WITHOUT PASSION OR ENTHUSIASM: THE PROBLEM OF ADMINISTRATIVE COMPASSION*

by **Victor A. Thompson****

I. The Problem Defined

> Mary Brown didn't mind that her husband, Laurence, an Air Force sergeant, was being sent to Vietnam. Only she wanted to be with him. To that end, the Air Force nurse, a lieutenant, extended her service for 15 months with, she claims, a promise they would serve at the same base. On Friday the Danvers (Mass.) couple said he got orders for Phan Rang. She's assigned to Ton Son Nhut, 160 miles away. "I feel I was deliberately deceived to make me re-enlist," she said. 1

Outside of the human interest aspect of this story, it raises a fundamental question about organizations: Can an institution make personal promises? Stories such as this abound. They make good newspaper copy. Every individual sympathizes with the couple; the story reinforces his low evaluation of bureaucracy, possibly paralleling an experience of his own.

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1 *Chicago Sun Times*, January 10, 1971, p. 46,

This kind of story stimulated the most widely distributed and deeply held sociological theory of bureaucracy, the notion that bureaucrats invest the means of administration with more value than the ends--the "inversion of means and ends", or "the displacement of goals". In fact, a leading book on organization comes close to stating that this proposition *is* the sociological theory of bureaucracy. [2] Administration has been defined as the triumph of technique over purpose.

Although the proposition antedates Robert Merton's famous essay on "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality", published in 1940, he, too, uses such as story to launch his discussion of the inversion of means and ends. [3] He quotes a story from the Chicago Tribune concerning Bernt Balchen, Admiral Byrd's pilot in the flight over the South Pole.

> According to a ruling of the department of labor, Bernt Balchen... cannot receive his citizenship papers. Balchen, a native of Norway, declared his intention in 1927. It is held that he has failed to meet the condition of five years' continuous residence in the United States. The Byrd antartic voyage took him out of the country, although he was on a ship carrying the American flag, was an invaluable member of an American expedition, and in a region to which there is an American claim because of the exploration and occupation of it by Americans, this region being Little America.
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> The bureau of naturalization explains that it cannot proceed on the assumption that Little America is American soil. That would be *trespass on international questions* where it has no sanction. So far as the bureau is concerned, Balchen was out of the country and technically has not complied with the law of naturalization.[4]

In this case, the special circumstances of Bernt Balchen were not recognized. He was treated universalistically as one instance of a special problem category, not as a unique individual. If I had been making these decisions, I am sure I would have given Mr. Balchen his citizenship and sent the nurse to live with her husband. I suspect that I would have reacted to the unique and personal aspects of these cases. But can modern organization respond in that way?[5]

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[2] James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1958), pp. 36 ff.

[3] *Social Forces* 17 (1940), pp. 560–568; also in Robert K. Merton, *et.al*, eds, *Reader in Bureaucracy* (Glencoe,Illinois: The Free Press, 1952), pp. 361–371.

[4] *Chicago Tribune*, June 24, 1931, p. 10; and in Merton, et. al., eds., ibid., p. 366.

[5] As it happened, Mr. Balchen got his citizenship eventually and had a successful career in the American Air Force. When he retired, he told the press that Admiral Byrd, the hero who first flew over the South Pole, had lied when he announced his flight over the pole, Thus, time puts a different perspective on all things,

A few years ago I read a short item that captured the essence of this problem in a Gary, Indiana newspaper. A state trooper had stopped a car that was driving down a country road at night without lights and weaving slowly back and forth across the road. The driver had no license. A woman was in the passenger side of the front seat. A man and a woman occupied the back seat. They were taken in and a ticket issued and bond posted. Very simple. There was more information, however, which was irrelevant to the administrative problem and its disposition. A police reporter wrote up the whole case, including the additional, but administratively irrelevant, information. It seems the man driving the car had been blind from birth and had never experienced the feeling of driving a car. His wife and some friends decided to take him out on a quiet moonlit night on a quiet stretch of road and let him drive for a few minutes. The lights were not on because he did not need them. Of course, he had no driver's license. The car was weaving for obvious reasons. But all of these facts were irrelevant to the problem category that he represented to the police. Once this category had been established, the associated routines rolled out of the mill as inevitably as time. [6] Could it have been different? Could the local police organization have acted compassionately? That is the question I set out to answer in this article.

Stories like the above are commonplace. They make good copy. Most people can identify with the client in such cases because most people have acquired certain emotional habits and needs by being brought up in the small group security of the nuclear family. They want to be treated as special cases. They want someone to "really care". They do not want to be just problem categories. They want compassion.

Many of the frustrations of individuals when dealing with the large organization arise from the scope of the particular problem or transaction they attempt to negotiate. The typical problem or transaction of an organization is too large for effective handling by an individual, given the current technology (e.g., making an automobile). Otherwise, it would be very difficult to explain the existence of organizations. Furthermore, given this broad scope, the range of persons interested in the outcome of the transaction is normally much broader than the individual client, and these broader interests usually have some kind of organizational representation, governmental or private. The effects of this situation on the gratifications or frustrations of the individual client, and the individual organization employee, have been clearly stated elsewhere.

> Administrative action in the modern world is impersonal and institutional. It is not the product of one person's mind or heart. It reflects the concerns of all legitimate interests in the appropriate administrative constituency. Elaborate horizontal clearances and coordinating procedures assure this broad scanning of proposals before action. Furthermore, administrative action is expected to be (and usually is) objective, impersonal, unsentimental, occasioned by universalistic

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[6] On categorization as a characteristic quality of modern organization, and its relation to routinization, see Victor A. Thompson, *Modern Organization* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1961), pp. 17-18.

criteria rather than particularistic personal appeals or sympathies. To protect against charges of subjectivity or personal favoritism, considerable documentation is collected before any action is taken. All of this preparation takes time and frequently leads to charges of bureaucratic red tape.

This impersonal, objective, institutional approach to action, while demanded by the norms of an industrial society, is somewhat at war with basic sociopsychological needs of individuals, most of whom have been socialized in primary groups where personal loyalty and action are stressed. Clienteles press for particularistic treatment, and many are tempted to use primary relations with officials to secure it. Reciprocally, officials may be tempted to appropriate authority to their personal use so that such particularistic requests can be granted (or denied). The desire for money side-payments need not be behind this conversion of institutional power to personal use. In fact, in the modern age it is probably more likely to be the understandable human need to be rewarded with gratitude or admiration.

Consequently, administrative assurances are sometimes given which cannot subsequently be redeemed. They cannot be passed through the impersonal, objective, institutionalized decision-making process of the bureaucracy. Generally speaking, if an individual administrative official has the personal power to grant or withhold favors, he has managed to appropriate administrative power to his personal use. One of the hardest lessons modern industrialized man has had to learn is neither to demand nor to promise special favors.[7]

Often, however, the problem presented or transaction attempted by the individual client is too small for the organization and is left to an individual functionary--e.g., to give an appropriate explanation of an event, to write an appropriate letter, to carry out a simple restitutive routine (e.g., exchange the returned item for another from stock), or to initiate an appropriate and simple automatic routine of the organization (e.g., a credit for a return). Out of these small scope problem situations some of the most frustrating client experiences develop. The employee may misunderstand the nature of the problem, either due to poor communication on the part of the client, or, on the part of the functionary, low understanding capacity (being "not very bright"), inadequate rehearsal of organization routines because of newness in the role, or unfortunate attitudinal postures of indifference or even hostil ty (e.g., like that arising from racial prejudice or a client gesture interpreted as threatening).

A colleague experienced a typical case of this kind. Upon moving in to a new house, he had gotten an estimate from an electrical company for the cost of attaching some electrical

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[7] Victor A. Thompson, "Bureaucracy in a Democratic Society", in Roscoe C. Martin, ed., *Public Administration and Democcy: Essays in Honor of Paul H. Appleby* (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1965,) pp. 205–226.

appliances. When the bill came, it was more than the estimate. He refused to pay it. Several letters and telephone calls (and months) later, he received a check for the difference between the estimate and the bill (which he had not paid). He then decided that the simplest thing would be to pay the inflated bill. His work took him to many underdeveloped countries where experiences of this kind are common. As he said, "I decided that if they wanted to do it the hard way, it was alright with me." He regarded the whole situation as comic rather than infuriating and frustrating. By virtue of his travels, he was accustomed to it.

Another colleague tells of recently trying to pay a motel bill somewhere in the West. The female counter clerk asked him for his credit cards. He said he did not use them; he would pay cash. She had no instructions covering this situation and had to call her supervisor, but not before he had given her a short lecture on the theory of money. He was an economist.

Mass industrial society poses many challenges to individuals. The resulting malaise is too complex to be easily understood, but one has to be deaf not to hear the cry for compassionate treatment, as witness the phenomenal growth of "hotlines" --telephone numbers for troubled individuals to call to get friendly help on problems from lost dogs to drugs to suicide. Long ago it was speculated that perhaps at the bottom of much industrial conflict was an alienated, lonesome, frightened, insecure workman who wanted his company to respond to him warmly and personally. He could not strike for love; so he sublimated his need into a demand for better wages and hours through his union.

If this depiction of the industrial worker has some merit, how many more persons must be in this fix today. Not just industrial laborers, but white collar functionaries, students, clients of large government agencies, customers of the giant private companies--all of us at times receive and hate the dehumanizing, stripping treatment dealt out by mass administration, from having our identity turned into a number (usually the social security number) to having our brief cases searched when we leave the library. Party of the program of current activism is aimed at this dehumanization. Activists harangue the students: "They don't care about you".

Suggestions of all kinds, such as academic proposals for a "new political science", or a "new public administration", are stimulated in part by a strong need to bring compassion into our affairs. Someone has to care.[8] Internation dealing will often turn on popular evaluation of the compassion in the arrangements. States are personified in the persons of their leaders and abstract reality rendered in this way intimate, personal, understandable, compassionate. Media evaluation of events is largely of this kind, the important question being the motives of the actors, their kindness, honesty, altruism, sincerity, compassion. A good example is a late 1971

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[8] See Frank Marini, ed., *Toward a New Public Administration* (Scranton, Pennsylvania: Chandler Publishing Company, 1971); and Marvin Surlsin and Alan Wolfe, eds., *An End to Political Science: The Caucus Papers* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1970).

column about President Nixon ("Unpredictable Nixon") by James Reston which he ended in this way: "And this is where we are at the beginning of the new year-- or so it seems here --alive, but confused and divided. And the paradox of it is that the new year is a presidential election year, and the central issue of the election may very well be between the men who are clever and the men who can be trusted." Counter-culture religions are proliferating to cater to the needs of mostly young people seeking identity and companionship in an impersonal world. Such religions are often substitutes for the more extreme adaptations of drugs--in fact, they are often cures.

Rightly or wrongly, industrial societies increasingly channel the energies of their members through large, purposive, rationalized, organizations which we have come to call bureaucracies. Not only productive or economic energies but much expressive energy is likewise so channelled, as in organized religion, organized sports, administered vacations, highly regulated parks and forests and campsites, and in many other areas of life. For many students, modernity is equated with organizations. Modern society has been called the *Organizational Society;* modern man *The Organization Man.*[9]

[9] Robert V. Presthus, *The Organizational Society* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1962); and William H. Whyte, Jr., *The Organization Man* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1957).

II. The Nature of Modern Organizations

Can modern organizations be compassionate? Can they "care"? Can organizations be depicted as good or bad, kind or cruel? From everything we know about modern organizations, the answer has to be "No!". In this essay I want to explore briefly why the answer has to be "No!", why the need for compassion persists, and what kinds of adaptations or solutions to this serious impasse have occurred or been suggested. If I succeed in clarifying the situation, perhaps more human ingenuity will be spent in seeking imaginative solutions and less in empty rhetoric and despairing cries of anguish.

There are two sides to the problem. On the one is the organization and its nature; on the other is the individual person and his needs. Let me discuss the nature of the organization first. The key to both the number and nature of modern organizations is specialization, or "differentiation" as the sociologists say. Even as individuals specialize in function or occupation to survive competitively in the face of explosively increasing knowledge and technique, organizations specialize or differentiate to channel these specialized skills to meet specialized needs of specialized customers, clients, or interested groups. Fewer and fewer needs can be met by individual efforts, creating the need for more and more organizations. [1]

Increasingly, these organizations are staffed by specialists. Specialists deal with *categories* of problems, not with human beings. They deal with one kind of problem of very many people rather than many kinds of problems of very few people. Specialists are psychologically unable to become personally and deeply involved with all of these people. Furthermore, only a small amount of information about the customer, or client, or colleague is relevant to solution of the specialized problem. The client becomes a problem category, not a historical person--he becomes an applicant for welfare, a speeder case, a cardiac, etc. He is not a person in this transaction. The transaction is impersonal, and this fact actually facilitates the expert solution of his problem. Interpersonal emotions do not interfere with the instrumental application of the specialist's expertise. "He who is his own lawyer has a fool for a client", as the lawyers say. But the client pays in the absence of compassion--he is not important just because he is he; his treatment is contingent. Payment of the fee is only one of the contingencies. His unique individuality, which is his identity, is ignored. [2]

In past times, with low mobility and very stable social relations, it was not always easy to separate the person from what he did day in and day out. The distinction between person and role was difficult to make. People became what they did and many modern names have come down to us from this period--Mason, Smith, Carpenter, Schumaker, etc.

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[1] See Victor A. Thompson, *Modern Organization* and "Bureaucracy in a Democratic Society", In Roscoe Martin, ed., *Public Administration and Democracy: Essays in Honor of Paul Appleby*, pp. 205–226; see also Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society*, translated by George Simpson (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1933).

[2] See Victor A. Thompson, *Modern Organization*, Chapters 2 and 8.

An enormous increase in mobility, first geographic, then social, and finally psychological, has made the distinction between person and role easier for us to make. People can choose roles like they choose merchandise. As Max Weber said, one of the criteria of modern organization ("bureaucracy") was the separation of person from office of personal rights from public rights, of person from role. [3] With this modern discriminatory skill, it becomes possible to think of fashioning or designing organizations for achieving specific purposes just the same as designing a physical tool or instrument for achieving a certain purpose. Recognizing the organization as a designed tool or instrument adds several dimensions to our problem of administrative compassion.

There are at least two basic roles in tool construction. [4] There is, of course, the *designer*, an engineer with knowledge of the means to the accomplishment of various ends of other people. There is, too, his client, the "person" who has a need for which a tool must be constructed. Let us call this role that of the "owner". The values which the tool is designed to achieve are "his". (I use quotes to indicate that these terms are usually personifications of much more abstract social entities.)

An organization-tool uses people rather than inanimate things like motors, cogs, and belts. People have values, goals, preference orderings, just like "owners" do. These values must be neutralized or what is finally designed will be anything but a tool; whatever it might be would pull and haul in all directions, and its "accomplishments" would only be predictable, if at all, by systems analysis. It would have *outcomes* rather than *outputs*.

To avoid this result, to actually construct an organization-tool, an additional role is needed--that of *functionary*. A functinary does his duty, applies his skill, performs his practiced routines, regardless of what goal or whose goal is involved. [5] A screwdriver does not choose between goals, and it does not choose between owners. It does what it is "told". To induce

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[3] Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, translated by A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1947); see also Daniel Lerner, "Toward a Communication Theory of Modernization", in Lucian W. Pye, ed., *Communications and Political Development* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 327--350, and *The Passing of Traditional Society* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1958).

[4] The analysis of organizations as both tools and natural systems, used throughout this book, is from Victor A. Thompson, "Systemic Limitations on Organizational Design", in a symposium collection edited by Martin Landau, and to be published by Duke University Press, Durham, North Carolina, some time in 1972, under the title, *Organization Theory and Comparative Analysis*.

[5] See F. William Howton, *Functionaries* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, Inc., 1969); also Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1936), pp. 105–106. There is another role, always implied in decision-making situations. Instrumental decisions are based on "true" knowledge; other kinds are bets or neurotic. Therefore, a role of objective observer is always implied in tool or system construction. It will be discussed below.

individual persons to enter or perform the functionary role, designers and owners enter into an exchange contract with them, the employment contract. In return for sufficient values, such as salaries, prestige, power , and a chance at increasing one or more of these, the employee gives up his own values or uses for the organization in deference to those of the "owner", thereby leaving a single, consistent, ordering of values by virtue of which all behavior of functionaries can be coordinated and the relative success or failure of the organization-tool assessed. In public organizations we often use the term "servant" instead of or in addition to "functionary". The "owner" of the public organization in the modern period is, of course, "the people" (it used to be a feudal king).

As I indicated above, the test of the organization-tool, the criterion by which it is judged, kept, abolished, or modified, is external to the organization; it is the goal or preference ordering of the "owner". There is no room for another test, such as the need of employees for "joy in work", *or the need of clients for compassion*. We do not build tools to fight with themselves, to undo what they do. The goal of a public welfare organization, for example, is the goal of the public for recipients of welfare; it is not the needs of welfare recipients.

To recognize compassion in administration is to recognize another claim; it is to "steal" the "owner's" property. Today it is likely that such "theft" exists on a fairly large scale as employees highly identified with "the poor" interpret their role to be that of agents of "the poor' within the welfare organization. They interpret their obligation to be to the client rather than the "owner", and they get all the money (or other goods) they possibly can for the client regardless of the plans and intentions (regulations) of the "owners". The extent of this kind of behavior has not been measured but it has probably contributed to the astronomical rise in welfare costs. [6] Other interest groups have long tried and often successfully to get *their* "agents" strategically located in bureaucratic organizations so that they could appropriate the "owner's " values.

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[6] Health, Education and Welfare Department officials are just beginning to admit the extent that "cheating" is taking place in welfare programs, having just recently raised the old figure of "not more than 1%" to 5.4%.

The Florida state welfare agency, in a self review, found about 8% of illegal welfare recipients. (Florida Times-Union, 1 (9/72, p. A–19.) The obvious interest of the administrative agency in keeping the figures as small as possible creates a suspicion that they may be somewhat higher. It is interesting that the state agency asked for a 73% increase in its budget for FY 1973. *Ibid.*, 1/11/72, p. B–11.

A related phenomena is the apparently increasing tendency for lower level officials to try to dictate policy by mass confrontation with superiors or by committing illegal acts such as giving secret policy documents to a hostile newspaper or newspaperman. As James Reston said of the leaking of classified national security documents to columnist Jack Anderson and publication of them by him, the practice represents "defiant disclosures of the *true facts* by officials who have lost faith in the judgment and truthfulness of their superiors." *Florida Times-Union*, 1/9/72, p. A–20. My italics. This unconscious disclosure of a vicious bias is classic.

