

Administrative and Political Development: A Structural-Functional Dichotomy in Developing Countries

By Tawat Wichaidit *

I. INTRODUCTION: GENERAL COMMENTARY

Political science has not often, and rarely intentionally, taken on applied forms. Apart from its contributions to public administration and constitution-making it has generally contented itself with observing and interpreting human behavior. Despite this attached posture, its composure as a discipline has been severely shaken by the obvious changes in the world it has so long contemplated and by the apparent irrelevance of many of its traditional concerns.¹ A succession of post war events has sapped its self-confidence. First it was challenged by the durability of little-known political institutions in the "second world", and then by the unexpected difficulty of transferring well-known institutions to the "third world," the developing countries.

These challenges to political science were not completely unheralded. For decades distastisfied political scientists had been experimenting with new comparative approaches, running the gamut of structuralism and functionalism, developing new vocabularies, and exploring new models and typologies. The more these new approaches presented new insights, the more archaic the traditional methods seemed. Some of the most fundamental knowledge about what were first called "non-Western cultures" had to be imported from other social sciences. One of the most useful new concepts in political science-- the "political culture" -- shows by its very name its indebtedness to anthropology,² and other innovations in recent political thought can be traced to social psychology, sociology, and, of course, economics. At the same time, the sudden emergence into statehood of scores of colonies and other dependencies made it useful to introduce quantitative methods that had been less interesting to policy makers when only five or six countries really counted. To make a long story short, there was a revolution in the methods of political science that coincided with the revolution of rising expectations on behalf of, and within, the developing

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¹ John D. Montgomery, "The Quest for Political Development," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (January 1969), pp. 285 - 295.

² Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965), pp. 1-44; 337-374.

countries Development was recognized as a multidimensional problem that included politics, and political science was becoming a multidimensional discipline that afforded much more adequate understanding of the developing countries than would have been possible a generation before.

On the other hand, writers of administrative change in developing societies tend to think that the literature on the development process in those societies is rather contradictory with regard to the role of the administrative agents.³ Some authors see such societies facing bureaucratic dominance which threatens both the creation of independent political institutions and the expansion of the economy. A recent group of essays examining the role of the bureaucracy in the development process concludes that "by and large, ... we are witnessing in many places the emergence of overpowering bureaucracies...."⁴ LaPalombara fears that "bureaucracies of the developing areas will... hamper the growth of a private entrepreneurial class,"⁵ and that where bureaucracies are cohesive and coherent, "political parties tend to be ineffective and voluntary associations, rather than serving as checks on the bureaucracy, tend to become passive instrumentalities of the public administrators."⁶ One case study of Thailand pictures the bureaucracy in a bureaucratic polity as a self-serving mechanism, not controlled by independent political forces, acting in a way that is in the bureaucrats' own self-interest, but irrational for the country's economic development.⁷

However, bureaucratic polities are not completely stable systems. Certain kinds of changes may modified the influence of bureaucrats on politics. The development of comparative political systems seems to reduce bureaucratic power. When there is a change of government, new individual representative of rural interests tend to move into positions of authority, displacing politicians with administrative backgrounds and other members of the urban elite.⁸ The rural politicization which accompanies the efforts of political parties to gain mass support may make bureaucrats more conscious of local desires. Frequently, such developments lead to severe restrictions on bureaucratic power. A possible consequence of such politicization may be to make many administrative positions less attractive than they were before bureaucrats became subject to such pressures. The lower prestige that may be associated with government jobs is an indicator of the downward social mobility that threatens bureaucrats after a political system becomes accessible to other social groups.

³ Leslie L. Ross, Jr., and Noralou P. Ross, "Administrative Change in a Modernizing Society," *ASQ*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (March 1970), pp. 69-77.

⁴ Joseph LaPalombara (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 25.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁷ Fred W. Riggs, *Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity* (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1966), p. 131.

⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

At any rate, no developing country could establish itself as a pure isolationist. Aids and technical assistance are being poured into the Third World countries quite heavily. Main impacts of these international activities upon political systems and bureaucracy of recipient societies have gain a significant attention from scholars in this field recently.⁹

If we assume that the development of a society depends on capabilities of its sub-structures, i.e., social, economic, nolitical, and administrative in dealing with changes within that society, the question to be raised is : which sub-structure needs to be emphasis.

To narrow down the discussion for the purpose of this paper, we may turn our interest to the analysis of selected sub-structures: political and administrative. There are series of questions that can be asked along this framework of study, e.g., which one needs to be emphasised and under what conditions?, what should be general conditions?, should both sub-structures be as effective as they were, if the emphasis should be placed upon them simultaneously?, etc. These are the nature of questions that writers in this field of study usually ask,. This paper is designed to explore more understanding about these problems in developing countries.

