then, that an institution dependent on western values should have difficulty thriving in the Thai culture:

*"Although they bestow some benefit to the farmers, these cooperatives have generally been a failure..... Among the many reasons for the failure of this program, one of the most important had to do with the villagers' preference for associational rather than organizational relationships."*⁶

Therefore, although value differences appear to have played a major part in the frustration of the cooperative program in Thailand, the attention of American advisors and evaluators has been focussed on more recognizable, more understandable, practical problems, while value-difference problems have been largely neglected.

Malaysian Hospital

Another example of a project where value differences have not been readily recognized and dealt with involves the new University Teaching Hospital in Kuala Lumpur. This is an ultra-modern, western-style hospital financed by the German aid program at a cost of approximately \$55,000,000:

*"In keeping with its physical and medical standards, the operational style of the hospital including its arrangements for visitors is wholly Western. While Malaysian custom requires that the extended family (and other relatives and friends of the sick) visit the patient rather than sending flowers and get-well cards as is the Western custom, the University Teaching Hospital virtually discourages visitors altogether by a combination of poorly timed and short visiting hours, elaborate security measures, and the unusual stipulation for Malaysian hospitals that each patient may receive only one visitor at a time"*⁷

⁴ Rufus B. Hughes, et al, *Thailand Agricultural Cooperatives: An Evaluation With Recommendations* (International Cooperative Training Center: University of Wisconsin, 1968).

⁵ Toshio Yatsushiro, *Northeast Thailand: Its Land, People, Culture* (Institute of Advanced Projects, East-West Center, Honolulu, 1970), p. 63.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

⁷ M. Shan, "Development In Malaysia and Foreign Aid", unpublished paper, Harvard University, 1971, p. 85.

This project is to be contrasted with the Gombak Hospital for aborigines, which is situated just outside of Kuala Lumpur, and is assisted by CARE-Medico. In this hospital, not only have some of the buildings been constructed in aborigine style to make patients feel at home, but the atmosphere is informal and families are free to visit the sick according to their custom. Moreover, the paramedical staff is partly recruited from the aboriginal client group, giving patients immediate contact with the institution through people who share the same values. Thus, with all these positive factors built into the institution, the aborigines are strongly encouraged to utilize the medical facilities available to them.

In summary, in the former case (the teaching hospital) the institution has been transplanted from the West without conscious adaptation to the value system of the client group in the non-western society. This results in sub-optimal usage of the facility by potential patients who are discouraged by its incongruent western style of operation. On the other hand, the second (aborigine) institution has minimized value differences between itself and its client group, in both the planning and the operational stages; congruence has been sought with the strongly-held values of the client group.

High Yielding Cereal Varieties

Having illustrated the proposition that value differences are often not explicitly recognized in the planning and execution of development programs, we now turn to the additional proposition that the *impact* of programs on the value systems of client groups is still not considered by many development administrators either. In the first proposition, we assume that fixed values may act as barriers to successful project implementation; in the second proposition we recognize that development is a dynamic process whereby values themselves evolve in response to innovative development programs, and that even a "successful" project may have unexpected consequences.

A.I.D.'s 1969 Spring Review of the New Cereal Varieties indicated very clearly that the impact of innovative technologies on the value system of client groups is still not an integrated part of development planning and administration. In a summary paper entitled "Emerging Problems" A.I.D./Washington makes the following critical assessment of the situation with regard to the "Green Revolution":

*"We have, in other words, helped let loose a technological revolution that may touch the lives of over half the people in L.D.C.s with no rigorous professional analysis of the desired, probable, or even possible effects on the social and political evolution of these countries."*⁸

Clearly, there is an urgent need both for projections of program impact on values in the planning stage, and for routine monitoring of actual impact during and after the execution phase. Yet is still the exception rather than the rule, even in such enormous programs as those associated with the Green Revolution.

⁸ "Spring Review of New Cereal Varieties; Emerging Problems", A.I.D./Washington, May 1969, p. 3.