A recent meeting of young teachers of public administration defined a "New Public Administration". [7] Employees (officials, functionaries) are to use their special resources to take from those who have money and power and give to those who have not, regardless of the goals of the "owner", like a company of modern Robin Hoods. The "New Public Administration" is a call for equality by means of "theft" and "subversion" on the principle of that ageless fallacy, the end justifies the means. [8]

It is true that if an administrative official could in some way appropriate various administrative resources (e.g., money, cover, authority) to his own use, he could then use them as he personally wanted, within the remaining organizational limits that he could not control. He could even use such appropriated resources to afford compassionate treatment if he so wanted. Such a use of personally appropriated resources would almost certainly be selective--or as social scientists say, particularistic rather than universalistic. Probably no one is indifferent as between the members of any possible pair of people. Our lucky administrator, who had appropriated resources so that he could grant or deny favors, say yes or no at will, would undoubtedly bestow his favors (compassion) according to whom the would-be beneficiary was, rather than solely according to the merits of the claim. Some would bestow the favor only for a monetary price ("corruption", in the modern world). It is difficult to see how sane persons could seriously advocate the personal appropriation of administrative resources by administrators as a solution to the problem of compassion. [9]

Such theft of resources nevertheless takes place, though in less obvious ways than in the pre-industrial past or in the underdeveloped countries. In the past, [10] office frequently became private property, to buy, sell, or inherit. In the past it was a frequent device to have the expenses of an office, including the office-holder's salary, financed from his fees or other collections from clients ("prebendary financing"). We still find this pattern in some local government areas in this country--e.g., some justice of the peace jurisdictions. In the past, and in most underdeveloped countries, it was and is customary for office holders to use their resources in such a way as to give

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[7] Frank Marini, ed., *op.cit.*

[8] I mildly apologize to the academic practitioners of the "new public administration" for such terms as "theft" and "subversion". They are to be understood in the context of the argument and as such are semi-metaphorical.

[9] This, I take it, is nevertheless the program of the new public administration. To Max Weber, modern, efficient, national administration only became possible when this practice was finally eliminated. *Ibid.*

[10] The following discussion depends heavily on Fred Riggs, "Agraria and Industria--Toward a Typology of Comparative Administration", in William J. Siffin, ed., *Toward the Comparative Study of Administration*, pp. 23–116; and his *Administration in Developing Countries* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1964); and many other writings of the Comparative Administration Group, too numerous to mention.

preference to friends, kinsmen, and, later, fellow political party members. In some parts of the world today, it is customary to "purchase" favorable administrative action through the payment of "baksheesh", or, as we would say, "bribes" or "kickbacks". In many places (e.g., Mexico), it is customary to hire a professional intermediary to solicit preferential treatment for oneself, a person we would call a "5 per-center". [11]

While all these older forms of individual appropriation of administrative resources still exist in modern society to a certain extent, they conflict with modern administrative morality and so are considerably reduced. Newer or simply more subtle forms, however, have taken their place. Resources are unevenly distributed as symbols of rank or status--office size, furniture, rugs, parking places, company cars and drivers, etc. More important than the personal use of resources as symbols of rank and marks of deference is the effect of status rank on the distribution of influence, on the flow of information and communication, the initiation of ideas and suggestions, the correction of errors. Highly positioned individuals acquire personal power from the irrational distortions which arise from status rank. Within some limits they can make arbitrary exceptions in the application of organization routines or changes therein. They can, therefore, dispense some personal (compassionate) treatment. Control systems in organizations have never been perfectly efficient; they leave some leeway, some elbow room, to juggle budgets, manipulate reports and budget requests, edit information to higher authority. [12] To recognize administrative discretion, however, is a far cry from advocating the personal appropriation of administrative resources as a device for solving the problems of inequality, poverty, or any other problem.

The organization-tool is a consciously adopted design for goal accomplishment. It is a system in that all parts are related to all others by reference to their presumed relevance to a single goal set, in the same fashion as an automobile is a system. It is an artifically contrived system. As such, it is one-hundred per cent prescription. It is a system of roles and rules. It does not describe behavior; it prescribes it. Although it has and must have motivational elements in it, they are encased in a prescriptive plan, carried out by functionaries acting according to rules and roles in a very roundabout fashion. The rewards and penalties of the motivational plan are not direct; they are administered--i.e., mediated by functionaries. In the artificial system, *all* relationships are impersonal and abstract. There is not only no compassion; there is no way that compassion can be included. Compassion cannot be prescribed. A designed role of " administrator of compassion" is ludicrous.

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[11] For a good demonstration of the applicability of the Riggs model to a transitional society, see Martin Harry Greenberg, *Bureaucracy and Development : A Mexican Case Study* (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Co., 1970). Among other characters, the "intermediary", or "five per-center", is well described.

[12] See Herbert A. Simon, Donald W. Smithburg, and Victor A. Thompson, *Public Administration* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1950), chapters 13 and 14; Victor A. Thompson, *The Regulatory Process in OPA Rationing* ,(New York: Kings Crown Press, 1950), *passim.*, and Victor A. Thompson, *Bureaucracy and Innovation* (University City, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1969), chapter 4,

Theoretically, compassionate employees could be selected. However, competence to achieve the "owner's" goal will seem more important, and in the likely case of conflict between goal and compassion, only one choice is possible; compassion must go unless it indeed *is* the goal. Again, the design may meet public relations needs by special training in compassion for people in boundary roles like counter clerk. But this is difficult to bring off. Synthetic compassion can be worse to sensitive clients than none at all. In the final analysis, compassion is an individual gift, not an organizational one. I will discuss this problem further below.

Organization-tools are different from others in that the materials of which they are composed are autonomous, goal-forming, creatures. They are human beings. As such, they have needs to preserve themselves, their values, and their self-images--they have survival needs. They also have the propensity to interact and thereby generate spontaneously roles and behavior norms and to enforce them informally upon one another. They have a strong tendency to become interlocked in an unplanned, spontaneous system. Being spontaneous, unplanned, and without a goal, let us call this system the *natural system* of the organization. Since this system arises without the roles of designer and owner, there is no external criterion to which it is beholden. Its only criterion is internal. This criterion is survival, the same as for all other natural systems.

The natural system of informal norms and roles grows up spontaneously to protect the survival needs of the incumbents of the functionary roles. Survival-endangering behavior, like competition, high individual production, and the rate and direction of change are informally brought under control to the extent possible. Endangering personal obligations like responsibility or risk are informally reduced or spread around in some way if this is possible. To accomplish their "missions", natural systems, if allowed to do so, reach equilibrium states and develop homeostatic processes to reduce deviating swings from these states and to restore them by counter swings if possible. The form of the process is much like the negative feedback of a thermostatically controlled heating system. Duplicating methods and capabilities develop informally to reduce the risk of failure with its associated threat to the individual. Strangely enough, many formally important organizational functions are performed in this unplanned, spontaneous system, such as innovation, structural flexibility, much of the motivating.

Natural systems do not have decision making organs, and hence cannot be studied by the methods of logical or policy analysis. They are studied by statistically controlled empirical observation. Because society is a natural system (a prime example of one, in fact), moral evaluations of a society, such as calling it "irrational", or "racist", etc., are either senseless or a form of poetic license. So, also , is the rather common practice of blaming society for various individual failures. Artificial systems like governments, however, *do* have decision making organs--legislatures, administrative agencies, constitutional conventions. Evaluative terms of various kinds, rational or moral, are properly applied to them. They act; they make choices. They have *outputs*, whereas natural systems--e.g., societies--have *outcomes*. To blame a natural system for anything makes no more sense than to blame nature, also a natural system, or a subsystem of nature such as gravity.

Natural systems are not established. They develop, given the appropriate conditions. The appropriate conditions seem to be occasions and time for stable interactions. Organizations whose technologies and products are stable undergo such natural systemic development that they become almost impervious to change. Schools are a good example of this process. [13] On the other hand, in organizations that use a dynamic and changing technology, the equilibria and homeostatic processes of natural systems are never fully-developed. Such organizations are much easier to change by their designers and "owners".

The natural system of an organization, because it develops in response to artificial system demands and responsibilities, becomes in time a unified system rather than a collection of small natural systems or groups. The artificial system is "monocratic"; it is unified by reference to the owner's goal (which may, of course, be a system or set of consistent goals). What unity the organizational natural system acquires depends upon its derivative nature. It derives from a unified artificial system.

This monograph is not the place for further discussion of natural systems development in organizations or the conditions which facilitate or retard this development. However, one point must be made. There is a potential conflict between the "owner's" interest and the natural system, between "cost-benefit analysis" of goal accomplishment and survival needs. This potential conflict raises *control* to the principal position in all artificial system processes. Control attempts to assure a reasonable meeting of the external criterion, the "owner's" goals. Meeting this test is one, and usually the principal, condition of survival of the natural system.

Whatever else a modern public (or private) organization is, therefore, it is a machine-like instrument or tool of an external power, an artificial system of prescribed roles and rules. It is not a person. It is not a parent or friend. It is an abstract system of interrelationships designed to achieve an externally defined goal. Roles are bundles of duties (and powers); they do not care; they do not have feelings. Whereas a particular incumbent of a role may care for a particular client (or customer, etc.), such is not part of the organizational plan. In fact, such a caring relation between the incumbent of a role in a modern organization and a client is regarded as unethical, as giving the client "pull", perhaps as "nepotism" or "favoritism".

We are proud of the fact that modern administration, compared with administration in the past, is relatively free of such "particularistic" behavior--that it is "universalistic", instead.[14] We are proud of the fact that modern administration gives jobs to people who *merit* them rather

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[13] See David Rogers, 110 *Livingston Street* (New York: Random House, 1968). On the conditions for natural system development see George Homans, *The Human Group* (New York: Harcourt Brace and World, Inc., 1950.)

[14] These terms were developed by Talcott Parsons and are now used in virtually all cross-cultural studies. See his *The Social System* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1951), pp. 58–67; and Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, eds., *Toward a General Theory of Action* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 77.

than people who *need* them. Departures from such impersonal (noncompassionate) performance is pounced upon by the media; the departures make good news stories precisely because they violate modern cannons of good administration. Why should a modern role incumbent care about a client? Who cares for *him*, other than his family and close friends? He, too, is caught up in an abstract, impersonal network, the artificial system, the organization-tool. [15]

Furthermore, constructing organizations of abstract, impersonal roles eliminates (not entirely) the relevance of the personal relations between role incumbents, whether they be love, hate, or indifference. The officially prescribed relationships exclude this aspect of interpersonal relations. Otherwise, each organization would be unique, like a family; very few of them would exist; and this country could support no more people than it did in 1492, namely, about 700,000. The exclusion of personal elements from prescribed role relations has made the modern organization possible and adequate to its logistical task of provisioning hundreds of millions of people. Full, affective communication between functionaries, the goal of many organization psychologists, would be disastrous.

Most people in underdeveloped countries cannot understand an abstract order; their relations are personal; their obligations are personal; they are unable to fashion organization-tools. That is why they are underdeveloped, economically and politically. [16] If they participate in politics, lacking organizations, their participation, obligations, and interests are personal--i.e., compassionate. There is no public interest. There is no "owner" of the public organization, the accomplishment of whose goal is the test of the public organization. Everyone gets all he can get. Compassion monopolizes administration.

Still the problem remains. Most people are brought up in a small intimate group--the nuclear family. Their earliest and most constant experiences involve emotional dependence and support, involve, that is, compassion. In a thousand ways, we come to need such treatment, to be treated as whole and unique individuals whose feelings are important. We do not experience ourselves as problem categories. We learn to expect incredible amounts of effort to be expended on our behalf, just because of our feelings. ("We forgot the Teddy Bear. We'll have to drive back [100 miles] and get it.") We do not want to have to justify ourselves, to live with contingency.

We are modern men and women. We believe in the principle of equality before the law, in "universalistic" norms of administration. In fact, however, we are ambivalent. We want administration to be universalistic (noncompassionate) in general, but why would a little exception

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[15] As Max Weber said, the modern functionary carries out his duties *sine ira et studio,* without passion or enthusiasm. *Op. cit.*

[16] See Lucian W. Pye, *Aspects of Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969), and SamuelP. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1968).

in our case hurt anything? The one exception would not even have a perceptible effect on public administration, but it would do a tremendous amount of good for me.

Our first experience with the large, abstract, impersonal organization can be no less than devastating. For many young people, this first experience is college. Yet how much worse it would be for a person brought up in the extended family or clan of traditional society! It is said that there once existed a tribe, in New Zealand, I believe, that punished serious infractions of social norms by treating the culprit as a non-person. Everyone acted as though he were not there--a sort of social banishment. People so treated, it is said, died in about three months on the average. [17]

Yes, the problem remains. The family has greatly shrunk, but it has not disappeared; nor is it easy to imagine an alternative to it which eliminates small group experiences completely.[18] The modern organization, by its nature, can offer only impersonal, categorized, non-compassionate treatment; but many individuals apparently still need personalized, individualized, compassionate treatment by the ever more ubiquitous organization. What are some of the adaptations which occur in attempting to resolve this impasse?

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[17] Although this report is widely circulated, I have not been able to find the source for it. However, the use of the "non-person" sanction by primitive peoples is well documented. See Lucien Levy-Bruhl, *Primitive Mentality*, translated by Lilian A. Clare (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), p. 280; also, Theodore R. Sarbin, "Role Theory", chapter 6 in Gardner Lindzey, *Handbook of Social Psychology*, Volume I (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., 1954), p. 235.

[18] In the Kibutz, small group emotional conditioning and socialization comes largely from peers, but it is still there. This form of childhood training seems to produce a more apathetic adult. Bruno Bettelheim, *Children of the Dream* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1969).

III. Solutions: Personnel Administration

Compassion can be thought of as special treatment, "stretching" the rules, premodern actions dispensed by the "rule of men", not the "rule of law". In the modern period such behavior is denigrated in such terms as "amicism" ("pull" from highly placed friends or relatives), nepotism, corruption (purchased compassion). From early in our history, faithful party service bought one compassion ("spoils"). While such behavior will continue as long as people have needs for compassionate, individualized treatment, it can hardly be suggested as a solution of our problem without a major change in modern administrative mores. What else, then?

An adaptation obvious enough to have occurred to nearly everyone is to staff administrative agencies with compassionate personnel. A characteristic phenomenon of the times is the appearance of organizations staffed by young idealists to aid those who feel they do not get satisfaction from the more established institutions of our society--clinics staffed by medical personnel who work for little (relatively) or nothing; store-front law firms similarly staffed who charge low (or even no) fees; even some governmental organizations appeared in the first blush of enthusiasm for this approach, such as legal aid under OEO, but the power redistribution implications of these were sooh recognized and they were put under harness or abolished.

The store-front, young idealist, approach is pathetically inadequate because there are not enough of such personnel to even make a beginning, and besides, those who go into this kind of work understandably stay only a short time, the powerful pull of a promise of large incomes soon wrestling the idealist conscience to uncomfortable silence, reinforced by the absence of gratitude. Those who will be benefactors must be prepared to be hated by those who are the objects of their good deeds--those whose inadequacies are so painfully pointed out.[1] The phenomenon is probably a passing fad, and, in any event, provides staff only for small anti-establishment establishments, not the giant bureaus where most of the decisions governing us are made.

An exception to the above is the nursing profession which both selects a large proportion of people who have strong needs to help others and provides a training which legitimizes and reinforces those needs. The hospital, therefore, probably comes the closest to a compassionate organization, a fact which in itself underlines the extent of the problem.[2]

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[1] Our foreign aid program has been beset by this difficulty for some time. Many Americans have expected gratitude and have been puzzled by the amount of foreign jubilation over our reverses. See the remarks by Paul Hoffman, the Marshall Plan Administrator, concerning the AID program, in *Time*, Magazine, January 17, 1972, p. 31. St, Vincent de Paul told his disciples to deport themselves so that the poor "will forgive you the bread you give them."

[2] See Sam Schulman, "Basic Functional Roles in Nursing: Mother Surrogate and Healer", in E. Gartly Jaco, ed., *Patients, Physicians and Illness* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1958), pp. 528–537. The bureaucratization of the hospital is making it less and less possible for nurses to there indulge this need to help others. Here, too, compassion is incompatible with professional efficiency,

An older but basically similar approach--that is, an approach through personnel administration, is to give special attention to the problem in training those who "meet the public" -- counter clerks, bus drivers, etc. (Here I do not refer to "T-Group" training, which is a basically different matter and which I, therefore, wish to treat separately.) Although the training of counter-clerks and others goes on continuously, it does not seem to solve the problem. A friendly attiude towards one's fellow man is hardly a result of an administrative training program. Such buffer roles between frustrated and frightened clientele and a basically impersonal (hostile?) and abstract organization, an organization that controls employees' behavior in a roundabout fashion by means of rules and roles performed by functionaries, such buffer roles are not feasible on a large scale. The self-protection of the role incumbents often requires a hostile and, at best, disinterested treatment of the clientele, and the special training is soon forgotten.

Why should we expect otherwise? When the young instructor, for example, wants his school to treat him with compassion, to treat him like his father used to do, just what is it that he wants? The school is not a person; it has no feelings. He wants his chairman to give him compassion, to show personal appreciation and recognition. But how about the personal problems of the Chairman? Who will meet *his* needs for compassionate treatment? Who will stand *in loco parentis* to him? The Dean? But the problem is still there. It cannot be generally solved because the organization, in the final analysis, has no feelings but operates through rules, and roles filled by people who, on the average, have the same needs for compassion as the hypothetical young instructor with whom I started this illustration.

Occasionally there is an exception to this general rule. An unusually "heroic" person gets into this chain of personification of the abstract, a person able to dispense compassionate behavior without receiving it himself. One suspects that, as usual, the costs must be paid somehow-in ulcers, a beastly home life, the ruined personality of a child, etc.

Psychologists are especially prone to overlook this problem, to expect heroic persons to show up at the right time, and the right place, in the right numbers. Thus, they write books on *Child Psychology* when the problem is the psychology of the parents. Or they write books on the psychology of employees, suggesting managerial strategies for dealing with them more effectively; but a large part of the problem is the psychology of people who need to get into authority (manager) roles and succeed in doing so, because they have enough *power* to make their psychology an important question. A sadist on the assembly line might spoil a few parts. A sadist in an authority role....