Theories of Administrative Development

✓ With increasing theoretical attention, scholars have tried to determine which types of relationship between the administrative and the political sub-structures of a society are conducive for their development.¹⁰ Two positions on this question are clearly discernible. Inayatullah, a new emerging figure in this field has tried to summarize this argument. In his own words :

...according to one position, administrative development occurs when the political subsystem of the polity is developed enough to be able to put restraints on the bureaucracy. Otherwise the bureaucrat tend to use the power and resources at their disposal to advance their own personal and group interests. This not only leads to a decline in the efficiency and probity of the bureaucracy itself but also leads to a retardation for the development of the political subsystem of the polity. More explicitly this position assumes that a balance of power between the two subsystems is a necessary

⁹ See, for examples, Milton J. Esman, "Foreign Aid: Not By Bread Alone," *Public Administration Review* Vol. XXXI, No. 1 (January-February, 1971), pp. 92-100; Gart N. Jones, "Failure of Technical Assistance in Public Administration Abroad," *Journal of Comparative Administration*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (May 1970), pp. 3-51; and Ferrel Heady, *Bureaucracies in Developing Countries: Internal Roles and External Assistance* (Bloomington, Indiana: CAG Occasional Papers, March 1966).

¹⁰ Warren F. Ilchman has done an excellent job in lisitng and criticizing related literatures in regard to this subject, see his article on, "Rising Expectations and Revolution in Development Administration," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. XV, No. 1 (1965), pp. 301-328.

condition for the development of each. Implicitly, however, this balance should be tilted in favor of the political subsystem to claim the Prometheon of bureaucracy. The corollary of this thesis is that any effort to enhance the efficiency of the bureaucratic subsystem through administrative reforms is likely to upset this balance and therefore retard both political and administrative development.¹¹

In the first instance, a small number of scholars, to some extent subscribe to this view.¹² Fred W. Riggs is one of the prominent advocate of this group. In one of his articles, he even made a crude analogy of this first proposition, having a ship's rudder and engine-power as political and administrative substructures respectively:

...suppose that a ship has lost its rudder but that the engineer seeking to rectify the situation is unaware of this fact. He concentrates on building up engine-power, forcing the helpless ship to go around in circles more rapidly than before, still unable to reach its destination. Yet if the steering functions were adequately performed, an increase in speed might well be regarded as most useful....¹³

On the other hand, the second position countends that in many developing countries, the administrative substructure is more developed and has incorporated modern values and norms of the society. Ralph Braibanti is the main advocate of this group.¹⁴ It is supported, to some extent, by Professors Milton Esman and Ferrel Heady.¹⁵ In terms of values and norms which have been incorporated by the administrative substructure, Inayatullah has described the essence of the second position in the following manner :

¹¹ Inayatullah, "An Analysis of Intra-Polity Balance and Bureaucratic and Political Development in the Framework of a Theory of Subsystems," *SEADAG PAPERS* (New York: The Asia Society, 1967).

¹² S.N. Eisenstadt, "Problems of Bureaucracy in Developing Areas and New States," in Bert F. Holelitz and Wilbert E. Moore (eds.) *Industrialization and Society* (Hague, 1963); Lucian Pye, "The Political Context of National Development," in Irving Swerdlow (ed.) *Development Administration: Concept and Problems* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1963), pp. 25-43; Fred W. Riggs, "Bureaucrats and Political Development: A Paradoxical View," in LaPalombara, *op. cit.*, pp. 120-167, and his *Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964).

¹³ Fred W. Riggs, "Relearning an Old Lesson: The Political Context of Development Administration," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. XXV, No. 1 (March 1965), pp. 77-78.

¹⁴ Ralph Braibanti, "Administrative Reforms in the Context of Political Growth," in F. Iulick (ed.) *Symposium on Research Needs Regarding the Development of Administrative Capabilities in Emerging Countries* (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1966), Part II; *Political and Administrative Development* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1969), his recent publication which is edited by him comprises several interesting articles by prominent writers in this field and it also demonstrates his main belief in his thesis especially on pp. 3-106.

¹⁵ Milton Esman, *The CAG and the Study of Public Administration: A Mid-term Appraisal* (Bloomington, Indiana: CAG Occasional Papers, 1966), and Ferrel Heady, *op. cit.*; *Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp. 98-110.