Mekong River Basin Project

A similar plea for thorough consideration of the impact of proposed projects on the value system of the client group has been made by Jasper Ingersoll, an American anthropologist commissioned to study the human dimensions of the Mekong Project. According to Ingersoll, just as no planner would consider implementing a project before an engineering feasibility study, no large project should be implemented before a careful *social* feasibility study involving the client group. As he points out:

*"The point is not so much that few people have disagreed with this sensible position, as that most governments and lending institutions have not taken any specific steps in this direction. Careful engineering study and detailed economic analysis are means towards advancing the economic and social well-being of the people. Thus far, most energy and resources have been directed towards these technical means and relatively little to the people in the (river) basin concerned and to the relevant aspects of their present way of life"*⁹

Ingersoll's extensive Mekong study is an attempt both to analyze the impact of the project on a selected client group, and to abstract guidelines for future pre-project social feasibility studies. Similar efforts are now being undertaken in Malaysia with regard to three major land development /resettlement schemes with the assistance of teams of social scientists from the University of East Anglia and their Malaysian counterparts-this effort being mounted after previous schemes ran into major unforeseen social problems. A word of warning is appropriate here, however. Social feasibility studies must be *well* done, not just done. Our experience with engineering feasibility studies and cost/benefit analyses warns us that there is a built in optimistic bias which consistently underestimates problems and costs, and often over estimates the benefits. These pitfalls need to be avoided if social feasibility studies are to be meaningful.

These brief references to actual program experiences in Southeast Asia illustrate the author's basic conclusion that, since value differences are still not routinely examined by development administrators when planning and implementing development programs, value clashes often go unrecognized even when problems occur; and further, that the impact of projects on the value systems of client groups is still largely ignored and unknown.

As was noted previously, in order for project problems to be diagnosed as arising from value differences, the actors must first have some awareness of their own values, and of the value systems of co-actors, including client groups. Without this awareness and some cross-cultural sensitivity, problems encountered in planning and executing projects may easily be ascribed to technical, administrative or personnel problems rather than to the underlying value differences which often manifest themselves in such symptoms.

⁹ Jasper Ingersoll, "Human Dimensions of Mekong River Basin Development", *A.I.D.*, 1970, p. iii.

Why is it that many programs are still planned and executed by lending agencies, engineers and bureaucrats who ignore, particularly, the value systems of client groups? Part of the answer according to A.I.D. / Washington officials rests with the apparent inability of many social scientists to translate their findings into practical recommendations that the administrator can apply to program decisions. A history of "bad experiences" with social scientists used in field assignments has led to a reluctance by many administrators to use social scientists at all, feeling that they have little practical contribution to make. This is particularly true of sociologists, anthropologists and political scientists who tend to command less respect with bureaucrats and applied scientists than economists, for example. These problems have long been recognized, yet still they persist-perhaps because the problem has not itself been understood in terms of the very kind of value differences that social scientists can find between the different actors in the development process. Thus, the well-known anthropologist, George M. Foster, has stated that administrators and social scientists have different work-related value systems which must be recognized and dealt with if the two groups are to cooperate successfully. Nothing that neither the social scientist nor the administrator is normally happy with the attitudes and performance of the other. Foster pinpoints the source of the difficulty as follows:

*"The basic problem, it seems to me, arises from the fact that the administrator and the anthropologist are members of rather distinct subcultures with very different values and goals... The value system, the methods of work, the goals of the administrator are vastly different from those of the anthropologist."*¹⁰

While the social scientist typically sees knowledge as the highest work-related value, and seeks to develop theories from this knowledge, the administrator is a problem solver who sees knowledge as a useful tool to achieve administrative and program goals. Moreover:

*"An important difference in the two (professions) has to do with ego gratification..... The distinct way in which professionals and research scientists achieve status in their fields obviously has important bearing on how they view their roles and what they hope to accomplish in any cooperative program."*¹¹

In order for the social scientist to be of real value to the development administrator, Foster suggests that his work must satisfy three criteria: 1. it must deal with concrete problems rather than theory, 2. the information obtained from field studies must be written in an easily digestible form that the administrator can quickly understand ("with a minimum of sociological jargon"), 3. information must be passed promptly to the administrator, with due regard for the time

¹⁰ George M. Foster, *Traditional Cultures: The Impact of Technological Change* (N.Y.: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 242.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

constraints and deadlines which face him. On the other hand, the administrator must be sensitive to the value system of the social scientist and attempt to accommodate these values as far as possible.

Value Conflict in Development Progra

There are many actors in the development process, and it is clear from an examination of numerous case studies that value differences can impede development programs at several different stages and levels. Taking an extreme case, in which the actors never have direct contact with one another, the United States Congress may pass resolutions concerning cooperatives or family planning in L.D.C.s which imply values different from those held by the client groups in countries where A.I.D. has programs. Similarly, the values of foreign project advisors often come into conflict with the values of local counterparts or with the client group. Obviously, there are many combinations of actor-actor relationships where value differences can occur. In order to catalogue all the possible combinations, the matrix in Figure 1 has been developed, based on the assumption that there are seven potential actor groups in the development process. The total matrix assumes a potential foreign donor component to development programs, and therefore includes three actor groups on the "donor" side: project staff (advisors, technicians), development administrators (bureaucrats), and politicians. On the host country ("recipient") side there are four main actor groups: politicians, development administrators, local project staff, and client groups. The 28 boxes of the matrix indicate all potential two-actor combinations in which value differences may arise, as well as the potential for value conflict *within* each of the seven actor groups. This latter aspect is important when actor groups are non-homogeneous, such as when client groups are culturally heterogeneous, or when donor project staffs are multi-national (e.g. United Nations teams).