Beyond these sufficient obstacles to solving the compassion problem through personnel administration (i.e., the selection, training, and placement of personnel), there are other equally insurmountable obstacles to its success. Synthetic compassion can probably be detected by most people, and it has a stomach-turning quality. It makes the frustration, loneliness, fear, and alienation greater for those who see through it. It produces a response similar to the commercials on T.V.

Besides, this synthetic compassion is usually dispensed by those who have no power anyway--those who meet and absorb the public's problems with basically no power to do anything about them. The kindly assurance of the counter clerk is hollow, nor should a sophisticated customer take out his frustration on such a role player. Most of us know it is not his (her) fault. She (he) is powerless. The real power holders are protected from us by layer upon layer of such buffers, and organizational decision making is largely processual rather than personal, anyway. Taking it out on the counter clerk gives only immediate relief; it probably heightens the problem in the long run--especially if one's conscience forces him to return to apologize to the counter clerk (or bus driver, or policeman, or store clerk, etc.) On top of the frustrating (dare I say "stupid"?) treatment, an apology is exacted by one's own conscience!

Any approach to an organizational problem through the attitudinal selection or training of personnel reduces the flexibility, hence value, of the organization to the "owner".[3] It is, therefore, a high cost approach and, if done without the "owner's" knowledge and permission, a form of theft. Should the owner wish to change his goals or values, he will Find the tool unresponsive. Unless he can then engage in wholesale firing and the selection of an immediately efficient new staff, he has lost resources.

[3] This kind of staffing (by attitudes or program identification) has created many problems for various Office of Economic Opportunity programs, like Legal Services. British administrators generally take a dim view of strong program commitments by civil servants. That is for politicians. See, for example, H.E. Dale, *The Higher Civil Service of Great Britain* (London: Oxford University Press, 1941). He was formerly Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. See also E.N. Gladden, *The Civil Service: Its Problems and Future* (London: Staples Press Limited, 1945). He was in the Service for 30 years. See also Peter du Sautoy, *The Civil Service* (London: Oxford University Press, 1957).

IV. Solutions: Organization Development and Sensitivity Training

Since most of us are members of large bureaucratic organizations, concern for more personalized or compassionate treatment of individuals by organizations naturally extends to employees as well as clientele (or customers, patients, etc.). Several social psychologists have been working on this problem for years, beginning at least with Elton Mayo. Many of them consult with organization managements about changing organizations or their supervisory styles. These psychologists have begun to call their field Organization Development, and so I will lump their efforts and theories all togeter under that title.[1]

Organization Development seeks to change organizations. It is casual about the purpose and direction of change because it relies upon a natural system, natural law, concept of a *healthy organization*. Warren Bennis, for example, equates "scientific management" with "organization health". The natural system, natural law, origin of the concept is clear. "It is now possible to postulate the criteria for organization health. These are based on a definition by Marie Jahoda, according to which a healthy personality '... actively masters his environment, shows a certain unit [y] of personality, and is able to perceive the world and himself correctly.' Let us take each of these elements and extrapolate it into organizational criteria."[2] Frequently, it is urged that healthy organizations will be more effective in achieving their goals, but the major emphasis of O.D. is that the organization be a more healthfull environment in which adults can work. These people gloss over the fact that an organization is a tool of an external power ("owner").

In the healthy organization, all relations are supportive; many motivations are harnessed (besides money), and all work in the same direction; employees are members of tightly-knit solidarity groups; high standard group goals are set by group decision; communication is full and frank, both as to facts and feelings, and flows easily without distortion in all appropriate directions (not just from the top down); dealings are not one-to-one, boss-to-man, but more in the nature of group confrontations; relations are collaborative rather than "win-lose" competitive.

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[1] See Warren Bennis, *Changing Organizations* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966); and *Organization Development* (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1969); Paul R. Lawrence and Jay W. Lorsch, *Developing Organizations* (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., 1969); Rensis Likert, *The Human Organization* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967); Chris Argyris, *Interpersonal Competence and Organizational Effectiveness* (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1962), and *Organization Development* (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1960); Robert R. Black and Jane Srygley Mouton, *Building a Dynamic Corporation Through Grid Organizational Development* (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1969); Richard Beckhard, *Organization Development: Strategies and Models* (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company); H.J. Leavitt, "Unhealthy Organizations", in H.J. Leavitt and L. Pondy, eds., *Readings in Managerial Psychology* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964).

[2] *Changing Organizations*, chapter3, at p. 52. The quotation from Marie Jahoda is from Current Concepts of Positive Mental Health (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1958).

A basic problem is the common acceptance of the organization's goal--the problem of social order. Most O.D. advocates implicitly adopt a Rousseaulike position. Man's natural state is harmony; but his institutions have perverted him. In the healthy organization, each person would see that his best interest was served by making the organization succeed. Rensis Likert suggests an elaborate semi-mechanical device of overlapping groups so that many hierarchical superiors would be group leaders of several groups, this multiple group membership being assumed to be powerful enough to bring about organizational unity, not just dampen the conflict.

One gets the feeling that some O.D. practitioners do not care about sacrificing the owner's goal as long as individual employees obtain a more healthfull working atmosphere--a sort of sub-conscious subversion. More serious are some apparently faulty empirical assumptions of O.D. First, there is no reason for assuming that individual goals, or solidarity group goals, will be consistent with that of the external power, the "owner".[3] With the calculations impeccable on both sides, individuals and organizations can arrive at contrary and possibly conflicting conclusions with perfect rationality. And, of course, irrational behavior is common enough and can always lead to conflict.

Second, the relationship between employee morale and high production of the owner's goals not only has not been proved, but if it holds at all may only hold under specific cultural conditions and with a reversed causal order. A worker with a strongly internalized norm (duty) of high production will experience personal satisfaction from high output. The satisfaction results from the output, not the reverse.[4]

Finally, even if one does not regard the concept of a "healthy organization as natural law metaphysics, which I do, it is still possible, even likely, that different production goals and conditions will require different organization structurers--the "healthy organization" will not be optimal under most conditions--perhaps not under very many conditions. Somehow, the picture

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[3] See Victor A. Thompson, *Modern Organization*, pp. 183—186; and Edward A. Shils, "Primary Groups in the American Army", in Robert K. Merton and Paul F. Lozarsfeld, eds., *Continuities in Social Research: Studies in the Scope and Method of "The American Soldier"* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1950). The continuing differentiation and autonomy of subsystems is one of the most profound natural system processes. It allows integration of individuals into the subsystem which would not be possible in the larger system as a whole. If I accept values A and B but reject values C,D, and E, I cannot cooperate with the system ABCDE, but I could cooperate with system A and system B if they were differentiated out. In this way, boundary maintenance becomes decisive for the maintenance of cooperation.

[4] See Arthur H. Brayfield and Walter H. Crockett, "Employee Attitudes and Employee Performance", *Psych. Bul.*, 52 (1955), pp. 396–424; Edward E. Lawler, III and Lyman W. Porter, "The Effect of Performance on Job Satisfaction", *Industrial Relations, a Journal of Economy and Society*, 7 (October 1967), pp. 20–28; Robert J. House and Lawrence A. Wigdor, "Herzberg's Dual-Factor Theory of Job Satisfaction and Motivation: a Review of the Evidence and a Criticism", *Pers. Psych.*, 20 (1967), pp. 369–389; and Charles L. Hulin and Milton R. Blood, "Job Enlargement, Individual Differences, and Worker Responses", *Psych. Bull.*, 69 (1968), pp. 41–55.

of a strongly identifying group of workers and their boss sitting around planning high group production goals for latrine digging is ludicrous. Often claims of success for O.D. involve Research and Development or similar groups; often groups of salesmen. In any case, the success stories are of the N = 1 type and cannot really be evaluated.

O.D.is based on a natural system model of organizations. Natural law notions evolve easily from such models. The organization, however, is also an artificial system, a tool of an external power. As such, it is evaluated from an external vantage point by reference to how efficiently it produces the externally imposed goal. An organization, being composed of self-directing and structure-creating creatures also develops in time into a natural system, organized around the artificial. The criterion of the natural system is survival--survival is a necessary quality of natural systems. Conflict between the externally imposed criteria of the artificial system and the survival criterion of the natural system is not only possible, but I am sure that some clever person can show it to be inevitable, sooner or later.[5]

O.D. practitioners have developed a change instrument which has broader implications and so must be listed as another device to aid in the solution of our problem of administrative compassion in the modern world. I refer to "laboratory training" or T-Group training. The T-Group (Training-Group) was developed by O.D. practitioners to facilitate organization change.[6] A group of trainees is brought together under a most permissive and non-structuring "leader" with the hope that they will begin to explore the possibilities of fuller interpersonal communication, as to facts, but especially feelings. It is hoped that the trainees will develop skills in "authentic" communication without exploitative reservations, including both giving and taking, that is, listening. A by-product would be a great deal of self-knowledge and self-acceptance and the expansion of empathy. The whole thing is referred to as the development of interpersonal skills. Training groups can be composed in different ways--the trainees from many organizations, or a group of fellow workers and their boss ("family groups"), or members from different parts of the same organization, groups of people at the same hierarchical level (peers) or from several levels, etc.

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[5] Ralf Dahrendorf, in his book *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), thinks in terms of concrete groups of people called "classes" rather than in terms of systems. To him, therefore the inevitable conflict is between the group-superiors--and the group-subordinates. Superiors, however, are also under the control of the natural system to some extent. The conflict is between systems, the behavioral one (natural) and the prescriptive one (artificial), or between self-interest and duty.

[6] It was developed by the National Training Laboratories of the National Education Association. For descriptions of the method see Leland Bradford, Jack R. Gibb, and Kenneth D. Benne, eds., *T-Group Theory and Laboratory Method* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964). For a short description, see Herbert A. Shepard, "The T-Group as Training in Observant Participation", in Warren G. Bennis, Kenneth D. Benne, and Robert Chin, eds., *The Planning of Change* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962).

T-Group training is very difficult to evaluate, but a great deal of effort has been spent trying to do so. Not wholly unexpectedly, advocates find measurable changes both in the trainees and in their organizations after they return.[7] If one takes the evaluations of non-advocates a different story emerges. There is no convincing evidence that organizations have been changed in this way; and no one has even attempted to show that production and efficiency have been so improved.[8] Occasionally new problems for organizations have been generated by T-Group training, however, (for example, mass resignations of trainees).[9] Participating individuals, on the other hand, may experience great personal value (or the opposite--there have been suicides) from the sessions, just as they might listening to a Sunday sermon, or contemplating a beautiful painting. Some kinds of small measurable attitude changes are often found, although how long they last is another matter.

Despite the meagerness of these findings, T-Group methods have become a large business; with large investments of personal reputations. They have also been commercialized through "encounter groups" into a multi-million dollar fad, but this should probably not be blamed on the original O.D. psychologists who were seeking a way to change organizations in the direction of organization health.

Although the evidence does not support the idea that T-Group (laboratory) training will help solve the administrative compassion problem, the technique has by now become so widely publicized and oversold (the wrong term since it suggests merely an exaggeration) that t has acquired great political utility to administrators. For example, one of the "non-negotiable demands" of some groups critical of a school system, or a police department, may be that th employees in question be required to take "sensitivity training" (another synonym for T-Group).

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[7] For example, see Paul C. Buchanan (Associate Professor of Education at Yeshiva University), "Laboratory Training and Organization Development", *Admin. Science Q*, 14 (September 1969), pp. 466–477. He says, however, that evidence for organization change is not impressive. See also Herbert A. Shepard "Changing Interpersonal and Intergroup Relationships in Organizations", chapter 26 in James G. March, ed., *Handbook of Organizations* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1965), pp. 1115–1143.

[8] See especially John P. Campbell and Marvin D. Dunnette, "Effectiveness of T-Group Experiences in Managerial Training and Development", *Psych. Bull.*, 70 (August 1968). Also, see Robert J. House, "T-Group Education and Leadership Effectiveness: a Review of the Empirical Literature and a Critical Evaluation", *Pers. Psych.*, 20 (Spring 1967); and G.S. Odiorne, "The Trouble with Sensitivity Training", *Training Development Journal*, 17 (October 1963). Warren Bennis, who has been President of the National Training Laboratories, says, "Sometimes the changes brought about simply 'fade out'..... In other cases, the changes have backfired and have had to be terminated....." *Changing Organizations*, p. 174. He says, further, "Relating change programs to harder criteria, such as productivity and economic and cost factors, was rarely attempted and was never, to my knowledge, successful". *Ibid.*, p. 172.

[9] See the sources in the note above. In addition, see A.J.M. Sykes, "The Effect of a Supervisory Training Course in Changing Supervisors' Perceptions and Expectations of the Role of Management", *Human Relations*, 15 (Summer 1962), pp. 227–243.

By agreeing to this demand, the administrator can get the political "monkey" off his back, even though he may know that he is making a zero contribution to the underlying problem. (Of course, he may conscientiously believe in the efficacy of the "therapy". Why should he know different?)

When such a political agreement has been reached, requiring sensitivity training for the personnel of the agency, we have witnessed the most profound invasion of personal rights which can currently take place in our society. Such requirements are in the same category as requiring personnel to go to church and become "converted". They are only a step removed from compulsory incarceration in a mental institution, allegedly so widely practiced behind the iron curtain. And yet, who speaks on behalf of these teachers, policemen, etc.? Their unions? The American Civil Liberties Union? The National Education Association? No so that you can notice it.

Efforts to heighten the affective or personal aspect of inter-functionary relations in modern organizations have a basic flaw. As I said above, the artificial system, or formal organization, is composed of rules and roles. The roles prescribe necessary functional relations but eliminate the personal or affective aspect. Since these personal factors of love or hate are irrelevant (almost), anyone with the needed technical skill can be placed in the role. People are largely interchangeable, making it easily possible to construct all of the organizations we need.

As the natural or informal system develops, however, spontaneous, informal roles develop in which the affective, personal aspect of interpersonal relations is very high. Informal, natural systems develop a high level of affect.[10] Here, as in so many other ways, we find a natural conflict between the natural and the artificial systems. To illustrate, the obligations of the role of friend may be incompatible with the obligation of the role of boss. In fact, studies of the behaviors in small groups, including small working groups, can raise the question of how the abstract, impersonal, modern bureaucratic organization is possible at all. Why do not the interpersonal obligations (friendship, for example) of the natural system thoroughly sabotage the interpersonal organizational duties of the artificial system? I think the answer must be that modern socialization produces less exacting interpersonal obligations than were produced in the preindustrial era, personal obligations which are compatible with the prescribed formal role obligations of modern organization design.

Friendship, under our conditions of mobility, is more superficial than it used to be. Friends are no longer expected to "give the shirt off their backs". We meet our new fellow employees in the morning; are on a first-name basis by the afternoon; and may be transferred the next morning. Modern man has many acquaintances but few friends. He has been lonely even in a crowd.[11]

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[10] See especially, George Homans, *The Human Group;* also see Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander, eds., *Group Dynamics*, 3rd ed., (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1968).

[11] It is fair, though not necessary, to cite at this point David Riesman, Nathan Glazer and Reuel Denney, *The Lonely Crowd* (Garden City, New Jersey: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1953).

When one's friend and peer is elevated to the role of boss, he is not expected to extend special treatment to the former friend; none would be asked and indeed the friendship would probably be allowed to terminate quickly. In June, 1960. *Modern Office Procedures*, a trade journal, advised newly promoted bosses to "Break away gradually--Recognize the simple fact of office life that the higher you go, the fewer friends you'll have in the company." "Give your friends in the office every chance to break away from you. They know you can't remain part of the old gang."[12] Adventures across the impersonal, functional, borders of the role are allowed ritually at certain times only-- the office Christmas party or the annual picnic.[13] This miniscule recognition of the problem seems enough for modern man.

If the affective, personal element in inter-role relationships within administration is enlarged, through sensitivity training or otherwise, the equilibrium between the natural and artificial systems of modern organizations may be sufficiently disturbed to reduce our ability to form organizations. As organizations become increasingly unique systems of interpersonal relations, like families, too small for most modern purposes, the number of organizations we can successfully field may fall below our functional requirements; the society and economy may regress back toward a preindustrial "tribalism". Tampering with organizations is also tampering with personalities and must be undertaken with the same care and understanding. The carelessness and casualness with which organizational advice is handed out reflects the general lack of confidence in the advice and its actual ineffectiveness.

There are other problems connected with the training of employees, whether they be supervisors or those who deal with clients.[14] Some training conducted by the organization itself seeks to strengthen employee knowledge of the prescriptions of the artificial system and to reinforce their authoritative nature. The rules and regulations are reviewed and high level superiors give pep talks to indicate that the organization really wants them obeyed and wants all employees (functionaries) to be loyal to the "owner's" objectives. Organization-run training is frequently (usually) of this kind both because such training is part of the central concern of control, and because the trainers can be expected to be experts in the artificial system and hence able to teach it. Most organization-run training is "orders in another form."

When training is conducted by people from outside the organization, as it increasingly is, or by trainers within the organization who have studied with those from without, the subject matter is frequently wholly or in part the natural system (usually natural systems of organizations

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[12] Reported in Sylvia Porter's column, *Chicago Daily News*, May 23, 1960. Such practices are general throughout American business, according to *Modern Office Procedures*.

[13] See Erving Goffman's discussion of these rituals in his paper, "On the Characteristics of Total Institutions", in his *Asylums* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1961).

[14] The following discussion of training is based on my paper, "The Systemic Limitations of Organization Design", in Martin Landau, ed., in a forthcoming symposium to be published by Duke University Press.

in general). External students of organizations mostly use a natural system model; they study the organization as a complex of statistical distributions. The values they import into their science, and hence their training programs, are natural system values--that is, natural law. Furthermore, they are observers rather than participants and so have interest different from organization members. Understanding is more important than profit (or success defined in some other way). Furthermore, they do not have to take responsibility for the results of their advice. Usually they are academics and since few people pay any attention to them outside the classroom, they feel free to say whatever they want.