The capacity of the bureaucratic subsystem to infuse these values and norms will be severely limited if its autonomy is not protected from other presumably chaotic and traditionalistic subsystems of the society and particularly the political subsystem. The breakdown of insulation between bureaucratic and political subsystems at a time when the former has not adequately developed the institutional capability to meet the ever-escalating demands of the latter, will lead to a decline in the efficiency and probity of the bureaucratic subsystem. Therefore, the responsiveness of the bureaucratic subsystem to the political subsystem is not related to its probity and efficiency. Its arbitrary use of power can be more effectively controlled by internal restraints emerging from internalized values of institutional checks imposed by the judiciary until the political subsystem of the polity achieves a high level of institutional maturity.¹⁶

In any event, there is at least one character that two above arguments shared. The analysis is not a snap-shot of any one particular structure or system. It is rather an accumulation of ideas and theoretical frameworks after those writers have observed and studied the two phenomena for a long period of time. Furthermore, it seems agreeable among scholars that following independence, developing countries declined in both political integration and administrative efficiency. Such a trend appears inevitable and can be proved on empirical evidence and by theoretical reasoning. Lucian Pye puts the degeneration process succinctly:

...the leader of such nationalist movement have tried to achieve destiny by politicizing, and hence corrupting, the upper reaches of the administrative structures, while allowing the main base of their movements to wither and decline to the point that they can be used to put an ritualistic demonstration at times of "election" or when foreign visitors need to be impressed. When the division between the administrative and political is violated to such an extent, the capacity for effective administration declines and the development of political processes is also stifled.¹⁷

We may conclude that the question on which scholars disagree is whether such a trend can be reversed and guided in the direction of pluralistic politico-administrative tradition. Fred W. Riggs seems pessimistic. He thinks, as his crude analogy demonstrates earlier, that the trend will most likely lead to authoritarianism and totalitarianism. The other scholars are not as pessimistic and deterministic: Braibanti, Pye, Heady, and Esman are hopeful of the capabilities of the developing societies to follow the Western path.

¹⁶ Inayatullah, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

¹⁷ Pye, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

II. ADMINISTRATIVE AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: BASIC UNDERSTANDING

Bureaucracy: Instrumental or Multifunctional?

Politics and administration are becoming so interwoven in the study of developing countries that the apparent autonomy and neutrality of administration may, in reality, become a facade.¹⁸ Criteria developed to characterize the reality of administrative autonomy and neutrality and pluralist politics may prove inadequate to capture the character and strength of an institution in any developing country where politics is diffused or pervasive and social forces operate through a complex pattern of undifferentiated and non-autonomous structures.¹⁹ Students of administration have long since given up the illusion that there is, or can be a clear-cut structural differentiation between the policy-making and policy implementing functions.²⁰ Most would agree that higher level bureaucrats are inevitably drawn into the policymaking process even in such structurally differentiated political system as that of the United States. Nevertheless, most of scholars continue to be influenced by the normative expectations that the role of the bureaucrats should be essentially "instrumental", and herein lies the source of much confusion. There is a tendency to equate instrumental with "unifunctional". To conclude subconsciously that since most Western higher bureaucrats appear to be performing an instrumental or responsible role, their role must be essentially a unifunctional, or at most, a limited bi-functional role. Yet, this is not the case at all. In both developed and developing countries, administrators perform multifunctional roles.²¹

The tendency to confuse instrumentality with unifunctionality apparently has confused a number of observers of both Western and non-Western bureaucracies to develop erroneous generalizations about the roles of bureaucrats in these different bureaucratic systems. For example,

¹⁸ One study about problems of administrative and political development in India comments: "Administrative challenge cannot be studied in isolation from the emerging pattern of politico-administrative relationship.

In fact, the pattern of politico-administrative relationship would at times form the background for the study of the problem under review, at others would explain the factors responsible for the administrative bottlenecks and at still others would even cover some important aspects of the administrative challenge...," see, M.V. Mathur, Iqbal Narain, U.M. Sinha and associates, *Panchayati Raj in Rajasthan* (New Delhi, 1966), p. 255.

¹⁹ A.T.X. Rahman, "Theories of Administrative and Political Development and Rural Institutions in India and Pakistan, *SEADAG PAPERS* (New York: The Asia Society, 1967), p. 16.

²⁰ Richard L. Harris, "The Role of the Administrator under Conditions of Systematic Political Change," *CAG Occasional Papers*, Bloomington, Indiana, 1967.

²¹ *Ibid.*

in his excellent book, Ferrel Heady delineates the role of the higher bureaucrats in a wide spectrum of political systems, both developed and developing.²² However, he seems reluctant to accept the multifunctionality of the administrator's role in the West, and therefore he concludes that the higher bureaucrats in the developing countries are more likely to perform multifunctional roles than their counterparts in the West. In his words:

At a minimum we can say that there is a relationship between political modernity and bureaucratic specificity of function. The bureaucracies in developed countries resemble the diffracted model, with its more restricted functional activity for the bureaucracy; the bureaucracies in the developing countries are more likely to be multifunctional, participating actively in policy-or rule-making and even in interest articulation and aggregation.²³

Heady's conclusions contrast rather markedly with those of Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell. Unlike Heady, they emphasize the multifunctional importance of bureaucracies in the developed political systems of the West. They explain their concept by the following discussion:

The conception of bureaucracy which we have been elaborating is one of multifunctionality. And while all political structures are multifunctional, the specialized officialdoms and bureaucracies of differentiated political systems are more multifunctional than almost any of the other types of structure. Bureaucracies dominate the output end of the political conversion process: they are indispensable in the rule-making and adjudication processes as well as influential in the political processes of interest articulation, aggregation, and communication²⁴

The reason for this wide divergence of views, as Almond and Powell have suggested, is that most students of bureaucracy in the West have been more concerned with the "problem of making bureaucracies instrumental to political purposes and responsive to ideological norms" than with establishing what functions they perform.²⁵

From the above discussion that had the role of the bureaucrats as a critical variable in the study to find a relationship between administrative and political substructures of each society,

²² Ferrel Heady, *Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective* (Englewood Cliffs., N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp. 73-97.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

²⁴ Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston: Little Brown, and Company, 1966), pp. 157 - 158.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 145.

it is clearly seen that there has been a very close relationship between them in a very confusing manner. Braibanti, one of the main advocates of administrative and political development, tries to overcome this problem by presenting some characteristics of political development which are especially relevant to administrative development. He lists four characteristics, namely, Architectonics, Diffusion of Power, Institutions, and Innovation,²⁶ from which he tries to demonstrate a very close tie between administrative and political development in developing countries that have characteristically been colonized by western power. He accepts some limitations in trying to achieve that level of understanding. He explains his method of analysis in the following manner:

The universe of empirical referents is too vast and too disordered to allow for any rigorously constructed meaningful relationship between experience and definitions of (political and administrative) development. Probably the best to be expected is the combining of intuitive theoretical insights in proportions varying with the definer with empirical analysis of some new political systems and with some historical perspective or older (e.g., European) systems. In such conditions there are as many sets of criteria as there are definers, each set suiling some immediate expository purpose. Certain attributes, four in number, which seem to have an important relevance to administrative reform are selected and discussed²⁷

Before going into the discussion in a more detailed manner, it is appropriate to set up some theoretical framework for further exploration about the concept of political development.

Political Development: Definitions of the Concept

As mentioned earlier, political scientists in the 1960's began to pursue more actively their interest in what was variously called political modernization or political development. Their starting point was the concepts of tradition and modernity, eventually this essentially comparative and static focus gave way to a more dynamic and developmentally oriented set of concern.²⁸

²⁶ Ralph Braibanti (ed.), *Political and Administrative Development* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1969), pp. 32-77. Though Braibanti points out that the primitive nature of the study of development is that identical concepts are often expressed in different terminology and different attributes are given varying emphases, he himself is no exception of "Ideology" set forth by LaPalombara. LaPalombara regards ideology as involving "a philosophy of history, a view of man's present place in it, some estimate of probable lines of future development, and a set of prescriptions regarding how to hasten, retard, and or modify that developmental direction... a set of values that are more or less coherent... (and the linking of) given patterns of action to the achievement or maintenance of a future or existing state of affairs." See, Braibanti's page 38 and Joseph LaPalombara, "Decline of Ideology: A Dissent and an Interpretation," *American Political Science Review*, IX (1966), pp. 5-18.

²⁷ Braibanti, *op.cit.*, p. 34.

²⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, "The Chage to Chage: Modernization, Development, and Politics," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (April 1971), pp. 283-323. He presents an extremely interesting discussion about the concept of political development in this article.

The first publication which undoubtedly played the major role in focusing the attention of political scientists on developmental problems was *The Politics of the Developing Areas*, edited by Gabriel Almond and James Coleman. The principal intellectual impact of the book came from the introduction by Almond and to a lesser degree, the conclusion by Coleman.²⁹ This impact was very largely the result of their application to the politics of non-Western countries of a general concept of the political system. Almond distinguishes between developed and developing political systems to the extent that the former is characteristic of a modern society and the latter of a traditional society. His distinctive contribution in this respect was the insistence that all political systems are culturally mixed, combining elements of modernity and tradition.³⁰

Although the aforementioned book is a work in comparative politics, it is not one in political development. It does not present a concept or theory of political development though the presentation of a behavioral and systems approach for the analysis of comparative politics has been outstanding. The phrase "political development" is notably absent from its vocabulary. It is concerned with the analysis of the political systems of developing societies and the comparison of those systems of modern societies. Its key categories are system, role, culture, structure, function, socialization. They are categories essential to the comparative analysis of political systems; they are not oriented to the change and development of political system.³¹ Almond posited a number of functions which must be performed in any political system and then compared systems in terms of the structures which perform those functions. Though he mentioned about developmental models as his theoretical frameworks "...to understand differences precisely and grapple effectively with the processes of political change ...,"³² but he did not attempt to present a "developmental model" which would constitute to the understanding of "the processes of political change."