If there is no foreign aid component to the development program, then potential value differences are reduced to boxes 19 to 28 inclusive. Case studies of domestic community development programs appear in this quadrant of the matrix.

(Figure 1)

**MATRIX OF POTENTIAL VALUE CONFLICT
IN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS**

		"DONOR"			"RECIPIENT"			
		D.A. (D)	P.S. (D)	P (D)	D.A. (R)	P.S. (R)	P (R)	C.G.
D O N O R	Development Administrators (D)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	Project Staff (D)		8	9	10	11	12	13
	Politicians (D)			14	15	16	17	18
R E C I P I E N T	Development Administrators (R)				19	20	21	22
	Project Staff (R)					23	24	25
	Politicians (R)						26	27
	Client Group							28

Thus, when analyzing development program problems for underlying value differences, it is important to bear in mind *all* the potential conflict relationships between actor groups, and not simply assume that value differences only arise between foreign and host country development administrators, or between project staffs and client groups. In fact, host country development administrators trained in the West are likely to absorb many Western values in the process, thus making it less likely that value conflict will occur between themselves and donor administrators, and more likely that value differences will occur between themselves and client groups in their own

culture. In addition, very few countries are culturally and racially homogenous, which raises the important possibility of value differences within major actor categories such as client groups. Events in Pakistan and Malaysia, which have severely disrupted the development process in these countries, underscore the importance of potential value clashes within these groups.

A Typology of Value Conflicts

Value differences among actor groups, affecting the outcome of development programs, can be categorized as follows:

1. Value differences affecting *goals*
2. Value differences affecting *means*
3. Value differences affecting *relationships*

For example, value differences may lead foreign and host-country development administrators to have different goals for programs of rural development. A case of this kind involving U.S. and Thai administrators has been described by Ronald C. Nairn, who gives the American position on rural development in Thailand as follows:

*"A view expressed by the USOM Community Development Office was that the only objective of a community development program was to promote the growth of autonomous and self-governing institutions at the village level as precursors to the development of democracy with a peasant base."*¹²

It is not surprising that these program goals would reflect American democratic political values. However, Thais do not necessarily share these same political values, and any differences could give Thais quite a different view of the goals of this rural development program:

*"While the politically minded Westerner may see in rural development schemes generally a means for promoting democracy, it seems that the Thai elite saw something quite different. Amelioration of peasant problems was a means for preserving the status quo."*¹³

This does not mean that programs are necessarily frustrated when actors differ over ends. As Charles Lindblom has pointed out in his *The Science of Muddling Through*, people with differing values and objectives can often agree on a single program, since programs generally have multiple effects. Thus, a new dam may be supported by those who favour increased government spending on infrastructure to stimulate industrial development, by those who favour increased irrigation assistance to farmers, by those whose region will benefit from the dam, and by those downstream who will benefit from flood protection. All may support the same program for different reasons, even though they hold differing values and goals. Similarly, a rural development program may

¹² Ronald C. Nairn, *International Aid to Thailand: The New Colonialism?* (Yale Press: New Haven, 1966), p. 100.

¹³ *Ibid.*

raise the standard of living and increase the loyalty and security of the client group simultaneously. On the other hand, while there may be several non-conflicting ends to a single program, execution of the program is usually by a single *means* which has to be chosen from a set of mutually exclusive alternatives. Thus, the opportunity for value conflict over means is much more likely to undermine a development program than conflict over ends, which need not be mutually exclusive.¹⁴

Problems involving means to achieve agreed program goals are common in development programs. For instance, many of the case studies collected over the years refer to situations in which the innovations such as roads, inoculations, wells, irrigation etc. met the felt needs of the client group, yet failed to succeed because the method of implementation conflicted with client-group values. Thus, there are many projects where the introduction of village wells failed because the social hierarchy of the village was not respected in pre-project consultations, or because wells were placed in "efficient" locations that ignored prevailing social values. The case of the new Teaching Hospital in Malaysia referred to earlier is a similar example of the *means* of goal implementation running afoul of client group values. In this case, the western values of orderliness and efficiency conflicted with client values concerning responsibility to the sick.