From these outside (and perhaps inside) trainers, therefore, trainees absorb some forbidden fruit. They learn about the natural system, and they may learn natural law values--such as the natural harmony of the orgaization; or that one should be "people-oriented" rather than "task-oriented"; or that their organization is "unhealthy". Natural systems are only dimly understood by participants, although much of their behavior is controlled by them. Consequently, armed with this new knowledge, the trainee may attempt to resist these controls or to manipulate them for personal or group advantage. Or he may wish to realize his new natural law values--e.g., being people-oriented rather than production-oriented. In either case, he cannot be trusted by peers or superiors or both. He may have become more of an observer than a participant and hence not quite trustworthy from the organization standpoint. Tremendous pressure will be put upon him to return to the old, safe, predictable, pre-training role performance. In a few months his training will probably have "washed out", or if not, his frustrations may induce him to resign or seek a transfer; or he may be fired.[15] The potential conflict between the external criteria--the "owner's" goals--and the survival criteria of the natural system is real and inescapable. Tools are not designed either to survive or to be happy. Etzioni adds the point that human relations (natural system) training for foremen assumes that they can be both formal leaders (who are officers of the company) and

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[15] See Edgar H. Schein, "Forces which Undermine Managerial Development", *California Managerial Review*, 5 (Summer 1963), pp. 23-34; Kenneth R. Andrews, "Is Management Training Effective? 2. Measurement, Objectives, and Policy", *Harv. Bus. Review*, 35 (March-April 1957), pp. 63–72; E. A. Fleishman, "Leadership Climate, Human Relations Training, and Supervisory Behavior", *Per. Psych.*, 6 (1953), pp. 205-222; Center for Programs in Government Administration, "Education for Innovative Behavior in Executives", Cooperative Research Project No 975 of the United States Office of Education, Department of Health, Education and Welfare; Harold Guetzkow, Garley A. Forehand and Bernard J. James, "An Evaluation of Educational Influence on Administrative Judgment", *Admin. Sci. Q*, 6 (1961-62), pp. 483–500; and A.J. M. Sykes, "The Effect of a Supervisory Training Course in Changing Supervisors' Perceptions and Expectations of the Role of Management", *Human Relations* 15 (Summer 1962), pp. 227–243. Sykes reports a case where 97 supervisors were given a human relations course, Eighty-three later said it was a failure; 14 had no opinion; none said it was a success. Nineteen of them left the company within the year; 27 others applied for jobs elsewhere in the company. In the previous two years, only 2 supervisors had left the company. The supervisors said that the attitudes of senior management had not changed (they had also taken such a course at the same time.). In other words, the expectations of the supervisors had changed but not the organization.

informal leaders of the men--that they can play influence roles in both the artificial and natural systems. The resulting conflict and stress will render such dual roles intolerable for all but a very, very small number of unusual people.[16]

[16] Amitai Etzioni, *A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations* (New York: The Free Press, 1961), pp. 119 ff. So rare are people who can play both expressive and instrumental leadership roles, that they have been called "great men". E.F. Borgatta, R.F. Bales, and A.S. Couch, "Some Findings Relevant to the Great Man Theory of Leadership", *Am. Soc. Review*, 19 (1954), pp. 755–759.

V. Solutions: Smaller Units

A more irrational reaction to the impersonality of modern organizations is the growth of a spirit of regression to a simpler technology and hence simpler organization forms. Even as the British textile workers of the early nineteenth century followed "General Ludd" in his destruction of newer labor-saving technology, many today wish to blame science and technology, not only for such problems as pollution, but also for the alienation, the frustration and desparation, of the individual (I should say "some individuals" since most, I suspect, are doing very well). Commitment to this position seems to be associated with fanaticism, with the charisma of a movement, and as such shows a tendency to follow the ancient fallacy--the end justifies the means. There have been suggestions of conscious distortions, even by scientists, by those opposing the Amchitka underground blast, the use of DDT, the SST--and who knows how many others? We are told that there are currently (1972) ten times as many college students enrolled in astrology classes as in astrophysics classes.[1] The annual meetings of the America Association for the Advancement of Science for 1970 and 1971 were disrupted several times by groups who have defined the enemy as a personified "science" and blame it for everything from human failure to racial prejudice to war. If scientists are moving in the wrong direction, it is because they are allowing bureaucrats, politicians, college administrators, and private Luddite groups to define that direction, to push their research in directions contrary to their scientific instincts.

Under pressure from "environmentalists" all during 1971, the AEC was forced into a major reorganization, the purposes of which, according to Chairman Dr. James R. Schlesinger, were to deemphasize "technology purely for the sake of technology"; and to "provide increased emphasis on environmental matters and on research....on.... various aspects of safety....".[2] The danger of politically directed research is the loss of redundancy and hence reliability. Substituted for the decisions of many scientists and technologists following their own interests is the decision or conclusion of a bureaucrat or a politician, or a group or institution composed of them. Such decisions have a very high chance of being proved wrong over the long run. The age of the prophets was in the biblical past.

It is difficult to imagine a more dangerously mistaken view than this neo-Luddit ism. Science and technology are simply knowledge about how to solve human problems. Self-imposed ignorance can do nothing for anyone. Translated into economic terms, the plea for scientific, technical, and hence, industrial, regression is a plea for increased unemployment and inflation. Human problems are bound to increase, requiring ever more knowledge and ingenuity. Disillusionment with the older romanticism of progress does not necessarily imply an hysterical despair. In fact, it requires quite the opposite.

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[1] *Time, Magazine,* January 3, 1972, p. 44, attributes this statement to Yale physicist D. Allen Bromley. On distortions in the opposition to DDT, see various speeches and remarks by Norman E. Borlaug.

[2] Reported by Frank Carey of Associated Press in the *Florida Times-Union*, 1/9/72, p. A–15.

Technological development has produced an ever larger and more expensive material component, the hardware, and this fact has necessarily resulted in ever larger organizations, ever more centralization. (Of course, the desire for power has had the same effect and in some cases has increased size and centralization far beyond what can be justified technically.) Only a science-fiction type technologic breakthrough--like a breast-pocket computer, perhaps, could reverse this trend toward increasing organization size and centralization. Such an eventuality cannot be predicted one way or the other, but on the basis of our past history we cannot expect it,[3] at least in manufacturing. (The growth of service industry may reverse this trend, as discussed below.)

Appreciation of the impersonal (dehumanizing) consequences of size has led to suggestions to decentralize--to operate from smaller units. There is much evidence to the effect that small units are more comfortable working milieux, but the definition of "small" is not easy. An organization where each person can get to know most of the others personally has many of the qualities of a club, if not indeed a family. Authority relations are softened by various social relations which develop concomitantly. Evaluations and penalties are leavened by the emotions and obligations of something approaching friendship. The same is true for interpersonal competition and hence communication. Secrecy is much less important where win-lose competition is actually taboo, a breech of community relations, of good neighborship. Knowledge of the total operation is easier had by each, providing each worker with a cognitive map which helps to restore the meaningfulness of work. The natural system may become so strong as to dominate the artificial system in these small organizations. The owner and his plans may be at the mercy of the natural system-or, as some would say, informal organization).

The small unit is likely to be less impersonal, more compassionate, to the client or customer. Roles are more general and hence relations less restricted. Having fewer customers promotes familiarity. Final decisions can be reached lower in a hierarchy and hence perhaps more quickly. Procedures are likely to be simpler and more easily modified on the spot if they threaten to bring a about absurdities. All of these things will help the client or customer feel more like a person and less like a problem category. He is likely to think such an organization is a "good" one, i.e., compassionate.

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[3] See James R. Bright, *Automation and Management* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1958).

Despite a spate of predictions that the organization of the future is going to be smaller, impermanent, and democratic,[4] it is possible that these predictions are wishful thinking. The evidence is not clear. I agree that whenever the technology of the task allows decentralization into small units, the correct ethical position is to propose or support such decentralization. Task technology in advertising, movie and T.V. program making, and similar activities, has long promoted a type of organization which I shall call project organization. (In line with the pretentious jargon of this field, this ancient phenomenon has been increasingly glorified as "matrix organization".)

Project organization not only allows the greater personalism (compassion) of the small organization, but it has other apparent values. Professor Huntington of Harvard reports that by 1952 the technical (read "strategic") problems of war had been settled in this country, stabilizing the large defense bureaucracies within which the survival ("bureaucratic") needs of individuals and groups had to be met. The technical ("strategic") functions fell within no single service but within interservice functional commands by 1958.[5] The "bureaucratic" rivalry stemming from survival needs (career needs, if you prefer), was no longer reinforced by technical considerations. To put it another way, bureaucratic, inter-service, career-type rivalries no longer needed to interfere with technical (strategic) problem-solving. Strategic flexibility was acquired by separating bureaucratic survival needs from the structure for technical problem-solving, by placing technical problem-solving in temporary *project* organizations (although they are not so called by the military).

Project organization separates the homeostatic, equilibrating, adaptive, foot-dragging of the natural system, dominated by the internal criterion of survival, from the instrumental, expansive, prescriptive, problem-solving of the artificial system, dominated by the externally generated and imposed goals of the "owner"--in the case of the military or any other public organization, by the public and the public interest. Because components of the project organization (group, team, etc.) can fall back upon their permanent bureaucratic home for survival "career" needs, they will be less resistant to changes of an instrumental or technical nature--in the case of the military, less resistant to strategic innovations.

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[4] See Warren G. Bennis, *Changing Organizations*, chapter 1. Bennis believes work will increasingly be performed in temporary, interdisciplinary, project groups, even though a larger coordinating framework may remain. See also William G. Reynolds, "The Executive Synecdoche", *Business Topics* (Autumn 1969), pp. 21–29. Thomas L. Whisler takes much the same view and adds the idea that the replacement of men by machines, especially computers, makes for smaller organizations personnel-wise. See his *Executives and Their Jobs--the Changing Organizational Structure*, Selected Papers No. 9, Graduate School of Business, the University of Chicago. Peter F. Drucker believes hierarchical structures are doomed because they veto and stiffle innovation. *The Age of Discontinuity* (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1969). See also Alvin Toffler, *Future Shock* (New York: Random House, Inc., 1970), to the same effect.

[5] Samuel P. Huntington, "Interservice Competition and the Roles of the Armed Services", *Am. Political Science Review*, 55 (March 1961), pp. 40–52.

In recent years there have been an increasing number of small research, development, and engineering organizations which, meeting the criterion for small size, have been humane and even exciting places for professional and sub-professional personnel to work.[6] Many of these have even met the test of impermanence, either because they worked on one (or a few) contracts at a time, were constantly forming and reforming in response to immediate, specific, contractual and sub-contractual needs, or because their experienced staff, high in demand, could often play a game of musical chairs (encouraged by government contract rules which allowed much higher salaries and raises for new personnel than for old. The more times you moved, the richer you became). The world of these small changing organizations is a world of personal friendships and loyalties, of greatly rewarding mutual admiration, and consequently or powerful mutual and self-controls. Such organizations are not bureaucracies as Max Weber described them.

How many opportunities for project organization exist within our huge bureaucracies no one knows, nor if such opportunities are increasing. Although this question is one of unimaginable importance, it has never been researched, to my knowledge. One place where the general project pattern is most applicable and perhaps is beginning to appear is in the area of new product development in business. The bureaucratic structure is deadly here.[7] The survival need most threatened, in addition to the hostilities and plottings of one's apprehensive peers, is security. Yesterday's entrepreneur risked(somebody else's) money. If he failed, he could move elsewhere and try again. With vastly improved data gathering, storage, and transmittal by an enormous credit rating industry, the failing entrepreneur is not likely to get a second chance. Entrepreneurship, therefore, must largely take place inside huge bureaucracies (these large organizations are also more likely to have the vastly increased amounts of capital needed.) Today's entrepreneur, consequently, is usually an official, a bureaucrat. If he fails, he loses more than a little money. His failure goes into his personnel record and follows him around forever. This record, as Erving Goffman has said, is a part of him; it is his paper alter ego. When he fails, therefore, the bureaucratic entrepreneur loses part of his personality, his ego, his image-- losses infinitely more important than money, which Shakespeare rightly said was just trash by comparison.

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[6] See William G. Reynolds, *ibid.*

[7] See Donald W. Collier, "An Innovation System for the Larger Company", *Research Management*, (September 1970), pp. 341–348; Theodore Levitt, *The Marketing Mode: Pathways to Corporate Growth* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1970), esp. chapter 7; Tom Burns and B. M. Stalker, *The Management of Innovation* (London: Tavistock Publications, 1959); Victor A. Thompson, *Bureaucracy and Innovation;* James D. Hlavacek and Victor A. Thompson, "Bureaucracy and New Produce Innovation"; in preparation; Robert Townsend, *Up the Organization* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc, 1970); Hubert Kay, "Harnessing the R. and D. Monster", *Fortune*, January, 1965, beginning at p. 160; "How Bell Labs Answer Calls for Help", *Business Week*, January, 1971, pp. 38–44; Donald C. Pelz and Frank M. Andrews, *Scientists in Organizations;* and Louis Saltanoff, "The Innovation Myth", *Industrial Research*, August 1971, pp. 45–46.

Usually the bureaucrat entrepreneur does not know what the outcome of a new product venture will be. Most fail.[8] Even the successes take so long to register success that the original recommender, the bureaucratic entrepreneur, may have been long charged with failure or retired. Even if he had some rough notions of the probability of success, he has no knowledge whatsoever as to the outcome of this particular case, this particular toss of the coin. What would be rational for the organization, which lives in the long run, would not be rational for him, given our doctrines of administrative responsibility.[9] His rationality dictates a search for immediate profitability. The two rationalities are mathematically distinct--that of the organization, and that of our would-be entrepreneur. Under our concept of individualized, exclusive, administrative responsibility, the risk to the official is so great that for him to recommend a new product venture would be nonrational.

The problem of developing new products, therefore, is a problem of 1) recognizing and motivating entrepreneurial talent (a propensity for high risk?); 2) reducing individual risk; and 3) finding and releasing creative capacity. Business organizations fit along a continuum in their blind gropings to solve this problem organizationally. At one extreme is the organization with a stable product, technology, and market that barely recognizes that such a problem exists. The automobile manufacturers would be examples. An early approach to the problem was a purely bureaucratic one. Establish a division to deal with it--the New Products Division.[10] This response to a problem is undoubtedly the most characteristic bureaucratic response: perception of problem→assign responsibility for its solution to some individual →place a bureaucratic organization at his disposal. Thus, if a Superintendent of Schools is running into increasing criticism about racial prejudice, it is a good possibility that he will appoint an Assistant Superintendent for Racial Problems

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[8] See S.C. Gilfillan, *The Sociology of Invention* (Federalsburg. Md.: Stowell, 1935); and Bureau of Economic Research, *The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activities* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962), *passim;* Simon Marcson, *The Scientist in American Industry* (Princeton, New Jersey: Industrial Relations School, 1960); and Richard R. Nelson, "The Economics of Invention: A Survey of the Literature", *Journal of Business*, 23 (April 1959), p. 114.

[9] See Victor A. Thompson, *Decision Theory, Pure and Applied* (New York: General Learning Press, 1971); also *Bureaucracy and Innovation*, pp. 26–27.

[10] See Jay W. Lorsch, *Product Innovation and Organization* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965).

(or Civil Rights, or what not).[11] In fact, as I will show later, this response is becoming increasingly alluring as a solution to the problem of administrative compassion--an official is appointed to deal with it, often called an Ombudsman.

The next step in the development of organizational adaptations to the new products problem, and probably representing a greater degree of urgency for its solution, is to adopt the older project form as copied from advertising, and appoint New Product Managers. The most recent organizational adaptation, coming from the organizations with the greatest need to solve the new products problem--large, high technology organizations, like the big chemical companies, is the Venture Group.[12] In this adaptation, a group of highly trained business and scientific (including engineering) professionals are brought together, given a largely non-accountable budget) ("funny money"), assured of their power to commandeer the services of the permanent bureaucratic functional divisions, and physically removed from the premises for as (reasonably) long as is needed to come up with a new product and bring it to the level of marketability. Some Groups have even been legally seperated, financed, and launched as independent companies. Vanture Groups have been known to remove themselves to peaceful surroundings conducive to creativity, such as beauti-

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[11] During the 1960s, when racial pressure on the Chicago Board of Education became too strong, Superintendent Willis suddenly, without advance consultation, appointed an "Assistant Superintendent for Integration". (The person appointed was a black woman). See Victor A. Thompson, "The Innovative Organization", in Fred D. Carver and Thomas J. Sergiovanni, eds., *Organizations and Human Behavior: Focus on Schools* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1969). "In order to give the discipline continued thrust and new programs in dealing with its minorities, the ASA has added Dr. Maurice Jackson to its staff as Executive Specialist for Race and Minority Relations". *The American Sociologist*, Volume 7, No. 1 (January, 1972), p.1. Note even the bureaucratic assignment of the most universal of activities in a *National Science Foundation*. See Don Price, *Government and Science* (New York: New York University Press, 1954). Innovation is segregated in "R and D units". See Thompson, *ibid*. This widespread administrative practice is a manifestation of an even wider one--"solving" problems by labelling them. The first Hoover Commission recommended a Board of *Impartial* Analysis for Engineering and Architectural Projects "for making certain that only projects which are economically and socially justifiable are recommended for approval". *Report on the Department of Interior*, p. 5. It is not only in the United States that we find word magic administration. The Swedish Constitution of 1809, still in force, creates the office of *Justitiekansler*, who is to be "an able and impartial man". Brian Chapman, *The Profession of Government* (London: Unwin University Books, 1959), p. 246. Problems are frequently "solved" by naming them in amended administrative regulations. The administrator can then disarm his critics by pointing to the regulations to prove that the matter is "covered", and strangely enough, this gesture usually stems the criticism. See Victor A. Thompson, *The Regulatory Process in OPA Rationing*.

[12] See James V. Hlavacek, *An Emptrical Analysis of Managing Product Innovation in Complex Chemical Organizations*, unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, College of Business Administration, University of Illinois, Urbana, 1971; also James D. Hlavacek and Victor A. Thompson, "Bureaucracy and New Product Innovation"; and *Venture Management*, a survey of venture management operations in 36 large U.S. industrial companies by Towers, Perrin, Forster and Crosbey, Consultants, in 1970.

ful seashores. This system works best of all, provided authorities back in the bureaucracy homeland can keep the sword of Damocles from hanging over the Group's head. Creation can be neither coerced nor crassly purchased.[13]

Many people feel that customers were well treated during depressions. Businesses were so eager for sales that they would go out of their way to help customers. But when ours became a full employment economy, so the theory goes, many store clerks acted as if they could not care less whether or not they made a sale. These perceptions, and others like them, give rise to the belief in competition. Competition will cure the impersonality, the lack of compassion, of large organizations. Customers and clientele can shop around until they find the kind of treatment they crave.[14]

Government activities, however, are monopolies. The science of administration seeks to eliminate all overlapping and duplication; it seeks to divide up the work and parcel it out in exclusive jurisdictions so that if anything goes wrong the exact person to blame can be found. As Martin Landau has said, the management ideal is zero redundancy.[15] Until this state is reached, there is some "waste" in the system. The reliability which natural systems derive from redundancy is to be derived in artificial systems from elaborately contrived control devices. Artificial systems depend upon management.