Six years later, Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr. presented with another major theoretical work which was concerned with political dynamics and focused explicitly on political development as a subject and as a concept.³³ The earlier set of political functions (now termed "conversion functions") was now supplemented by categories which described more fully the demands and supports which operate on the "input" side of the political system and by categories which described the "output" capabilities of the political system in relation to its environment (extractive, regulative, distributive, symbolic, and responsive).³⁴

²⁹ Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (ed.), *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press, First Princeton Paperback Printing, 1970), pp. 3-64, 532-576.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 22-25.

³¹ Huntington, "The Change to Change.....," p. 299.

³² Almond and Coleman, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

³³ Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966).

³⁴ *Ibid.*

Almond and Powell argue that political development is the response of the political system to changes in its societal or international environment and, in particular, the response of the system to the challenges of state building, nation-building, participation, and distribution. The three criteria of political development were held to be: structural differentiation, subsystem autonomy, and cultural secularization.³⁵

In the meantime, Lucian W. Pye compiled a fairly comprehensive listing of ten meanings which had been attributed to the concept of political development:

1. the political prerequisite of economic development;
2. the politics typical of industrial societies;
3. political modernization;
4. the operation of a nation-state;
5. administrative and legal development;
6. mass mobilization and participation;
7. the building of democracy;
8. stability and orderly change;
9. mobilization and power;

10. one aspect of multidimensional process of social change.³⁶

Pye also attempted to summarize the most prevalent common themes on political development as involving toward: increasing *equality* among individuals in relation to the political system; increasing *capacity* of the political system in relation to its environments; and increasing *differentiation* of institutions and structures within the political system. These three dimensions, he argued, are to be found "...lying at the heart of the development process."³⁷ In a similar vein, Huntington's effort to generalize about definitions of political development found four oft-recurring concepts: rationalization, national integration, democratization, and mobilization or participation.³⁸

Huntington argued that the "quest for political development" led political scientists to grapple with three more problems:

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Lucian W. Pye, *Aspects of Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1966).

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 31-48.

³⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics*, XVII, (April 1965), pp. 387-388.

1. What was the relationship between political development and political modernization?;
2. was political development a unitary or a complex concept?;
3. was political development a descriptive or a teleological concept?39

He, then, came up with at least three solutions to these problems:40

1. as either an aggregating concept or a distinguishing concept, in short, political development is superfluous. The concept of political development, he said, serves in effect as a signal of scholarly preferences rather than as a tool for analytical purposes.41
2. in regard to the study of political development, political science finds itself in a familiar ambiguous methodological positions between its two neighboring disciplines, namely, sociology and economics.
3. if political scientists had modeled themselves on the sociologists and talk about political change in imitation of social change rather than political development in imitation of economic development, they might have avoided many of the definitional and teleological problems in which they found themselves.

Political development will be discussed along this line of reference in regard to its relationship with administrative development. This will be the next task of this paper. The main purpose of the above discussion is to avoid the conflict of presenting different definitions of political development.

39 Huntington, "The Change to Change", pp. 301-305.

40 *Ibid.*, pp. 304-305.

41 This is quite a severe blow to other political scientists. It may be the problem of using the different terms for the same meanings as I mentioned earlier. In this respect, he made an excuse for his earlier publication, i.e., *Political Order in Changing Societies*, the reason why the concept of political development was quietly dropped. He said, "I focus instead on what I conceive to be the critical relationship between political participation and political institutionalization without worrying about the issue of which should be labeled 'political development.'"

III. ADMINISTRATIVE AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT : PATTERNS OF RELATIONSHIP

There have been two broad meanings of the phrase "administrative development." Firstly, it has been synonymous with administrative change, describing the variety of important revisions of administrative practice and modernization that all administrative entities engage in from time to time. Professor John D. Montgomery has adopted such a definition and describes it as follows:

Administrative reform (or development) is, of course, a political process in that it must adjust the relationships between a bureaucracy and other elements in a society, or within the bureaucracy itself...it is an intellectual problem as well, in that accepted principles and theories of administration find their ultimate test in the many unexpected consequences of their application.⁴²

Montgomery thinks that administrative development has lost its grip on the imagination of political scientists, because specialists have concentrated more on the processes and even the mechanics of development than on its political purposes and interactions. The current literature on the subject ignores the conceptual problems of adapting static models of administrative perfection to dynamic political reality, leaving them instead to advisors, practitioners, and politicians.