The third type of problem resulting from value differences involves relationships (interpersonal and interinstitutional) and communication. Thus, actors may agree on project ends and on the means of implementation, yet the project may still falter or fail because of the breakdown of crucial interpersonal or interinstitutional relationships. Typically, the breakdown of interpersonal relationships arises among members of project staffs: foreign technicians and their counterparts. Ronald C. Nairn had illustrated this problem in the following passage which describes relationships between foreign U.N. experts and Thai counterparts in a UNESCO project:

*"The factors mentioned by the counterparts as most irritating and disruptive to the general transference (were): the experts' manner seemed rude and overbearing ... the expert condescended to the Thai...the expert knew nothing about the Thai and would not learn...the expert never listened to the Thai about anything."*¹⁵

In the "polite society" of Thai culture, foreigners often appear blunt aggressive and offensive even though their behaviour may be quite normal by Western value standards. Thus, foreign advisors may easily offend his counterparts unwittingly; and given the Thai stress on personal relationships rather than organizational outputs, project outcomes can easily be seriously affected by such cultural value differences.

A case known personally to the author illustrates the point. A team of foreign experts at a new university in Thailand were assigned to advise the university in the development of two new faculties. But after two years, many of the foreign experts were discouraged by the seeming

¹⁴ See John D. Montgomery, *The Politics of Foreign Aid* (N.Y. : Praeger, 1962), Chapter ,Iii, p. 105.

¹⁵ Nairn, *op.cit.*, p. 88.

lack of responsiveness of their Thai counterparts to major suggestions for institutional improvement. One of the experts summed up his disappointing two years with the statement: "the Thais are just not cooperative". But an interview with a U.S.-trained Thai counterpart brought forth the real reasons for the project's problems: "The foreign experts have thoroughly offended their Thai colleagues. First of all, they complained upon arrival about their housing, which had been built especially for them, and which was better than Thai professors had. Secondly, they have refused to invite Thai colleagues to their homes. Finally, they criticized an expenditure for flags and uniforms for the students when we were preparing for an official visit by the King, saying that the money could be better spent on other things. The reaction of the Thai staff to these insults was to refuse to cooperate with the suggestions of the advisors, while continuing to be polite and friendly as custom requires. We can wait—we will still be here after they have gone." In short, the foreign advisors were completely unaware of the true nature of the problem, and of the clash of values that had taken place. They were simply exasperated by the outward politeness, yet "unresponsiveness" of the Thais.

This is a classic case of value differences disrupting a project, and illustrates the difficulty that foreign actors often experience in Asia in obtaining verbal "feedback" from counterparts and client groups. In cultures where polite social intercourse and "face" are important, "feedback" on interpersonal relationships is often more subtle and more non-verbal than the Westerner is accustomed to; too easily he can be deceived into believing that friendly relations exist, when in fact a breakdown of trust and respect may be undermining the project. Similarly, counterparts may be deeply offended when in fact no offense is intended or recognized by the Westerner.

Institutional politics and communications problems are closely related matters affecting relationships between actors in the development process. Cases involving institutional politics in Viet Nam have been amply documented John D. Montgomery in his *The Politics of Foreign Aid*, while the importance of communications problems are highlighted in this passage from a joint USOM-Thai evaluation report on the Accelerated Rural Development Program:

"Three major areas of communication which need to be analyzed and improved are as follows:

1. *Communication between Thai and USOM staff.*
2. *Communications among Thai Government officials.*
3. *Communications between Thai officials and the villagers."*¹⁶

As the report points out, each of these three areas has its special problems. As far as the first is concerned, "the USOM staff and the Thai have different languages, different social values and cultures. These differences heighten communications problems." Communications problems between officials and villagers are often even more disruptive to projects, as in this case:

"Since most of the government officials and the villagers have different educational and socio-cultural backgrounds, these factors unless fully recognized can hinder effective

¹⁶ USOM/BANGKOK, "Evaluation Report: Second Joint Thai-USOM Evaluation of the Accelerated Rural Development Program", Bangkok, July 1966, p. 96.

*communications. Furthermore, in traditional Thai administrative behaviour, communication between these two groups is usually a one-way downward process. Both sides fail to really communicate."*¹⁷

In conclusion, then, we can state that the breakdown of interpersonal relationships and effective communications can arise from value differences between actors, and can effectively hinder the successful implementation of development programs.