Consequently, competition within the bureaucracy appears to Congress, the President, staff agencies, and the Press as duplication and overlapping, as waste. Furthermore, although some governmental activities are services which might (I think they would) be improved by competition, like education, street cleaning, garbage collection, it is difficult to imagine competition in most government activities -- armies, police, economic regulation, subsidies, elections, planning and zoning, building and other code enforcement, foreign policy, etc., etc. Usually, but not always, government services arise because of a breakdown of competition.[16]

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[13] See Morris I. Stein and Shirley J. Vidich, eds., *Creativity and the Individual* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1960), and, by the same authors, *Survey of Psychological Literature in the Area of Creativity With View Toward Needed Research* (New York: Research Center for Human Relations and New York University Press, 1962).

[14] Alvin Gouldner reported this kind of behavior in his study of "Red Tape as a Social Problem", in Robert K. Merton, *et. al.*, eds., *Reader in Bureaucracy* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1952), pp. 410-418.

[15] Martin Landau, "Redundancy, Rationality, and the Problem of Duplication and Overlap", in *Public Administration Review*, 29 (July - August, 1969), pp. 346-358.

[16] Although most government services are either not amendable to competition or result from its breakdown, William Niskanen, Jr., suggests that we adopt the principle of competition as a means of bringing the bureaucracy under control. See his *Bureaucracy and Representative Government* (Chicago: Aldine - Atherton Publishing Co., 1971). They were economists at Rand Corp. who developed the idea of rationalizing government expenditures by "cost / benefit" analysis, in dollars, into a "new" form of government budgeting and decision making called Planning, Programming, Budgeting (PPB). See David Novick, *Program Budgeting*, a Rand Corporation Study (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1965); and also Fremont J. Lyden and Ernest G. Miller, eds., *Planning Programming Budgeting: A Systems Approach to Management* (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1967). The classic statement of how government originates in failures of the economic system is Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics, Economics and Welfare* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1953).

Consequently, that great stimulus to good service, competition, is lacking from government and to put it back is, in most cases, to take the activity from the public sector and put it in the private one. All interaction involves some cost. If the parties to the interaction are equal in power, the costs must be shared. If most of the power is on one side, if the interaction is monopolistic, as interactions with government nearly always are, the bureaucracy can, and does, shift the cost to the clientele.[17] When the client is kept waiting for hours--and then as likely as not told to come back tomorrow; when having worked up from the end of one line, a client is sent back to the end of another on the ground that he is in the wrong line; when a form is rejected for a minor error and the client told to go back home and fill it out right; when a suspect is pushed around in a back room of a police station; when such things happen, the monopolistic bureaucracy is shifting the cost of the interaction to the client. When a fiercely competitive retailer establishes and enforces the policy that "the customer is always right", the costs of the interaction have been largely shifted to the store clerks and away from the customers.

The last two suggestions for increasing administrative compassion, for personalizing the treatment of individuals by organizations-- namely decentralizing, and establishing competition in the supply of service, suggest that a more comfortable and individualized administration could be purchased for a price. If we were willing to accept less for our dollar, we could go to the corner grocery instead of the super-market. In government circles and in political science it is often said that if the individual does not like the impersonal, categorized, statisticized treatment that he receives from administrative agencies, he can go to the courts and there get individualized, personal, unique treatment. This argument seems plausible because of the large amount of time and money spent by courts on individual cases. However, the argument is false. In the first place, court treatment is so time-consuming and expensive as to persuade most people to forego it. Bad as it is, an administrative appeal or a letter to a congressman gives the ordinary individual a better chance of success.

More important, however, is the fact that courts of law are institutionalized to seek the general principle in the individual case. Justice is blind. The individual is unimportant; only the principle counts. (Juries, of course, modify this statement somewhat.) One of the hardest lessons the young law student must learn is to give up his natural, compassionate interest in the outcomes and dispositions for the actual persons involved in the cases he studies and to learn to concentrate solely on the principle of law involved.

After three years of practice in reading cases from this perspective, the law student acquires the professional capacity to exclude the personal and compassionate from consideration, much like the young medical student can finally stand the sight of blood and the thought of pain and death. This skill in impersonality is a necessary prerequisite to the successful practice

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[17] See Herbert A. Simon, Donald W. Smithburg and Victor A. Thompson, *Public Administration*, chapter 21.

of the profession--the giving of good legal advice and the healing of minds and bodies. Full feedback of information from clients would make both the practice of law and medicine impractical (also, of course, the practice of warfare).[18]

Since courts are almost completely staffed by law students grown older and professionally successful, one can safely argue that the court system is the least compassionate of all of our institutions. I will have more to say about government by courts at a later point.

In an earlier time, the specific, social position of the individual was so important that all administrative action had to be tailored to individual cases. Except for the lower classes, clients were not mere problem categories. Only when this form of social differentiation had declined enormously was it possible to begin planning efficient administration using universal rules, forms, and procedures for whole problem classes of people.[19] The modern administrative norm, which made efficient administration possible, was the rule that everyone in the same problem category should be treated equally. The result of the norm was to strip the uniquenesses of individuals away and to turn administration into an efficient business of mass processing of cases representing problem categories, with an enormous lowering of per unit costs (and other valuable consequences such as predictability). In fact, the norm was a necessary prerequisite of modern, mass, democratic government.

This equalizing quality of modern administration is especially apparent in people-processing organizations such as mental hospitals and prisons where the demands of economizing produce an official staff of functionaries small in comparison to the number of people to be processed. It becomes necessary for the staff to "strip" nearly all individuating characteristics from the people to be processed ("inmates"); to treat all of them practically the same, except for differences dictated by the goals, routines, and problem categories of the organization. Only a very little variety in clothes, food, furnishings or recreation can be effectively administered on those tightly controlled budgets. It all becomes G.I.[20]

Nearly all administrative organizations have these same problems, although is not such an extreme form, and so nearly all of these organizations resort to some of the "stripping" tactics of these more total institutions. They apply the norm of equality. Even in non-democratic governments of industrial nations the norm is applied to everyone but the political Elite. The "rule of law" in this sense is an administrative necessity in an industrial country. Industrialism is impossible without the lowered per unit costs and increased predictability which result. Although it is

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[18] See the discussion on "feedback" in Raymond A. Bauer, ed., *Social Indicators* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1966), chapter 5, and my background paper for this study, "Feedback in the Bureaucratic Organization", prepared for the Committee on Space Efforts and Society of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

[19] Fred Riggs has made this point very strongly in "Agraria and Industria-- Toward A Typology of Comparative Administration", in William J. Siffin, ed., *Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration*, pp. 23–116.

[20] See Erving Goffman, *Asylums*.

too late for industrialized and industrializing countries, there are still countries that have the choice between personalized, individualized, compassionate administrative treatment of at least some of the population (generally, the aristocracy or others able to buy compassion) and administrative efficiency. For us, it is too late.

VI. Solutions: Combining Roles

A set of proposed solutions to the administrative compassion problem, among other problems, involves combining the roles of "owner" and functionary in the same persons. Where this solution involves no more than the suggestion for small, independent businesses, it has already been discussed as part of the suggestion to have smaller organizations. Where this suggestion is more than one for smaller organizations, it deserves and requires some special attention.

A group of people can get together to establish an organization for some purpose--say to get more wages, or to purchase jointly some items all of them use. The former would be a labor union; the latter a marketing cooperative. The group would be the "owner". If it hired a large permanent staff, a bureaucracy, to carry out its joint concerns, like unions and co-ops do, everything we have said so far would still prevail.

But would the situation be different if the same persons were both the "owners" and the functionaries? The situation would not be different in principle. Norms would sharply differentiate the private from the public--the functionary's rights and duties from those of the owner. Conflicts between the "owner's" goal ("his" interests) and those of the functionaries would still occur, as when the service-station owner-operator struggles with himself over whether or not to close early and go to play golf. Rules to help solve such role conflicts have evolved, as when doctors are taught never to treat members of their own family. The "owners" interest in efficient goal accomplishment will encourage them to adopt and apply to themselves as functionaries all the devices of modern, efficient administration--strict accounting, personnel administration practices including pay according to performance ratings, etc.

"Owners," acting also as customers, say in Co-ops, will not be expected to be treated "particularistically" and given special prices--in fact, there will be especially strong taboos, even laws, against such attempts. The functionaries, whether or not owners, will show the human tendency to generate an interpersonal system (the natural system) whose only criterion is survival, not the "owner's" (their) goals. The functionaries of a union will themselves form a union and engage in union-like activities, including strikes.

People who study the subject claim that cutting functionaries into a piece of the ownership, as in profit-sharing, will mitigate the natural conflict between "owners" and functionaries,

between the artificial system and the natural system. I believe the evidence sustains this claim, but it is important to note that the conflict is only mitigated.[1]

When the same person performs two naturally conflicting roles, conflicts are not eliminated. They are often resolved by psychological rather than political methods, which makes conflict resolution less visible and hence more difficult to understand.[2] Such conflicts, however, are frequently resolved by political methods, half the members choosing to emphasize its functionary role and half its ownership role. In fact, I think it not too much to say that all polictical conflict can be interpreted as role conflict, meaning that a choice between roles must be made by each individual before a particular political conflict becomes possible. Israelis may fight Arabs, but each participant in the struggle must decide first whether to play the role of an Israeli (or Arab) on the one hand, or that of a human being, on the other (not to mention the numerous other role choices of citizen-family member, age-group-national, sex-national, and so on and on). In the Indian-Pakistan War of late 1971, several role choices had to be made before the conflict could be joined--national, religious, and ideological. About half of the refugees who fled to India do not want to go back to an independent Bangladesh. And note the complex role choices in the Irish conflict.[3] By selecting religion as the role criterion, Senator James Buckley and Senator Edward

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1 See Bert L. Metzger and Jerome A. Colletti, *Does Profit Sharing Pay*? (Evanston, Illinois: Profit Sharing Research Foundation, 1971).

2 On the psychological resolution of role conflict in organizations, see Robert L. Kahn, *et. al.*, *Organizational Stress* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964).

3 Talcott Parsons lists five basic choices an actor must make before the situation becomes for him sufficiently determinate to allow action. One of these is personal orientation vs. collectivity orientation. Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, eds., *Toward a General Theory of Action* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 77. This "choice", however, is actually several choices. Toward which collectivity should the actor be oriented? There are many reference critria an individual could choose to place himself in a group for one purpose or another, such as mounting a claim of discrimination. Tallness has not yet been chosen by many, but if it were, the group, "tall people", would have a powerful case for discrimination (e.g., furniture size, door sizes, automobile size, etc.).

Political events are largely concerned with Distributive problems and so the choice of reference criteria, hence groups, is basic to the political process. Ordinary and even dull administrative decisions may become the occasion for violent political action, depending upon how this choice is made. Thus a regulation setting minimum height limits for policemen in Guyana became the occasion for bloody riots. From B. B. Schaffer, "The Concept of Preparation: Some Questions About the Emergence of New States and the Transfer of Systems of Government", mimeo., University of Queensland. A few years ago the relocation of one part of a university (the French part) caused the downfall of a Belgium government. Recently, Vincent T. Ximenes, the Mexican-American member of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission complained that Michigan's minimum height for state troopers-- 5'9"--discriminates against Mexican-Americans, whose average height is alleged to be 5'6". If the latter figure were used, it would "discriminate" against Chinese-Americans, whose average height is alleged to be5'1 1/2". (*Urbana News-Gazette* 3/4/71, p.4.) See the literature on reference group phenomena, for example Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe, Illionois:: The Free Press, 1957), chapters 8 and 9; see also David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, *A Strategy of Decision* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), chapter 8.

Kennedy could agree on British withdrawal and the incorporation of Northern Ireland (Ulster) into Eire (Ireland). Presumably, these two Senators represent the right and left in American politics.

Organizations which combine crucial roles in the same persons, like Coops and unions usually become big, impersonal, abstract, non-compassionate, just like other bureaucracies, and for the same reasons, and with the same results. In the final analysis, a Co-op, for example, is just another method of financing some activity. It has no implication for our problem of administrative compassion whatever, As for a union bureaucracy, complaints by functionaries are likely to be met with Harry Truman's famous maxim--if you can't stand the head stay out of the kitchen. As to those people and entities with whom the union deals, a compassionate union is either corrupt, or hilarious like the lion in the Wizard of Oz.

VII. Solutions: Political Machines and Prefectural Administration

Any purposive social entity has two classes of problems to solve. One class relates to achieving its goal, and is often called the instrumental class of problems. The other class involves keeping the social entity together so that it can solve its instrumental problems. Keeping it together is often called the maintenance class of problems. Solving the maintenance problems is logically prior to solving the instrumental ones.[1]

Under some political conditions, delicate treatment of clientele groups seems to be a political necessity. Maintaining the consensual basis of a political community looms as a larger problem, in the eyes of the political elite, than efficient administrative problem-solving. Administrative resources are used for reasons of political maintenance. Administration is compassionate, inefficient, and "corrupt".[2] (I put quotes around "corrupt" because whether an action is defined as corrupt depends upon the existence of widely held norms defining it as "corrupt". If the sign says "no tipping", then tipping is "bribery", and it is "corrupt".)

Conditions such as these existed in this country after the Civil War when massive immigration into newly forming cities, both from within and from abroad, created low consensus, heterogeneous, political communities with great problem—solving needs. A workable level of consensus was created through"corrupt political machines", which traded administrative resources for political support (consensus). Thus were the cities built--in just a few decades[3]

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[1] Talcott Parsons, Robert F. Bales and Edward A. Shils, *Working Papers in the Theory of Action* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1953); Robert F. Bales, "Task Roles and Social Roles in Decision-making Groups", in Leonard D. White, ed., *The State of the Social Sciences* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 148–161; and Amitai Etzioni, *The Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations*, pp. 91 ff.

[2] See Lucian W. Pye, *Aspects of Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966); Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1968);Fred Riggs, *Administration in Developing Countries;* Martin Harry Greenberg, *Bureaucracy and Development: A Mexican Case Study* (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1970).

[3] For a good short discussion see Fred I. Greenstein, *The American Party System and the American People* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964).

Conditions similar to those just described still exist in countries like France and Italy.[4] Basic political issues have never been solved. Political consensus is below the level needed to handle many modern problems. Approximately a quarter of the electorate in those two countries normally vote communist--vote, that is, to destroy the constitution by bloody violence.[5] (Many, if not most, of these voters probably do not think of their vote for a communist as meaning just this.) The use of administrative resources including compassion to purchase a necessary minimal consensus, appears to be a necessity even as it did during the boss-machine period of city politics in America. The administrative solution in many of these politically divided countries is the —Prefectoral system of field administration.[6]

Prefectoral field administration has its origins in the functional requirements of an earlier period and continues to exist, if not purely as ritual, because no substitutes for many of those functions have been found. In earlier periods of low technology, government performed few functions-order, defense, taxation and perhaps roads and Communications in aid of the former. [7] Citizens were organized into territorially based social organizations because of lack of communication and transportation--into families, lineages, clans, tribes, neighborhoods, or other communal type social structures. National consciousness was often lacking and the government official was epitomized in the tax collector or the policeman, someone to "get around", to mollify by gifts and by insisting upon whatever prerogatives were associated with whatever relationship existed between the

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4 See Brian Chapman, *The Prefects and Provincial France* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1955); Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton, New Jersey: The Princeton University Press, 1960), "Introduction"; Gabriel Almond and F G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Comparative Politics* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), chapter 3; Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, p. 29; and James W. Fesler, "The Political Role of Field Administration", in Ferrel Heady and Sybil L. Stokes, *Papers in Comparative Public Administration* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Institute of Public Administration, The University of Michigan, 1962), pp. 117–143.

5 On France, see Roy C. Macridis in Samuel E. Finer, Roy C. Macridis, Karl W. Dautsch, and Vernon V. Aspaturian, *Modern Political Systems: Europe* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), p. 203, and for Italy, see Giovanni Sartori, "European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism", in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Wiener, eds., *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 140ff. This book also discusses the French situation.

6 See Brian Chapman, *ibid.;* James W. Fessler, *ibid.;* and Goran Hyden, *Political Development in Rural Tanzania* (Nairobi, Kenya: East African Publishing House, 1969).

7 Much of the following discussion is based on Fred W. Riggs, "Agraria and Industria--Toward a Typology of Comparative Administration", in William J. Siffin, ed., *Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration*, pp. 23–116; and his *Administration in Developing Countries*. See also Karl A. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism* (New Haven, Connecticut: The Yale University Press, 1957); Fred W. Riggs, *Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity* (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1966). Also helpful are some of the papers in Joseph LaPalombara, ed., *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton, New Jersey: The Princeton University Press, 1963).

client and the official, like the very common kinship relationship. One's kin in government were expected to use their administrative resources on behalf of one's needs.[8]

Under these circumstances, administration (usually a synonym for government) was territorially organized, whether government was indigenous or imposed by a colonial power. Let us use the "steel frame" of British colonial administration as an example (so called because it was used practically without exception in all British colonies and possessions).[9] A Governor represented the British king (or queen) in the country. He had full government powers; he was a Viceroy, a little king, and he ran a sort of court with the usual pomp and ceremony.

The country was subdivided into provinces, in turn divided into districts. At the head of each province was a Commissioner, the representative of the Governor, a little Viceroy or king in his Province. The District was governed by the agent of the Commissioner (sometimes Commissioners did not amount to much and the District head was the true representative of the Governor). This district agent was usually called the District Officer (D.O.) or the District Commissioner (D.C.). He was the Viceroy in the District; he dealt with the "natives" and had full power of government--the full power of the King -Governor-Commissioner in his small area. He personified the distant majesty and ran his own court where he (his gracious lady hovering in the background), dispensed justice, collected taxes, settled disputes, jailed and punished, supervised and taught the natives some simple arts of government.