On the other hand, a different use of "administrative development" has grown out of efforts to assist in the modernization of the developing countries. It is conceived of as the implanting of the administrative technology mainly derived from the Western nations in those countries. Ferrel Heady has noted that administrative development is based on the confidence "that developed societies in the West have achieved administrative capabilities that are transferable to developing countries," and that such "administrative improvement or up grading is *ipso facto* desirable and should be carried out wherever possible at the most rapid feasible rate."⁴³

Since the concern of this paper is primarily with the developing countries, the second definition of administrative development has been adopted. And since there has been a wide variety of definitions of political development as earlier mentioned, it is appropriate for this paper and the discussion of the relationship between administrative and political development to adopt

⁴²John D. Montgomery, "Source of Bureaucratic Reform: A Typology of Purpose and Politics," in Braibanti (ed.), "Political and Administrative ...," p. 427.

⁴³Heady, "Bureaucracies in Developing Countries ...," p. 8.

the approach of Huntington as offered in his *Political Order in Changing Societies*. He particularly stresses on *institutionalization* and this fits meaningfully with administrative development which is essentially institution oriented. In his words:

The existence of political institutions...capable of giving substance to public interests distinguishes politically developed societies from underdeveloped ones.⁴⁴

To evaluate whether administrative development has facilitated or impeded the struggle in developing countries to achieve viable political institutions, it is necessary to examine types of regimes and the political power elements they are based on.⁴⁵ Roderick T. Groves suggests that

Some types may generally support administrative development but not be successful (or seek to be successful) in developing solid and enduring political institutions. On the other hand, it may be that power elements that have the greatest institutionalizing impact are indifferent or opposed to administrative reform. But whatever the case, where the political process is based on minimal structural continuity the role that administrative reform will be permitted to play will be singularly determined by the power-element in control. The same can be said for political institutions.⁴⁶

For a practical matter, we will divide the following discussion into four parts, i.e., the pattern of relationship between administrative development and the military, between administrative development and the elitist bureaucracy, between administrative development and dominant leaders, and between administrative development and political parties respectively.

The Military and Administrative Development

Following Huntington's thesis, the prominence of the military in politics in developing countries can be attributed to the very low level of political institutionalization. Though the military's background is highly institutional and a source of an understanding of the value of institutionalization that might favor the institution building concept, in actuality military regimes have not been the strong supporters one would expect. The reason for this seems to lie in an aversion to the rough and tumble of politics. Military regimes often take power after a divisive and turbulent political period in order "to restore order and national harmony." Their justification for their own entry into politics is *to end politics* and they usually begin by outlawing the most vigorous and conspicuous of the pre-military political institutions. In any event, some military regimes have supported administrative development while others have not. The crucial difference seems to lie in the

⁴⁴ Huntington, "Political Order...", p. 28.

⁴⁵ An interesting study has been done along this line, see Roderick T. Groves, "Administrative Reform and Political Development," *Development and Change*, Vol. II, No. 2 (1970-1971), pp. 36-51,

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

attitudes of key leaders. If one or more of the key figures in a military government supports administrative development the regime is likely to support significant development activities. If the principal leader supports development a good deal of implementation may result. Such were the cases in Pakistan and Thailand with the military regimes of Ayub Khan and Sarit Thanarat respectively. The Sarit regime brought a sharp change to Thai administrative structure. Several reorganization committees were appointed for the purpose of recommending change in various areas and subsequently most of the development proposals previously presented were implemented.

There are many instances, however, in which military regimes have no significant support for administrative development. Partly the explanation may lie in the widespread contempt the military displays towards civil bureaucrats as "paper-pushers" and incompetents and their confidence in a "military approach" to modernization and administrative improvement. This seems often to consist of little more than staffing key administrative positions with military personnel and emphasizing decisiveness and aloofness from politics. Such was the case in Venezuela during the military regime of Perez Jimenez. It has also been the case in Burma where an administrative development approach was abandoned by the military regime for more revolutionary methods of administrative structuring and staffing. The Burmese military came to view the administrative apparatus as an arch-conservative influence which had to be broken if revolutionary modernization was ever to take place⁴⁷

The Elitist Bureaucracy and Administrative Development

Powerful bureaucracies are by no means always the most vigorous advocates of administrative development, particularly when carried out by outsiders, whether in the forms of technical assistance or foreign advisors. As powerful political structures they can be expected to be hostile to suggestions that emphasized technical expertise over high-level policy-making. Yet this is likely to be the thrust of administrative development proposals developed by experts schooled in Western practice and tradition with its emphasis on separation of the political and the administrative with the latter properly subordinate to the former⁴⁸

Yet prestigious bureaucracies have a need to maintain an air of professionalism and this requires support for administrative development. To resolve the dilemma such bureaucracies often have ended up sponsoring administrative development activities that are carefully circumscribed and oriented so as to pose little threat to the bureaucracy's power and prestige. Braibanti notes, for example, that most of the development studies done in Ceylon and Malaya were directed toward salary and service structuring questions, issues unlikely to change the basic character of the

⁴⁷ James F. Uryot, "Bureaucratic Transformation in Burma," in Ralph Braibanti (ed.), *Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1966), pp. 437-443.