We have outlined three types of value-difference manifestations: problems with goals, problems with means, and problems with relationships. Within each box of the matrix in Figure 1 (i.e. within each set of relationships) all three of these problem types may occur. Thus, value differences between the host-country project staff and the client group (box 25) may manifest themselves in problems concerning goals, means or relationships. Therefore, when value differences are suspected as the cause of problems within development programs, each set of bilateral relationships between actor groups can be examined to determine *where* the clash is occurring. Once this is established, it can be determined whether the problems relate to goals, means or relationships. But the social scientist will want to move beyond this point to identify exactly *what values* have created the difficulties for the program, and to determine how to resolve the difficulties themselves. Thus, we will wish to establish a list of values that will be relevant to the dynamics of planning and implementing development programs.

Perhaps the broadest approach to this key question has been formulated by Lasswell and Holmberg who have suggested eight main categories of values that span the entire social science spectrum. These values include:

1. Power
2. Enlightenment
3. Wealth
4. Well-being
5. Skill
6. Affection
7. Respect
8. Rectitude

If we accept this categorization as a useful one within the context of the development process, we can create a second matrix (Figure 2) which exhibits the eight values along one axis and the three types of value conflict along the other. This matrix then allows us to analyze and classify problems in development administration arising from value differences between actors. Let us take as an example the case of the foreign experts at the Thai university, referred to earlier.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

It was evident to most observers that the project was in trouble, and the application of the three-stage methodology outlined in the preceding pages, would have led evaluators to the following diagnosis:

1. Between which actor groups have problem-creating value differences occurred?

Answer: Between the foreign project staff and their counterparts (Box II of the matrix).

2. What types of value conflict exist?

Answer: Relationships (interpersonal).

3. What values are involved?

Answer: Affection, respect, rectitude (the King being a semi-religious figure).

Of course, the case could be further analyzed to determine the cultural and social context of

(Figure2)

MATRIX OF VALUES AND CONFLICT

	TYPES		
	Goals	Strategies	Relationships
Power			
Enlightenment			
Wealth			
Well-being			
Skill			
Affection			
Respect			
Rectitude			

the value differences in the case of both actor groups. This more detailed analysis would lead to a thorough understanding of the nature of the problem, and perhaps offer clues as to how the problem might be solved, given the relative values of each group.

Finding Solutions to Value-Difference Problems

The preceding discussion has been based on the premise that problems must be recognized and diagnosed before they can be solved. Thus, a methodology for examining project problems has been offered and a framework for classification proposed. However, the main problem still remains: how are the problems to be resolved in a systematic way? In the Thai University case discussed above, the problem was never correctly diagnosed by the foreign experts or by the development administrators in Bangkok, so there could be no planned solution to the problems plaguing the project. Had the problem been diagnosed correctly, the next step would have been to determine an appropriate prescription for solving the difficulties. The final step would require acceptance of the prescription by the people involved. In the case under discussion, the project might have been revitalized via appropriate sensitization of the two actor groups to each other's value system, and by apologies and behaviour adjustments by the experts. However, the challenge of establishing a standard methodology for dealing with value-difference problems once they have been recognized by development administrators, remains to be taken up by concerned social scientists and development practitioners-remembering that the value gap between academicians and administrators must also be bridged if the research is to be crowned by implementation and practical success.

Moreover, what we have already learned through twenty years of patient study by social scientists needs to be integrated into the actual practice of development administration. Development planning, especially at the macro level, still too often assumes that the client group belongs to that mythical cultural species, "Homo economicus"; and questions of value differences, and the project impact on social, cultural and political values are seen as peripheral rather than central to development planning. In a single program or project, such assumptions may not lead to immediate discernible diseconomies. But impact tends to be cumulative, thus leading to large scale "systems failure", such as the massive social disruptions witnessed in Nigeria, Pakistan and Malaysia in recent years. Do such apparent massive failures of the development planning process reflect the acceptance by L.D.C.s of the compartmentalization of the social sciences and of the status hierarchy of the social sciences in the West? Are communications problems within the social sciences being built into the institutions of development planning and implementation?

Have we really emerged from the "one-way" view of technical assistance which characterized the Point Four period, and moved on to a new period of partnership and cooperation in international development; or do the case studies of current programs indicate that we may only have emerged in spirit but not in practice? How successful have we been at building institutions that allow for the joint recognition and solution of value-difference problems? How are the "felt needs" of client groups to be integrated institutionally into the planning and implementation process, what institutional forms are required? What training programs exist for making key actors

aware of value differences between themselves and other actors; what improvements and extensions are required? How do institutionalized values restrict unduly the alternatives considered by development planners and technicians in the decision-making process; how can sub-optimizing restrictions be overcome?

These are all questions which need to be examined in depth and answered squarely if the role of value differences in the dynamics of the development process is to be understood, and if the great cooperative venture of international development is to really benefit those to whom it is directed.