The District Officer watched out for political dissension and had the native force to handle it, usually, but he could always call upon the forces of the Viceroys in the higher territories, up to the army of the King. If administrative services were needed--say, a new track through the woods

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[8] See especially previous citations to Fred W. Riggs, and in addition, his paper, "The Sala Model: An Ecological Approach to the Study of Comparative Administration", in Nimrod Raphaeli, ed., *Readings in Comparative Administration* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1967). See also Victor A. Thompson, "Bureaucracy in a Democratic Society", in Roscoe C. Martin, *Public Administration and Democracy: Essays in Honor of Paul H. Appleby*, pp. 205–226.

[9] See the papers in Ralph Braibanti, ed., *Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1966). The term is used by James F. Guyot, "Bureaucratic Transformation in Burma", *Ibid.*, pp. 354–343. For other descriptions of the "frame", see Victor C. Ferkiss, "The Role of the Public Services in Nigeria and Ghana", in Ferrel Heady and Sybil L. Stokes, *Papers in Comparative Administration*, pp. 173–206, and J. Donald Kingsley, "Bureaucracy and Political Development, with Particular Reference to Nigeria", in Joseph LaPalombara, ed., *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, pp. 301–317.

a new community meeting hall, or what not, the D.O. was moneyraiser, planner, engineer, and supervisor of the project, all in one. The outcome could be no better than the skills of this untrained man (he was frequently out of a classical education at "Oxbridge"), but even this was often technically superior to what the "natives" could have supplied alone, depending upon the cultural development of the"natives".

More knowledge, technology, specialization, and needs rapidly accumulated, especially in the 20th Century. Around the Governor grew a host of specialized ministries dealing in specialized subjects and staffed by technically trained specialists--in education, health, finance, economic development, community development, agriculture, and others as the needs appeared and skills became available.[10] Agents of these ministries were eventually located in the Districts to bring their skill to bear on local problems.

District Officers lost real functions to these specialists one after the other, although the legal fiction was maintained that the D.O. was still the Viceroy, still legally omnicompetent and that all of these specialists from the Ministries were really under his direction as part of "the District Team". Meetings of the "team" were called less and less, as the ability of the District Officer, both to define a District policy goal and to supervise its implementation, gradually withered away. After all, it would be foolish for a D.O. to insist on drawing the plans for a new meeting house, infirmary, or school when a real architect from the central ministry was available.

District Officers still had a function, however. They lost one administrative problem-solving function after another to experts, but they could still perform important political maintenance functions for the central government.[11] They could warn of growing dissension, and perhaps put it down. Law and order, control of elections and supervision of local governing bodies were the last functions to go. If the specialists from headquarters could not change the behavior of the "natives", could not, that is, enforce national policy in the locality (the District), they could call upon the charisma of the D.O., the awe in which the agent of the distant Raj was still held. If the moralistic, universalistic, equal and technically accurate application of the law violated some local custom or ancient understanding, the D.O. had the legal authority to make an exception or modify the specialists' local programs. If he felt the political situation demanded it, he could call upon any kind of administrative resource available, including jobs for relatives of local notables.

Naturally, he was despised by the central ministry specialists, trained, often in European universities, in modern administrative morals, in the norms of universalism, achievement, impersonality, equality before the law, strict fiscal accountability. The D.O., however, was performing

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10 For a generalized discussion of this phenomenon, see Victor A. Thompson, *Modern Organization*, as well as the sources cited immediately above.

11 See James W. Fesler, *ibid.*, and Brian Chapman, *ibid.*

an important political function for the distant Governor, the great Viceroy, and so was protected against constant complaints and plots by the central Ministries to at least clip his wings, if not indeed to serve him up at a feast.

When the British relinquished their control of the colonies after World War II, these field officers, these Viceroys, were quickly nativized and in some places efforts were made to put them under civil service. However, if they had a function at all (other than a rapidly disappearing residual one), it was political, and so Civil service applied to them could only be formalistic. In most places they are frankly political officers attached to the political elite in power and sharing its political fortune.[12]

The relative power and importance of the two types of field officers, the generalist, political, D.O.s, and the technical, specialized, administrative, civil service field representatives of the central Ministries, therefore, depend upon the degree of a national political consensus, or lack thereof. Efficient administration, in short, is a luxury of a politically stable community organized outside of its administration in such a way that it can control its administration and hold it accountable for meeting these externally imposed goals efficiently.[13]

This "steel frame" of colonial, areal, administrative organization may persist through historical habit. Assuming that the major problems of political maintenance, of basic consensus sufficient to govern, are eventually resolved, an areal type of administrative organization, if it persists, is bound to become largely ritualistic. As knowledge and technology accumulate, problem-solving power passes from status to expertise. With political problems basically solved, the power, of expertise, of solving problems, is what counts increasingly.[14]

Eventually, the Viceroy becomes pure pageantry, and people with needs turn to those who can help them, the expert field representatives of the central ministries. Area gives way to function. Function (problem-solving) does not and cannot recognize fixed areas, and if area is somehow involved in the technical solution of a problem, the size and shape of the area will be different for every type of problem (actually, every type of technology). Today, neighborhoods are being urged as the appropriate area for various welfare services, while regional governments are being considered for such things as land and water use control. Over fifty different sizes and shapes of areas are used in the field administration of the central government of France. The meaning of area changes and as science and technology advance especially that relating to the movement of things and information, eventually is converted into an issue of time.

12 See papers in Ralph Braibanti, ed., *ibid.*; also J. Donald Kingsley, *ibid.*; and Goren Hyden, *Political Development in Rural Tanzania.*

13 See Fred W. Riggs, *Administration in Developing Countries;* Lucian W. Pye, *Aspects of Political Development;* and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies.*

14 See Victor A. Thompson, *Modern Organization,* and William H. Reynolds; "The Executive Synecdoche". *op.cit.*

The persistence, in the long run, of fixed area-based administration, like cities and states, can only be political. If citizen consensus must undergird government problem-solving, citizen evaluation of a general government's general performance is probably all that can be expected. Evaluation and consent, function by function, is now, and I think will remain, far too complex for citizens. Until consent (consensus) is no longer relevant to government, therefore, political needs will ensure the perpetuation of area-based government units, like cites and states. Probably, functions will escape these areal traps one by one, as political controversy concerning them subsides.

Prefectural type administrative structures persist, therefore, where basic problems of political consensus persist--for example, in France and Italy and the newly forming "nations" of Africa.[15] In both France and Italy, as I said before, one-fourth of the vote normally goes to the communist Party. In both of these countries Communists sometimes control city governments and the central government relies upon the local prefect to render them harmless.

In prefectural administration, the country is divided into provinces, each ruled by a fully-powered agent of the central government appointed by and responsible to a central Minister, in France the Minister of the Interior. In legal theory, all powers exercised over citizens in the province (in France it is called a Department) are those of the Prefect. Specialist agents of Central Ministries are bitter competitors in the provinces. The prefect, in turn, to protect himself, surrounds himself with Divisions of counterpart experts to deal with the expert agents of the Central Ministries on a somewhat more equal basis.

Although the fiction of Prefectural administrative problem-solving is maintained, the real function of the Prefect is political. He administers elections. He and his Lady maintain court where local notables can be seen. He makes exceptions to the laws and otherwise uses administrative resources to maintain the consensus backing the central government, such as it is. Central Ministry experts regard him as a political meddler and are bitterly critical of him, but still rush to use his charismatic support when they have difficult problems of enforcement (i.e., problems of consensus).

Although Prefects are no longer expected to crassly maniputate elections, they are still able to exercise great influence by the partisan use of their superior political knowledge of the locality. They are also in a position to grant many minor favors, such as issuing or expediting trading or liquor licenses, and more important favors by making favorable reports on large schemes for borrowing money or for local developments.

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15 The following discussion of Prefectural field administration relies heavily on James W. Fesler, *ibid.*, Brian Chapman, *ibid.*, and Jean Blondel, "Local Government and the Local Offices of Ministries in a French Departement *Public Administration* 37, (Spring, 1959)

Given the lack of political consensus in countries like France and Italy, national politicians must have local political bases and so are frequently important local politicians as well--elected members of Provincial, sub-Provincial or Commune (municipal) councils. They need the Prefect and his favors, as he needs their good reports to the Minister of Interior, and so a fruitful political exchange takes place that helps maintain the stability of government.

Provinces are subdivided into smaller areas (called arrondissement in France, Districts in Africa), headed by a Prefect's principle subordinate, the sub-Prefect. He, too, is a Viceroy in his district, a fully-powered agent of the central government, subject, of course, to vetoes by the Prefect and the Minister of Interior. His greatest power and most important role is supervision of the elected governments (Mayor and Council) of the Communes (of which there are about 38,000 in France). This supervisory power in France is called *tutelage*, and involves the veto of illegal acts, control of the budget, and the right to require that legally mandated actions be performed.

Many communes are so small that they lack expertise on all aspects of government and depend upon the sub-Prefect. Many Commune governments are so hopelessly divided politically that they act with complete political irresponsibility, depending upon the sub-Prefect to protect them with his veto. In some cases, local governments are so irresponsible that the sub-Prefect recommends that they be dissolved by the Prefect. Often he works subtly with the local politicos and others to get sensible solutions to local problems, solutions which are his own but which he sells to the locals or allows them to pretend the solutions are their own.

Lack of political consensus affects all levels of government, of course, and often the Prefectures must develop policies which should be developed in the capital but which the central government is politically unable to do. In France such Prefectural policies have been developed in fields of housing and management-labor relations; or Prefects may refuse to carry out court eviction orders. In countries like France and Italy, the Prefects are politically necessary, sort of embodiments of missing political virtues and at the same time convenient scapegoats for almost everything that goes wrong.

The Prefect performs many of the political functions of the former American political Boss. The conditions which made the Boss functional no longer exist in the American political system. Furthermore, federalism provides two constitutional officials who perform political functions performed by Prefects in prefectural governments--namely, the American Governor and the American Mayor. Consequently, field administrative systems in this country concentrate on administration--they are much less political than in some other countries.

It is interesting that the effort to create a non-political municipal executive in this country in the form of sehert City Managers has only been successful in communities low in political con-

flict. As a rule, Managers cannot escape politics and so their tenure depends upon political contingencies.[16]

Performance of political functions by Mayors and Governors (and the President) stimulates criticism, almost contempt, for them by "good government" people, much like the criticism and contempt directed toward the Prefects. There is a feeling that good government should be non-political. When we send advisers to the heads of developing countries we almost invariably send problem—solving experts whose advice often cannot be followed because it neglects the problems of political maintenance which are by far the most pressing ones facing these political Heads.[17]

The most relevant "expert" we have is the person who knows how to solve both kinds of problems, who knows how to assemble the needed amounts of both political consensus and administrative (problem-solving) resources to get things done which need to be done. Since there are so few of this type left in this country, one is tempted to suggest that the best "expert" we could send abroad to aid the developing nations would be Mayor Daley of Chicago.

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16 See Gladys M. Kammerer and John M. DeGrove, *Florida City Managers*, Studies in Public Administration No. 22, (Gainesville, Florida: Public Administration Clearing Service, the University of Florida, 1961).

17 See David S. Brown, "Strategies and Tactics of Public Administration Technical Assistance: 1945–1963", in John D. Montgomery and William J. Griffin, *Approaches to Development: Politics, Administration and Change* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), pp. 185–223; also David Wurfel, "Foreign Aid and Social Reform in Political Development: A Philippine Case Study", *Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.*, 53 (June, 1959), pp. 456–482.

VIII. Solution: Assign to an Office--The Ombudsman

In section five I mentioned that the most characteristic bureaucratic response to a perceived continuing problem was to assign it as a responsibility to some official and give him an organization of greater or lesser size as a tool or resource for dealing with it. The size of the organization provided will depend upon the amount and power of political pressure generated by the problem. For example, a group of local problems, under pressures arising from poverty, militancy, plus the generation gap, have been met with a new official and a new organization, the Community Psychiatrist (practicing "community psychiatry") and the Community Mental Health Center. The political steam behind these problems has generated large amounts of money for anything called "community psychiatry", even though we do not really know how to spend this money effectively. Gimmicks cannot wait upon knowledge.

The problem we are discussing, the frustrations of individuals treated with cold impersonality as problem categories rather than people by modern organizations, is beginning to get this typical treatment in one jurisdiction after another. I refer to the office of "Ombudsman". But first let me discuss some precursors of this office in this country. For a long time, legislative representatives and their staff, at least in Congress, have spent from one-half to three-fourths of their time receiving and trying or pretending to try to rectify complaints of individual citizens from their constituencies about harsh, unfair, arbitrary, stupid, or just plain inhuman treatment by bureaucrats.

Since Congressmen can become very important to bureaus, as aids in getting both funds and legal authority, these congressional overtures in behalf of suffering citizens are taken very seriously in the bureaucracy. On November 17, 1971, the day he was confirmed as the new head of the poverty program, Phillip Sanchez sent this message to his senior staff: "Response to congressional mail takes precedence over every other item of agency business." Recently, Elliott Richardson, Head of HEW, sent out a memo demanding prompt treatment of congressional correspondence. His memo contained a form telephone call that officials were to read over the phone to any congressman whose inquiry was not answered promptly. The official was to confess he had been "negligent in failing to acknowledge your inquiry of——about——." Later he should say, "I have told Secretary Richardson that we will reply to your inquiry by ——. We will provide you with a complete and comprehensive report on ——."[1] Many argue that today protection of individuals from bureaucrats is a more important function of congressmen than planning and passing legislation.

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1 Reported in Jack Anderson's column, *The Florida Times-Union*, 12/1/71,

Local communities are beginning to establish "Community Service Officers" and offices, or some similar title, as places where citizens can go for any kind of information or any kind of complaint about local government. Recently (12/4/71), the Urban Affairs subcommittee of the Joint Economic Committee of Congress proposed the establishment of some 40,000 locally elected officials and offices, federally financed, each with a jurisdiction of from 5,000 to 10,000 citizens, to help these citizens in all of their dealings with the national government. The subcommittee also recommended that the President establish a special representative in each of ten regions to report to him on all community problems.

Repeatedly in the last few years, journalists, political scientists, and some lawyers have been discussing an ancient Swedish institution--the Ombudsmen, which was formally established in Denmark in 1954 and thus brought to the attention of the world.[2] The Ombudsman (and his office) hear complaints of citizens about improper treatment by bureaucrats. They also discover cases on their own by tours of inspection. The ombudsman has power to secure information from the allegedly offending agency, to make recommendations for change, and to publicize the results. In Europe he can initiate court action against offending officials. He is supposed to be the individual's champion within giant bureaucracy. Andrew Shonfield, a British writer, associates this office with "a cult of bureaucratic humanity", and says "the special virtue of the Ombudsman lies in the deliberate effort to impart more humanity-that is, greater concern for individual circumstances--into the behavior of administration."[3] Many Western countries, and Japan, have established this office. It is appearing in many American Universities in response to student demands. Two American states have formally established the office--Hawaii and Nebraska, but the office actually exists in many more localities under a different name.

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[2] The following discussion of the Ombudsman rests upon Brian Chapman, *The Profession of Government* (London: Unwin University Books, 1959). See also Stanley V. Anderson, *Ombudsmen for American Government?* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Princeton-Hall, Inc., 1968); Walter Gellhorn, *When Americans Complain* (Cambridge, Masschuasetts: Harvard University Press, 1966); L. Harold Levinson, ed., *Our Kinds of Ombudsman*, Studies in Public Administration No. 32 (Gainesville, Florida: Public Administration Clearing Service, 1970); Richard J. Carlson, ed., *University of Illinois Assembly on the Ombudsman* (Urbana, Illinois: The Institute of Government and Public Affairs, 1969); and Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1969).

[3] Andrew Shonfield, *Modern Capitalism* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965)., p. 425.

It is difficult to evaluate this device precisely. Its very existence may have some symbolic power, detering bureaucratic arbitrariness somewhat and perhaps instilling some citizens (who have heard about it and are not afraid of government offices) with a little sense of security. However, from knowledge about bureaucracy in general and specifically about institutions somewhat similar to the ombudsmen, one can say with considerable confidence that the effect of the institution should not be more than barely noticeable on the just barely noticeable difference scale. If the ombudsman were to be staffed commensurate with the problem, that office would in turn become a giant bureaucracy with all of the same problems it was supposed to cure. Setting one bureaucracy to control another, our most basic bit of administrative wisdom (called "the staff system"), only changes the locale of the problem. "Who takes care of the care-taker's daughter while . . . . ", etc.[4]

The office of the ombudsman illustrates well the typical bureaucratic approach to a perceived problem--assign it to an individual and give him some administrative resources (budget and organization), the amount determined by the amount of political pressure perceived to be behind the problem. It is the approach of the gimmick, the gimmick being a bureau or office headed by a bureaucrat. The bureaucratic gimmick takes the place of deep analysis and understanding of the problem and so leads to formalism, to a false promise and deeper frustration, and almost assures that the problem will not be solved. The "administrator of administrative compassion" becomes an impersonal bureaucrat, his office routinized. The cases he can handle do not even scratch the surface of the problem, and it is quite obvious from the statistics that everybody knows this fact and that in any case clients cannot document the kind of frustrating and unsympathetic treatment which constitutes the problem.

As of 1959, the Swedish ombudsman got an average of 700 cases per year, one-third of which he had to dig up himself on his inspection tours (he and members of his staff cover the country every eight years). If these figures covered activities in his office in one city for one day, they would be interesting. Of these 700 cases, 200 are quickly dropped as unworthy, leaving about 500 cases per year which are pursued. About 150 of these will show "administrative errors, fault, negligence or bad faith." Only an average of 10 cases per year go to prosecution; the rest are settled informally. In his first year of operation, the Danish ombudsman, whose total staff consisted of eight people, including himself and the clerks, found 18 cases of maladministration.[5]

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[4] See Anthony Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy*, and Theodore J. Lowi, *ibid.*

[5] Chapman, *ibid.*, pp. 251–252, and p. 259.

Administrative appeals have never worked well.[6] If the reversal or correction of action depends upon officials higher in the organization, they must back-up their subordinates (who usually believe they are right) or else destroy the effectiveness of their organization as a governing, problem-solving, mechanism, a cost far too great to pay in the interest of one client's feelings. If the reversal of action occurs outside the organization, in another office, like an employee's appeal to a Civil Service Commission, reprisals against the appellant are likely and tremendously easy to carry out. A client would usually have less to lose than an employee, but the same principle holds, and the average citizen will not take the risk.