⁴⁸ This is the case of Pakistan and Ceylon, see Groves, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

bureaucracy.⁴⁹ Alternatively prestige bureaucracies are likely to demand that the responsibility for operationalizing development proposals be left to themselves in order that some measure of control can be gained at this point. In India, and Pakistan and Burma where foreign technical assistance has played a major role in development planning, the bureaucracies have been successful in retaining full control over the implementation process.⁵⁰

Dominant Leaders and Administrative Development

A dominant political leader is one type of regime that has been a common place throughout the developing countries. In part it is the consequence of the lack of effective, legitimized institutions whose influence would lessen the inclination to resort to strong-man rule, would reduce the opportunities available and would weaken an individual's impact on policy. It is also due to popular expectations and cultural identities. Human relations in traditional societies are based upon frequent personal contact and this cultural pattern fades slowly in those countries.⁵¹ This type of personalistic regimes may not contribute much to political development. In Huntington's view this is explained by the tendency of dominant leaders to view institutionalization as a potential threat. They distrust institutions for they consider them to be inhibiting on personal prerogative and discretion, a rival to their personal control.⁵²

It might be assumed that the personal emphasis of such regimes would make them quite unreceptive as well to administrative development. It is possible that this has been the case with the most intensely personalistic, most charismatic of such leaders. But paradoxically the reverse has been true of the more stolid, strongman types. Oftentimes these have been the warmest recipients of technical assistance and administrative modernization. While wary of a structuring of political life that could threaten them or their prerogatives they see little such threat in administrative improvement. Not being strongly reliant on mass support they tend to look upon power in more elitist terms and oftentimes consider administrative change, particularly at the outset, as a means of strengthening their control and winning elite support. They face no overwhelming pressures to accommodate a throng of patronage seekers and often they have links with and are sympathetic to the goals of the modernizing elite whose emphasis lies on economic growth and industrialization.⁵³

⁴⁹ Braibanti, "Asian Bureaucratic Systems...", pp. 661-666.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 667.

⁵¹ Riggs, "Administration in Developing Countries...", pp. 158-160.

⁵² Huntington, "Political Order...", pp. 238-239.

⁵³ Groves, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

Political Parties and Administrative Development

It has often been noted that political development involves a rapid expansion of political participation and political awareness. Such changes make the integrating character of party activity vital for adapting old institutions and processes to new conditions or in establishing new institutions on a firm political base. Thus political parties, when oriented toward a positive role, act as vigorous institution-builders. Of course, there are many cases where political parties in developing countries represent an unrealized potential in these regards, because of small size, disunity, leader ambitions, political miscalculation, etc. And party-bred institutions sometimes suffer the same fate as institutions closely identified with a particular leader or regime, decline or become obsolete following a change of regime or a political reaction.

The attitudes of political parties and party-dominated governments toward administrative development have not been overwhelmingly supportive and frequently have seemed ambiguous and inconsistent. Some parties have supported administrative development---the Congress Party of India for example.⁵⁴ On the other hand, the governing party of Mexico, the Institutionalized Revolutionary Party (PRI), shows no interest in administrative development approach.⁵⁵ Most typical have been parties that have at times supported and at other times opposed administrative development. This pattern has also been widely evident in Latin America where ruling parties have offered outward support while encouraging a "go slow" attitude toward implementation or while backing administrator who resist implementation and who hold out for reform loopholes, exceptions and compromises.⁵⁶

The weak and inconsistent character of political party support for administrative development can be explained by political realities and political interests. First, parties generally look to political patronage to maintain their unity and expand their appeal and this brings them into conflict with administrative development efforts that emphasize recruitment, selection and promotion of personnel by merit. As Fred Riggs has remarked, "...a merit system cuts at the root of one of the strongest props of a nascent political party system, namely spoils...."⁵⁷ On the other hand where administrative development cuts the other way, as it may where it seeks to break

⁵⁴Ralph Braibanti, "Reflections on Bureaucratic Reform in India," in Braibanti and Joseph Spengler (eds.), *Administrative and Economic Development in India* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1963), pp. 9, 10.

⁵⁵Groves, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

⁵⁶Groves, *op. cit.*

⁵⁷Riggs, "Bureaucrats and Political Development ...," p. 128.

up an elite administrative cadre of a largely ascriptive character, it is likely to receive party support for the same reason, i.e., patronage interests. This has been true in Ceylon where administrative development took place under party auspices between 1960 and 1964.⁵⁸

Another source of conflict between political parties and the advocates of administrative development can be described as a dispute over priorities.⁵⁹ Reformist political parties are likely to be far more concerned with substantive developments (land reform, public housing, health and sanitation programs, etc.) that will impress and appeal to their followers and the masses than administrative development. The latter is considered obscure, uninteresting to the public, difficult to appraise, and most indirect and questionable in its impact on the people and their living conditions. Thus reform political parties are unwilling to give administrative development priority over other societal developments and may downgrade it because of their concern that it will have an upsetting effect upon the bureaucracy and may thereby jeopardize urgently needed programs.