For generations, the military has had many formal avenues of complaint for enlistees or conscripts, including chaplins, the Inspector General's representatives, and superior officers.[7] Studies of the American soldier during World War II indicated that by and large, the only one of these channels of complaint the soldier felt it safe to use was his superior officer.[8] He did not care to risk "going around" his superior. In addition to a civil ombudsman, Sweden has a military one to protect individual members of the armed forces. As we would expect, the latter are hesitant to use this office, however, "...the overwhelming majority of the cases investigated by this office on grounds of maladministration emerge in the course of his personal tours of inspection."[9] In short, he has to dig them up himself. However, the real solution to the compassion and alienation problem in the military and all other total institutions is the Buddy system and network of the "inmate" culture which deals in all the basic needs, from extra food to love and emotional support.

An institution to correct the acts of organizations needs an independent source of information as well as power. When it must get its information from the accused organization, it is at the mercy of the latter. There are dozens of ways of hiding, or slanting, or reinterpreting incriminating information. Organization officials who could not protect their organization from an ombudsman's investigation would have to be a little dull and naive.[10] As for a continuing

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6 In one sense, administrative law develops because of this fact. See the Report of The Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, *Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies*, Senate Document No. 8, 77th Cong.

7 See Robert Gerwig and Wilson Freeman, "The Art of Military Ombudsmanship", in L. Harold Levinson, ed., *Our Kind of Ombudsman*, pp. 32041

8 Samuel Stouffer, *et. al.*, *The American Soldier*, Volume I (Princeton, New Jersey: The Princeton UniversityPress, 1949), pp. 398–401.

9 Brian Chapman, *ibid.*, p. 427.

10 See any realistic description of bureaucratic behavior, for example, Anthony Downs, *ibid.*, or Aaron Wildavsky, *The Politics of The Budgetary Process* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1964).

source of power, there seems to be none. Good government organizations are both weak and fickle. They go from fad to fad.

As I said before, we have a strong tendency to seek solutions of problems through passing an appropriation and establishing a new bureaucratic organization to deal with them. When bureaucracy is itself the problem, ther is a prima facie case against solving the problem in this way, a rebuttable presumption against the success of such a solution. The Ombudsman falls within this logical dilemma. Nevertheless, so great is the problem to which it is directed that this proposal should be given a fully supported try. If it does anything at all towards increasing bureaucratic monopolies' compassion towards the needs of helpless individuals, it is worthwhile.

IX. Solutions: The "New Public Administration"

A far more drastic attack on administrative impersonality and objectivity, and on our governmental priorities as well, is beginning to form within academic ranks, especially among young faculty members.[1] This growing group denies the possibility of a value-free social science. It declares that quantifiable, observable aspects of human relations and behavior are partial, leaving out the more important aspects of meaning and feeling. It holds that even our most basic ideas, those that seem natural and undetermined, are the products of presuppositions so basic as to be part of consciousness itself. It urges, therefore, that full knowledge requires an expansion of consciousness through development of full communication--communication of both facts and feelings without reservation, without self-serving suppressions and distortions designed as weapons in a battle of each against all. Consequently, it rejects positivism and the philosophy of science and toys with ideas from the philosophy of existentialism and phenomenology.[2]

Since it insists that no social science is value free, this "new public administration" and "new political science" urges the frank adoption of a basic value-egalitarianism. Our teaching and research should be aimed at helping the poor and the powerless, the halt and the maimed, the "little guy" in all power relations. The basic value, therefore, is the equalization of economic and political power. In more specific terms, the basic objectives of administration should be to solve the problems of poverty and racial or ethnic prejudice.

The role of administration is to be somewhat subversive--to promote these goals regardless of congressional or presidential mandates or the wishes of the "organized interests"--to be frankly political in the interest of the poor and downtrodden. Administration should be judged according to how well it achieves these values, not by its responsiveness to an unconcerned majority or its efficiency in achieving assigned goals. The role of schools of public administration is to recruit and indoctrinate such administrators, aptly termed "short haired radicals".

This viewpoint is a most amazing effort to establish a new claimant in place of the "owner" the public--a brazen attempt to "steal" the popular sovereignty. Regardless of congressionally or presidentially assigned goals, according to this group, public administrators should use their resources to advance the interests of this special clientele. They should go out into the political market place and seek political alliances with the poor, the students, the blacks and other racial groups, disaffected intellectuals, women's liberation groups, and I suppose prison inmates as well. If the establishment has enough sense to thwart this power grab, "it may be necessary for the

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1 See Frank Marini, ed., *Toward a New Public Administration: The Minnowbrook Perspective.*

2 Especially important is Alfred Shutz, *The Phenomenology of the Social World*, trans. by George and Walsh Frederick Lehnert (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1967), because this book is specifically a criticism of the sociology of Max Weber.

new Public Administration to develop outside of the existing institutional framework and thinking of the university and government".[3]

Beyond the political absurdity and immaturity of this program, it would not solve the problem of compassion for the poor and downtrodden in any case, and it would leave all of the rest of us, the vast majority, with our problem unsolved (presumably worse off, since the equalization could only be carried through by illegally taking things away from us). More important to our argument, a professionalized bureaucracy dedicated to the poor and the downtrodden would still be a professionalized bureaucracy. Expert treatment is impersonal treatment; bureaucratic treatment of any kind is institutional, impersonal treatment--treatment through rules and roles.

The occasional compassionate role-player would tire just as fast when dealing with the poor and downtrodden--in fact, faster since such people are likely to possess, on the average, less of the quality of loveability than the population at large. Furthermore, stepping out of the impersonal bureaucratic role can be dangerous for the role player. A perennial sequence in prison and state mental hospital administration is for guards and other officials to allow the relationship with the inmate to develop beyond the cool, official, impersonal, non-compassionate role relation and be unable to stop the development of the new, primary, compassionate relation with its new and essentially illegal expectations, until the instabilities and incongruities of the relationship are authoritatively corrected by superiors in an ego-shattering, emotionally painful experience, the whole sequence known to old hands as "getting burnt". Then follows a period of excessive coolness, excessive non-compassion.[4]

Compassionate treatment of the poor and downtrodden is somewhat of a hoax which functions largely to reduce the neurotic sense of guilt of the "more fortunate" person. What is often needed by the "less fortunate" person is a painfully enforced readjustment and reformation a failing personality and life style (e.g., psychiatric treatment, formal schooling) to enable him to stand on his own feet without the hand-ringing compassion of the guilt-ridden. In truth, the "poor and the downtrodden" are necessary objects of emotional exploitation by the neurotically guilty few.

Another aspect of the "new political science' and the "new public administration" is worth discussing briefly because it illustrates the illogic and danger of making a virtue out of subjectivity. ("I deny that you can divorce normative from empirical study", as one young enthusiast at a colloquium on "the New Public Administration" bravely shouted.) In this viewpoint, our politics is characterized by negotiation, compromise, and bargaining by interested parties--called a "politics of contract". Contrasted to this is a "politics of love", where confrontation rather than bargaining is used within a group of people who share a common set of absolute ethical principles.

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3 See "Comment: Empirical Theory and the New Public Administration", in Marini, *ibid.*, p. 233. A similar, barely veiled threat can be found in Marvin Surkin and Alan Wolfe, eds., *An End to Political Science: The Caucus Papers*, chapter 3.

4 Erving Goffman, "On the Characteristics of Total Institutions", in his *Asylums*, pp. 1–124.

The purpose of politics and confrontation, according to this view, is not to "win" but to assure that the political decision, the policy, is logically consistent with this absolute ethics. In Professor Lowi 's version of this process, bargaining is abolished, but the confrontation discussion is to test and gain consensus for the validity of the principle. In this way government again becomes principled (i.e., moral), and the public interest is refound. Government ceases to be a by-product of private horse-trading.

Professor Lowi's book, *The End of Liberalism,* is a most passionate plea for noncompassionate government. Government by principle is the opposite of government by compassion; it is universalism rather than particularism; it is the "rule of law" rather than the "rule of man"; and it is modern rather than traditional. One cannot disagree with the need for government principle, and fail to deplore too frequent departures from it, but one cannot imagine how this will bring compassionate government to the poor and the downtrodden. (Such is not Professor Lowi's objective.) Government by principle means decision by problem category rather than by the individual case.

I rather suspect that adherents of the "new political science" and the "new public administration" give a different interpretation to "government by principle". To this school of thought, all governmental decisions can be derived deductively from one or a few axiomatic philosophical principles, like those of the French Revolution, and especially equality. Human life has one dimension, equality, or at most a very few. Professor Oakeshotte has argued that the politics of deduction from a few fixed principles is a result of immaturity and inexperience and that it has been the basic political mode in the last few hundred years as the masses became involved in politics.[5] A study of large scale government decision-making by emergency agencies staffed with all sorts of civilian amateurs showed their chief governing skill to be the ability to use a simplistic logic.[6] Leftist activism has found deductive politics advantageous. It is simple; easy to understand; high in legitimacy; has a broad mass appeal; and, when it does not produce the desired result, can be junked unnoticed in favor of multidimensional social analysis. The following case illustrates these points.[7]

A few years ago a liberal Chicago lawyer lectured on the University of Illinois campus. He argued against certain areas of Urban law that need to be reformed because they reflect middle class values and not sufficiently the needs of the black community. (What would reformers do without the "Middle Class"?) Here already he has started the curious pattern of an unidimensional "middle class" and a multidimensional black community. He urged (the middle class?) that the middle class notion that integration must not be enforced be rejected (by the middle class?). White communities should be forcibly integrated (by whom?) by building public housing in them and

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5 See Michael J. Oakeshotte, *Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays* (New York: Basic Books Publishing Co.,, 1962), pp. 1–36. He champions experience over codified knowledge, or technique", or "doctrine".

6 Victor A. Thompson, *The Regulatory Process in OPA Rationing*, pp. 196–203.

7 Taken from a report in the Champaign-Urbana News-Gazette, March 29, 1969, p. 3.

requiring that a certain percentage of the residents be white. Should some of the white residents be tempted to move to the suburbs, he warned that public housing would be built there, too. You may run and dodge, he said, but we will follow you and put a public housing project down beside you. Do not think you can escape us.

This was the usual first stage of analysis where a policy is urged based only on a universal, abstract principle, in this case as usual, equality. Mankind is unidimensional and human reality is like a machine, governed solely by a few universal principles. The only way to prevent segregation he said, was to enforce integration (by whom against whom?).

The speaker moved into phase two of the procedure when he discussed zoning practices. These practices, he said, are based upon a few universal principles and do not recognize the multi-dimensionality of human society. Zoning does not achieve *his* objective. It "classifies and segregates residents". Therefore, we must change it so that it recognizes the many rich dimensions of man and the wide variations between men along all of those dimensions. "The codes are written on middle class values and assume all districts are the same, from the slums---to wealthy middle class residential areas." He urged that municipal codes be rewritten to meet the needs of every neighborhood; each neighborhood should be treated as though it were a municipality.

The objective for which this man sacrificed his intellectual integrity, though unstated, was clear enough. It was and is a value concern of many people, not just the radicals or the liberals, or any other group. For those who do not believe the end justifies the means, and especially the sacrifice of intellectual integrity, a different form of intellectual analysis would appear to be necessary.[8] They would have to start with the multi-dimensionality of all people. The theme of equality could not be erected into an absolute, although a very high position for it could be pressed and should, in fact, be one of the principal subjects of debate.

Such an approach would quickly resolve the discussion into one of distributions and the problem would become one of reconciling value conflicts arising in the course of discussing distributions. The resolution of such conflicts could only be in terms of trade-offs, of compromises, of bargaining-- never in terms of confronting absolute ethical principles as in the "politics of love", never in terms of "non-negotiable demands". In this bargaining the claims of the black community (a stereotyped and ambiguous term) could be pressed very strongly and such abstract universals as moral equality would undoubtedly provide strong reinforcement for these value concerns. The moral abstractions would serve the purpose of helping to get a very high priority for these concerns.

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[8] The following discussion of public problem solving depends heavily upon David Braybrooke and Charles E., Lindblom, *A Strategy of Decision*, and Charles E. Lindblom, *The Policy-Making Process* (Englewood Cliffs New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968).

In this form of argumentation, that absurdity, thc end justifies the means, would be strikingly absent; all men and institutions would bc multi-dimensional (complex) and stay that way throughout the argument; the issues would be conflicts of values arising in discussions of distributions; and they would be resolved by number of processses including bargaining, appeals to shared abstract moral principle, and analysis showing the proposed solution to be instrumental to a wider and more widely shared range of consequences (values) than had been at first supposed.

In the light of this analysis, recourse to the courts by activist reformers may be a mistake. Courts rule by deduction from general principles, in form at least (realists would argue that courts' decisions are psychological or ideological, their opionions being only and always rationalizaitons).[9] Courts lack the information and skill to rule in any other way. The only problem-solving training of lawyers is in a tortured and conventionalized logic. At no time are they taught knowledge of consequences or introduced to the techniques which depend upon such knowledge, such as statis-, tical decision theory. Decision by deduction from rules is the least compassionate kind there is. It also can result in self-defeating absurdities. For example, thc recent spate of decisions to the effect that the 14th Amendment requires equal (per pupil) dollar expenditures on public education from district to district and hence outlaws reliance on property taxes could have the effect, in a few cases at least, of requiring reduced per pupil expenditures in thc central city and increased expenditures in some suburbs. Money is only one of many things that go into the production of high quality educational output.

9 See, for example, Harold J. Spaeth, *An Introduction to Supreme Court Decision Making* (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1965).

X. Solutions: Changing Personalities, Changing Organizations

This account will by now strike the reader as hopelessly pessimistic. Actually, the reality of the situation is not as bad as it appears. Most people do not suffer unduly at the hands of the large, modern, bureaucratic organization. Human institutions are shaped by the kind of human material available to them.[1] Before industrialization can begin, there must appear some industrial men--some men and women who can imagine themselves in different and better circumstances, as rich persons, proprietors, doctors, teachers, or whatever "better" role is available.

They must also be socially mobile--that is, members of social institutions which will allow them to do something about these dreams. Membership in a large family, which puts loyalty to kinsman above everything, is a hopeless prospect for a young businessman. His family obligations to hire and support and finance kinsmen make it impossible for him to get ahead or even to stay even.

He must also be able to move geographically, both to avoid kinsmen and to find and move to new opportunities. As Daniel Lerner says, he must have geographical, social and psychological mobility--he must be able to change places, social positions, and personalities. And he must be motivated to want to do these things. Thus, industrialism arises apace with industrial man.[2]

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[1] Two examples will illustrate the general point discussed in this section. In East Africa, most people have limited monetary needs, most of their needs being satisfied in the traditional areas of their lineages. They are not, hence, committed to the labor market and have a very high turnover rate. Skilled labor, however, has a substantial investment of time and ego in skills and tends to be committed to the labor market. Therefore, industries that depend upon semi-skilled labor, where there is a high investment in training and high labour turnover are not competitive. Industries which depend upon either unskilled or highly skilled labor may succeed. See Walter Elkan and Lloyd A. Fallers, "The Mobility of Labor", in Wilbert E. Moore and Arnold S. Feldman, *Labor Commitment and Social Change in Developing Areas* (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1960).

Many managements in this country try to encourage a company-wide identification and loyalty stronger than that to the small, intimate, "primary" work group as a means of increasing control in general and productivity in particular. But what kind of socialization processes would be needed to create this stronger identification to the abstract, "secondary" grouping--the organization? Surely, as long as people are socialized in small primary groups--families--they will usually give their first loyalty to the smaller work group. Perhaps if all workers were socialized in secondary groups--say, orphanages--this management goal could be achieved.

[2] See Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society;* also Daniel Lerner, "Toward a Communication Theory of Modernization", in Lucian W. Pye, ed., *Communications and Political Development*, p. 327-350. See also Clar Kerr, John T. Dunlop, Frederick Harbison and Charles A. Myers, *Industrialism and Industrial Man* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964). Welfare and unemployment in Industrial countries is also partly a problem of "modernization" so defined--the modernization of "personalities", interpreting that term broadly to mean the development of skills and attitudes consistent with the achievement of modern personal goals.

One of the greatest enemies of industrialism is the extended family (very large ones are called tribes.). As the size and functions of the family decrease, creating a new type of man, industrial type organizations increase. As technology has decreed the ever larger, more abstract, more impersonal, more expert, less compassionate kind of organization, the kind of childhood experiences ("socialization") which would make membership in such organizations unbearbly painful has declined proportionately. We have the large impersonal bureaucracy, among other reasons, because the socialization which most people experience renders it, if not painless, at least tolerable. As Arthur Stinchcomb says, "The organizational that can be made at a particular time in history depend on the social technology at the time."[3]

To the extent that many people suffer either "in" our modern organizations or in dealing with them as clients, consumers, etc., we have a gap between the socialization of the individual and the technology of organization design, between the person and the institution. I feel strongly that this gap will be narrowed, if at all, not by gimmicks of the kind I have discussed in preceding chapters, but by further evolution of the socialization process and further development of organization design--by evolving personalities and organization structures. The truly determining elements of the problem are changing families, socialization practices, motivations personal orientations, work and the growing importance of creativity relative to productivity.

In societies changing from traditional to modern there is a period when both sets of behaviorial rules, the old and the new, are contradicting one another. Neither is able to exercise much control. Anomie or normlessness for the individual leads to disorganization of social institutions. Suicide and crime increase. Personal opportunism increases as each individual discovers he can find a semi-legitimate rule to justify just about anything. This situation leads to highly personalized behavior in government, to what we would call graft, corruption, bribery, nepotism, amicism.[4]

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[3] "Social Structure and Organization", in James March, ed., *Handbook of Organizations*, p. 153. For an empirical study and extended analysis of the relations between family socialization, personality, and kinds of organizations found in a society, see Daniel R. Miller and Guy E. Swanson, *The Changing American Parent* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1958). They found modern American family socialization (child rearing practices) consistent with the needs of a bureaucratic rather than entrepreneurial society.

The relation between socialization, personality, and the structural role needs of the society is heavily documented. For example, see Kurt Geiger, "Changing Political Attitudes in Totalitarian Society: A Case Study of Role of the Family", *World Politics*, 8(January, 1965), pp. 187–205; H.H. Golden, "Literary and Social Change in Underdeveloped Countries", *Rural Society*, 20 (1955) pp. 1–7; John Gulick, "Conservatism and Change in a Lebonese Village", *Middle East Journal*, 8 (Summer, 1954), pp. 295–307; Raphael Patai, "The Dynamics of Westernization in the Middle East", *Middle East Journal*, 9 (Winter, 1955), pp. 1–16; and Melvin M. Tumin, "Some Dysfunctions of Institutional Imbalances", *Behavioral Science*, 1 (July, 1956), pp. 218–223.