Beyond this, political parties in developing countries tend to be very sensitive about incurring the opposition of political influentials. Some of these will be bureaucrats but a much greater number will be related to or close acquaintances of bureaucrats. The hostility of such political influentials can be a serious threat to a party government, even if their number is small. The strength of parties lies in numbers but this is a strength that takes time to mobilize and is most effective in electoral contests and in providing long-run backing. By contrast, small and more cohesive groups that have economic or military weapons at their command can be very effective in marshalling a quick assault on power. Party regimes consequently can ill-afford to alienate so many influentials as to trigger a quick military or civilian-military thrust. Administrative development usually poses this possibility because its object is a structure that both contains influentials and involves influential interests. This fact adds to the reservation of political party regimes over administrative development.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of the above discussion a number of conclusions can be drawn about the relationship between administrative and political development. First, it suggests that the power elements that offer the greatest promise for political development are those that have been the least supportive of administrative development. In this regard a particular attention has been paid to political party regimes whose lack of interest in administrative development has been the most clear-cut of the power elements examined. There are some exceptions to this and party dominated governments have rarely been open in their opposition, but in practice they have consistently refrained from offering significant support to administrative development. On the other hand, as Groves points out, the centers of power in developing countries that have given the staunchest backing to administrative development have been those that held the least promise for political development.

⁵⁸Robert N. Kearney, "Ceylon: The Contemporary Bureaucracy", in Braibanti, "Asian Bureaucratic Systems...", pp. 522-529.

⁵⁹Groves, *op. cit.*, pp. 45-46.

This negative relationship between potential for political development and attraction to administrative development may help to explain the very disappointing record of administrative development in the past two decades.⁶⁰ Where administrative development has been carried out, it can be, under certain conditions, of substantial political value while, under other conditions, it can play a somewhat useful role in strengthening political institutions. What is needed is a study to evaluate the chances for the success of administrative development in developing countries while they can still step toward more effective processes of political development. This is not an easy task. Martin Landau argues in terms of ends and means: which one should be ends or should be means or vice versa?⁶¹

If we assume that in developing countries political environment always play an important role in any type of societal change, we may come to the conclusion that a direct or indirect cause of the failure of administrative development is due to the fact that such a program has been considered to be inconsistent with the political needs of the country. On the contrary, administrative development takes place because of the benefits that the political processes can gain. In regimes dominated by a single leader or the military, it has bolstered the system somewhat but seldom to a degree or in a way that would make the ruling cliques significantly less inclined toward institution building. And in some such instances it may have strengthened the bureaucracy and its image and made it thereby better equipped to stand on its own and sustain more continuity after the regime's collapse. In other political systems where the bureaucracy is a major political force, administrative development has often presented the case for a more subordinate policy-making role in order to create a better balance between the administrative and the political substructures. The contrary view that administrative development has served only to strengthen the bureaucracy and thereby cause more imbalance seems to exaggerate the importance if not distort the content of most administrative development. It may be true in some political systems: it is certainly not true across the board.

We can, as well, argue that in a system where political parties have dominated politics administrative development has had a very minor impact. It has probably served to strengthen the image of and, at least temporarily, the legitimacy of such regimes. As mentioned above in the case of Ceylon, administrative development may also have been used to institute changes viewed by parties as advantageous for their interests. There undoubtedly have been cases where proposals for

⁶⁰Many have commented upon the poor record. Characteristic is Albert Waterston's statement that, "India, Pakistan, Iran and the Philippines in Asia; Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Brazil, Argentina and Chile in Latin America; Ethiopia, Ghana and Libya in Africa; to name only examples, have for many years sought to improve the efficiency of their public services with only modest result to show for their effort." *Public Administration for What?—A Pragmatic View*, mimeographed document prepared for the Meeting of Experts on the U.N. Programme in Public Administration, January 11, 1967, quoted in Groves, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

⁶¹Martin Landau, "Political and Administrative Development," in Braibanti, (ed.) "Political and Administrative . . .," pp. 350-353.

administrative development have placed a ruling political party in a political bind but these have been far fewer than the cases where administrative development have been used for partisan advantage.

The claims by scholars toward solving the problem of administrative and political development have been presented on the behalf of developing countries. Several suggestions may be followed while others rejected. Although developing countries do not have much time to wait in reaching their objectives, undoubtedly, their structural-functional dichotomy between administrative and political development can still be expected to remain in the future.

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