[4] See Fred W. Riggs, "The Sala Model: An Ecological Approach to the Study of Comparative Administrataion", in Nimrod Raphaeli, ed., *Readings in Comparative Administration*, pp. 412–432. See also Emile Durkhem, *Suicide*, trans. by John A. Spauldine and George Simpson (Glencoe,Illinois: The Free Press, 1951).

Individuals oscillate between new and old practices, neither providing satisfaction. New practices are copied and formally promulgated without being understood, while affairs are actually governed by older norms and relationships. Thus, a formal civil service system will only serve to hide somewhat an out and out system of nepotism or tribal favoritism. Dual pricing is endemic, the price serving both a modern economic function and an older, perhaps kinship or gift-giving, one.

Government is distrusted quite generally, and most people believe that you have to have "pull" or pay a bribe to get even the most elementary right honored by bureaucrats.[5] As for the "freed" peasant masses, they migrate lonely and alienated to the cities where they reconstruct a social system along the lines of communes of fellow tribesmen, while the old folks stay on the farm, also lonely, gradually becoming too weak to work it.

This description, while reasonably accurate, was designed to suggest a parallel with many young people in the advanced industrial societies (what some people are beginning to call post-industrial society). The breakup of the family is seen in the apparently growing rejection of parental rules and values from a fairly young age (15 or 16). A new set of personal behavior norms has not yet been constructed, although an antibourgeois youth culture is rapidly in the making, aided by the instant communication of the media.

As of yet, neither set of norms is working well; one has been rejected, the other is not yet complete or adequate and perhaps also not fully accepted. The result is a great increase in individualism, in personal opportunism in regard to organizations, and, I believe, interpersonal relations in general--take all you can get; give no more than you have to. There is a general anti-organization ("establishment") feeling approaching philosophical anarchy, which many young have embraced without exploring its history, literature, or implications. Many refuse to work for most organizations, regarded as part of the "establishment", both government and industry. To do so would be to "cop out".

For some, even more virulent destructive attacks against the old society and its "establishment" have been necessary, including bombing and sabotage. Others set their face against the present (new) society by digging out old clothing and hair styles, old farming methods (organic), and old industry--weaving, candle-making, small farming. Communes of young men and women replace families for awhile, and "relevant" educational courses are taught by the young themselves since the old establishment is "incapable of change".

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[5] A few years ago the Indian Institute of Public Opinion, for example, found that 65% of Indian farmers believed that you had to have influence ("pull") to get government help. The payment to officials of what Westerners would call "bribes" (baksheesh) to get the most elementary rights and services is very common in the underdeveloped countries. See Fred W. Riggs, *ibid*.

Why is the youth movement for the moment almost world wide? (Fidel Castro has just revealed that 25% of school age children in Cuba have dropped out and only 25% are at their proper grade level.) Because poly-normativism (competing codes) is for the moment almost world wide. To fall between two codes of personal conduct is to be subject to forces which are independent of the content of the codes. Poly-normativism is, however, a transient condition, a sort of "changing of the guard".

Among the various decisions an individual must make about a situation before he has defined it well enough to take action with regard to it is whether the situation calls for an individual, personal, orientation or a collective one--i.e., whether the situation calls for him to act on behalf of a collectivity or of himself. In the modern period the individual needs to be socialized to adopt the collective orientation in all of his dealings with economic and governmental organizations (actually, with "bureaucratic" organizations). This orientation is little more than the golden rule "norm" extended to non-primary organizations--do unto others as you would have them do unto you; or, in Kant's terms, so act that your actions could be generalized into universal law. Actually, the golden rule is our modern administrative norm of equal treatment--the norm of universalism.

Many primary, solidarity group experiences are consistent with this norm--for example, investing one's effort in the goals and contributions of the other group members; or, as the psychologists would say, "cathecting" their goals and contributions. Such small group experiences reinforce a collectivity orientation. At the same time, it is in the small group that we learn to expect special treatment and acquire the belief that someone has the power to extend it.

The argument that if A violates a norm, there will be a noticeable increase in violations of that norm is not convincing. In fact, it is, in that form, not true. A collective orientation will probably not be created by rational argument. In fact, it is likely that individual rationality experiences reinforce the personal, non-collective orientations. It is usually true that stealing work better for the individual in a society with little theft; that cheating works best for the individual in classes with little cheating; etc.

Individualism results from reinforcing experiences where deviancy is not punished. The "son-of-a-bitch" comes out ahead because the rest will not compete on his level. Our courts, as usual a generation behind the public, have been handing down the kind of decisions in the 1960s and 1970s that parents handed down in the 1940s and 1950s. Although this decisional orientation will change, it hasn't yet, and in March, 1972, the Supreme Court ruled, 5 to 2, that using obscene and threatening language to a policeman is protected by the Constitution--one more in a long line of decisions reinforcing deviancy and encouraging a personal rather than a collective orientation toward our institutions.

In child training, the origin of this reinforced individualism is "over-security"--where the child is not required to pay a price for his love. The permissive child-rearing of the past twenty-five years has been discredited and many parents have discarded it. (Even Dr. Benjamin Spock

has discarded it.) Corresponding social doctrines denying individual responsibility--psychiatric forgiveness, the responsibility of society, and other denials of individual freedom--are now under attack from many quarters. They may have about run their course. Excesses produce their counter forces. Note the growing antipathy to "coddling criminals". These changes, assuming that they are indeed occurring, all make easier the inculcation of the collective orientaiton norm--namely, *you* should not get an exception (favor)-- the social value of the administrative action is more important than its cost to you personally.

The continuing belief in favors--i.e., that there is someone who can grant them and that it is alright to get them--depresses the collective orientation. Belief in favors is incompatible with the Kantian imperative, the golden rule, the modern administrative norm--i.e., treat everyone in the same problem category alike (universalism). If I have the power to grant favours I obviously believe in them and cannot say to a suppliant, "if I grant you an exception I have to except all others similarly situated"; I don't have to do so if I have the power to grant favors.

Modern man needs to be comfortable with impersonality. All this amounts to is giving a high value to instrumentalism, to the achievement of established goals. Personalism *versus* impersonality is similar to group maintenance *versus* group goal achievement. Group maintenance is largely an affective and personal process. Group maintenance is less important today with our immense stock of standardized, interchangeable roles; our great geographical, social, and organizational mobility; our reduced interpersonal expectations; our segregation of affective needs in increased leisure and related opportunities and institutions (groups, hobbies, vacations, associations, play, etc.).

One would also expect a heightened instrumentalism to be associated with a longer time sense, with the ability to defer gratification (a good psychological definition of capitalism). Waiting for organizational action should, therefore, become less painful. In the normal course of maturation people acquire an increased ability to wait for gratifications. We would expect socialization processes to be more effective in this respect than they have been in the past.

The family is changing and so is the kind of socialization of which it is capable. Parental roles are changing, and especially the role of the wife-mother. Alternatives to the mother role are growing, as is the inclination for women to assume it. More and more women are refusing to "sacrifice" themselves for children. They demand work equality with men; "unisex"; womens' liberation; smaller families. As the Director of the Woman's Bureau recently reminded other women, jobs today "aren't men's jobs. Technology has made them anybody's jobs".

The Kibbutzem of Israel provide the most striking example of this change, the women having rejected motherhood for work equality and comradeship with men. When the children of the Kibbutz reach the organization, the latter will change regardless of any managerial philosophies so strategies. Of course, I do not expect mankind to lose his social needs--his needs for interper-

sonal affect, security, and reinforcement; but only that what satisfied these needs will change. I expect abstract systems to become more acceptable--impersonal systems of rules, artificial systems. They will be the source of more reinforcements, comparatively, than the favors of families (and other natural systems).

Much has been said about the growing "professionalization" of work, and so I will not dwell upon this factor at length. Professionalized work is associated with personal responsibility for both defining and solving problems; interorganizational mobility; peer evaluations rather than the bureaucratic hierarchical kind; motivation through professional growth, work itself, and problem challenge, rather than the actual or symbolical achievement of power and status in a sort of Maslowian primitivism. Such changes must be matched by changes in organizations--in the uses of authority, in hierarchy and communication, in incentive systems, and in many other aspects of organization life.

Incentive systems within our bureaucratic organizations have been based on the assumption that man's central needs were for security and prestige (esteem of self and others). Thus, by doling out, or withholding, money and status, the discipline needed by our technologies could be obtained. There is growing evidence that a long period of affluence has weakened these needs and thereby decreased their utility as incentives. Expressive, self-actualizing kinds of needs are becoming dominant.[6] This change, too, suggests change in organization structure and practices the same directions suggested by the professionalizing (or at least upgrading) of work.

We are approaching an overage of means in relation to ends, if we have not indeed reached that stage. This condition suggests an emphasis on creativity and innovation rather than production--the discovery of new uses for our resources more than their careful husbanding. This statement is supported by the fact that we sell abroad ten times as much technology as we purchase from abroad. Innovation needs, in turn, suggest the growth of smaller organizations, of temporary ones, of the use of limited project teams--in general, the greater use of small, temporary, non-routinized, interdisciplinary arrangements of various kinds. This development fits the growing automation of the functions of the the large production-oriented bureaucracy, first the mechanical ones and now increasingly the decisional and communication ones. As people are displaced from programmed and automated manufacturing industry they become available for a great increase in service industry, not so easily programmed, and amenable to much smaller organization units.

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6 See for example, Ronald Inglehart, "The Silent Revolution in Europe: Inter-generational Change in Post-In- dustrial Society", *American Political Science Review*, 65 (December, 1971), pp. 991–1017; and John B. Miner "Changes in Student Attitudes toward Bureaucratic Role Prescriptions during the 1960's", *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 16 (September, 1971), pp. 351–364; also A. H. Maslow, *Motivation and Personality* (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1954), especially chapter 5.

Perhaps I can summarize these last few pages by saying that as individuals change in our changing culture and less strongly need an organization to be like a family, more and more people will work in more and more organizations which are in some ways more like families. Man and his institutions will fit one another better. A perfect fit we can never expect, short of genetic or behavioral engineering. Such engineering is a long ways off. We have not yet decided how to select either the engineers or the design.

For a long time, many psychologically trained students of our bureaucratic organizations have regarded them as unfit places for adults to work. (See, for example, the works of Chris Argyris.) The reader may very well wonder why we should do any better in the future than we have done in the past. The answer, I think, is that our primitive technology determined the kinds of organizations needed. Organizations with dull, routinized, highly scheduled work, in a world with an excess of needs over resources, needed strong controls, strong discipline, centralized top-down planning. Technology has advanced tremendously and may no longer be so controlling. The other factors I have listed, freed somewhat from technological constraints, will have more power to shape man and his organizations. It is inconceivable that some cosmic perversity will maintain or even widen the gap between man and his institutions. I expect it to decline, unless man heeds the siren cries of false prophets, of which there are always many, and follows them into slavery.

The most potent threat is the growth of efficiency with regard to information and control systems. There is danger to the individual there. I will describe it briefly.

Administrative inefficiency with regard to information processing has the effect of dividing our lives into near autonomous compartments. Events in one compartment--say, kicking the dog at home--do not effect outcomes in another--say, promotion at work.[7]

Within organizations, this administrative inefficiency with regard to information processing results in departmentalization, as Chester Barnard said.[8] Pyramidal, hierarchical lines (of authority) act as a communications network, the executive positions therein as switch-boards. Communication within the departmentalized organization, and hence coordination and control, takes place by means of telephone and face-to-face conversations, memoranda, interdepartmental meetings. In all of these cases, communication, and hence coordination and control, depends somewhat on the cooperation of individuals and solidarity groups ("cliques"). They have something to exchange, namely, their cooperation. Therefore, they can strike informal bargains and, in this way, protect individual interests and needs.

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[7] This argument is developed in Victor A. Thompson, *Bureaucracy and Innovation*, chapter 5.

[8] Chester I. Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Harvard University Press, 1938). See also Donald G. Malcolm and Alan J. Rowe, eds., *Management Control Systems* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1960), *passim*. See also *Exodus* 18, 13–21, where Moses was advised by his father-in-law, Jethro, to set up a departmental system based on a span of control of 10 to ease the problems of communications.

The perfection of data processing technique may eliminate this means of individual protection.[9] Control systems may approach perfection. The compartmentalization of life and the departmentalization of the organization may break down. Information about events in one compartment may more likely show up in another. Backstage areas with their performance-spoiling information may disappear. Interdepartmental cooperation with regard to information flow within organizations may be less and less necessary as everyone is plugged into an automated information system. If all these things transpire, we will come closer and closer to the frightful day Orwell wrote about when each of us will be "front and center" at all times.[10] Should all these developments continue to completion, the needs and methods of the large bureaucratic organization would become triumphant and the last possibility of administrative compassion would disappear. Orwell would be seen as a prophet rather than a story-teller, and we would discover that our freedoms had resulted from administrative inefficiency, not the philosophies of Milton and Mill.

Although this "new management science" has been used in some areas where coordination, control, and speed of decision are crucial, as in the Air Force's SAGE (Semi-Automatic Ground Environment) air defense system, its proponents often complain about resistance from (illiterate) "humanists". The New Science has not spread greatly. In many places its promise has proved to be a false one--e.g., Planning, Programming, Budgeting (PPB) as a device for achieving greater rationality in government decisions.[11] PPB has been almost a total failure and has been dropped by State Governments almost as fast as it was adopted after 1965 when President Johnson ordered it installed throughout the Federal Government. (By the way, who is *responsible* for the millions of dollars and man-hours wasted on this gimmick? It all could have been saved had we more heroic resisters to "innovation".)[12]

The new management science developments have not been widely adopted because the needs of the era are for creativity, not more rationality, coordination and control. As Business Colleges blindly develop and turn out more control science and control scientists--experts in a mathematically demonstrated rationality--their product gets less and less relevant to business.

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9 The potentialities are quite thoroughly discussed in Allen F. Weston, *Privacy and Freedom* (New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1967), Chapter 7. See also Donald G. Malcolm and Alan J. Rowe, *ibid.*

10 The metaphor is suggested by Erving Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everday Life*, especially chapter 3.

11 For a discussion of PPB see Fremont J. Lyden and Ernest G. Miller, eds., *Planning Programming Budgeting: A Systems Approach to Management;* also *Public Administration Review* Vol. 26 (December, 1966), an Vol. 29 (March/April, 1969). The entire issues are devoted to PPB.

12 Allen Schick, *Budget Innovation in the States* (Washington, D.C. The Brookings Institution, 1971). The tacitly accepted model of the innovation processs projects the heroic, unselfish, innovator fighting the selfish, narrow-minded, beneficiaries of the *status quo*. An equally plausible and useful model would project the selfish or neurotic advocate of change for change's sake successfully resisted by analytical, heroic, unselfish critics of senseless or even damaging changes.

As Joseph McGuire says, we now have nonbusiness business schools.[13] The product of the business school increasingly must be trained by business itself, or by passed.

Administration, as Professor Lowi says, is rationality applied to social relations.[14] Administration involves rational choice; it is the result of decision making. It has *outputs* rather than *outcomes*. It takes place under prescriptions, the prescription of a plan of administration from higher authority--the "owner" or "his" representative--hopefully influenced by the universal prescriptions of rationality. The results as they affect individuals, therefore, are to be attributed to men (and specific men, if we have enough insight into the process), not natural laws or forces. Administration is an artificial system and is, therefore, always contentious.

Markets, societies, and other natural systems, on the other hand, have outcomes rather than outputs. These outcomes are statistical distributions, and if they form repeatable patterns are natural laws--as opposed to the manmade laws of administration. Natural systems are "self-regulating". The individual in this process appears to be a random factor relative to the decisions of any specifiable human being. The results of this process as they affect the individual, therefore, are not experienced as arbitrary and oppressive. They are fate. If not fate, the individual "has no one to blame but himself". (To avoid this painful conclusion, it has long been customary to personify the natural system, and to "blame society", an essentially meaningless proposition but undoubtedly valuable psychologically.)

Responding to cues is less painful than responding to orders; it preserves the sense of freedom and autonomy.[15] However, the use of cues instead of orders, or vice versa, tells us absolutely nothing about the amount of social control over the individual. Freedom cannot be contrasted to government or other organization. Control in a natural system, which operates solely by cues, can be near absolute, as the following old news story illustrates.

> Lucknow, India (U.P.)--Local doctors are hard pressed to save the life of a boy who apparently has lived in the jungle all his nine years. He is so terrified of humans he tries to bite the hands of those who feed him.
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> The boy was picked up by police January 17. He was so emaciated he almost died, doctors said. And his health has not improved, because he has an intense dislike of cooked meat, milk, porridge, fruit juice and bread.

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13 Joseph W. McGuire, "The Collegiate Business School Today", *Collegiate News and Views*, 25 (Spring, 1972), pp. 1–5.

14 *The End of Liberalism*, pp. 30ff.

15 See especially Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics, Economics, and Welfare*, and many of the subsequent writings of Lindblom, for example, *The Intelligence of Democracy: Decision Making Through Mutual Adjustment* (New York: The Free Press, 1965). See also B.F. Skinner, *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1971).

> "He only burst into life when we produce some raw meat for him", one doctor said. His body is covered with scars, the doctor said, and his hands are like claws, with the nails long and talonlike and turned inward, [Note the difference between the natural system criterion of "survival" and the criterion of "efficiency".]

A natural system is studied statistically, and the individual's behavior is subsumed under some probalistic law; it is, in other words, determined--to the extent that anything is determined by probabilities. Artificial system, prescriptive, lawc, on the other hand, the orders of a conscious, organizational, decision-making process, presume a free individual. Otherwise, their issuance would be senseless. The individual is presumed to have the freedom to obey the law, which means, of course, that he has the freedom to disobey it.

Organizations with their orders instead of cues, therefore, including the state and its laws, are in some way involved in the creation of freedom. The perception of more freedom within the statistical distributions of a natural system is more psychological (non-cognitive) than real. The individual has a better chance under the rule of law, as Professor Lowi says, even if the law is not the best. He has the best chance under a regime of prescriptive rationality where the many rationalities of the individuals and groups have been represented in some meaningful form and aggregated.