

A MODEL

FOR THE STUDY OF THAI SOCIETY

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Why a Model?

The study of Thai society and public administration is handicapped by the inadequacy of the models, the working tools, provided by the standard academic disciplines, including public administration and political science. This is not surprising, since, after all, they were largely invented to meet the needs of Western industrialized societies. If we really want to understand the perplexing and urgent problems of Thai society, government, and administration, we must have a more satisfactory set of concepts and hypotheses. In this essay I will speculate on the direction in which, I think, the quest for such a methodology will lead.

First of all, what do we mean by a "model?" whether we know it or not, we always use models whenever we think about a subject, but we are not always conscious of that fact. A model is not the same thing as what we are interested in, but it resembles it, is more familiar, and is simpler, so that it helps us to pick out the important aspects of the thing itself.

For example, we may think of a society as being like a large family. The family is our model. In this case the king is like the father, he must care for his people the way a father loves and protects his children. In return, the people must honor and obey the king as children would their father.

Of course, many models are not adequate because they do not call attention to the right things, or they suggest irrelevant or wrong relationships. For example, although the family may be an adequate model for a simple system of government it is inadequate for describing a modern governmental system which has a parliament, cabinet, constitutional monarch, civil and military services, central and local levels of government, etc. Consequently, we need a more sophisticated model to help us understand these institutions.

It has been customary to use the model of Western governments in thinking about Thai government. The British or French constitutional systems, for example, may be taken as a model. In this case we take the parts of the familiar parliamentary system as a prototype, and look for counterparts to it in Thailand. If we run across Thai phenomena in government and administration that do not correspond to something in the parliamentary model, we tend to overlook them. On the other hand, we try to find something to match all the essential elements in the foreign system.

One way to overcome this difficulty is to change the parliamentary model to fit Thai circumstances. But the result is likely to be a make-shift and patch-work job that loses the advantages of a good model, namely clarity and simplicity. It might be better to start from scratch and look for a new model to use as an aid.

The Uses of a Model: Prescriptive and Descriptive

At this point an important question arises: What is the purpose of having a model? Shall we use it to tell us what we ought to do, or to help us understand what is? Both of these are legitimate uses of models, and it is important to keep the difference in mind. The first way is "prescriptive," or "normative." A "model king" for example, would be an image of how a king ought to behave, and a "model official" would be an image of the ideal behavior for a civil servant. In this paper I shall not be using models in this first way however, I will use models rather in the second way, i.e. "descriptively." They help us to form a picture in our minds of what reality is like.

From such a model we are helped to deal effectively with reality. A map is a simple model of a portion of the surface of the earth. To be helpful the lines representing streets in a map of Bangkok, for example, would have to correspond to real streets over which you might want to walk or ride. If you tried using the map and discovered that no street could be found where the map showed one to exist, you would probably throw the map away in disgust. On the other hand, if your main interest is to find your way around the city, you will want a conveniently small map, showing only the main roads, but not a big map giving every little soi and the location of each house. If your purpose is to carry out a property tax assessment, however, you may need the larger, more comprehensive map.

Thus the descriptive models needed to help us deal with the world are simplified versions of real life. They are neither "true" nor "false." You would not say that the simple street map is any more or less true than the detailed map showing every house. Rather you would say that one is useful for travel, another for tax purposes. A third map with pretty designs of temples, parks, dancing maidens and theatres might not be useful for either of these purposes, but would help to attract tourists, or serve to decorate a living room.

In general we cannot speak of the validity of a model, but only of its utility. In this sense the British parliamentary model is not true or false, but it is more useful for understanding British politics than Thai politics. A model of American society is quite helpful in understanding American life, but not very instructive in learning about Siamese life.

On the other hand, it is quite difficult to start out with Thai society as a whole and to construct a model from it. It is hard to separate the essential from the less essential features. There are so many thousands of things an observant scholar could see that he would scarcely know where to begin. One way to overcome this difficulty is to start by looking at some other countries that are similar in many respects to Thailand, and asking what they have in common, and wherein they differ. If you put together the points of similarity you can construct one useful kind of model. You would then have a simplified picture of characteristics shared by several countries.

These, of course, might or might not be significant. However, the model would enable you to go on to note the respects in which any one country differed from the general picture. Then you could try to find out why these differences arose. Also you could investigate whether the points of similarity were significant or not. This procedure is most likely to be helpful to the extent that the other countries taken into account are really similar. For Thailand, they might be other Southeast Asian countries, such as Burma, Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines, etc. Since I happen to have spent some time in the Philippines, I cannot help drawing heavily on my observations there to note some of the similarities and differences I would put in my own model of a "Southeast Asian Country."

Inductive and Deductive Models

There is another kind of approach which I have also found helpful in trying to think about the real world. This approach can be called “deductive,” whereas the way of drawing maps and comparing countries can be called “inductive.” In the deductive way one starts out from certain definitions and “axioms,” as in Geometry. From these initial propositions one is able, by logical reasoning, to derive statements which are logically consistent with them. One cannot say of such statements that they are true or false, but only that they are “valid” or “invalid,” i.e. that they follow or do not follow from the premises. The ideas of a square and a circle, or a cube and a sphere, for example, are based on such deductive reasoning. The ideas can exist in our minds even though nothing in real life ever resembled them.

However, we can also apply them as models to real life and base our course of action on them. For example, if we assume the world is like a flat surface, or cube, as our immediate sense impressions tell us, we might conclude that if you traveled far enough, you would eventually fall off the edge. Such a notion kept our ancestors from exploring very far for many generations. But if you think the earth is like a sphere, then you might conclude that if you travelled far enough you would come back to the point you started from, just as you can now do quite readily—if expensively—by flying to Hawaii, New York, London, Rome, New Delhi, and back to Bangkok.

I should like to try this deductive method, beginning with some logical definitions, to create a model that I think might prove helpful in giving us a better understanding of Thai society and government. Of course, I shall constantly check back to the real world especially the similarities in Southeast Asian countries to see whether or not the models being constructed seem to be useful. If they go too far from reality, I will throw them out and try a different approach. However, we must also keep in mind the internal consistency of the models on the assumption that if the parts of a system are logically related to each other, the parts of another system which corresponds, by analogy, to the first, will also have a similarly logical relationship to each other.*

* For additional discussion see my article, “The Use of Models for Administrative Analysis: Confusion or Clarity?” *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. VI. (1960) no. 3, p.p. 225-242.

Functional-Structural Approach and the Fused-Refracted Continuum

In constructing our model for the study of Thai society, I shall make use of what is called the "Functional-Structural" approach. * This method starts out by defining a "structure" as any repetitive pattern of behavior in a society. Thus a government bureau is a whole set of structures consisting of the many things the officials in that bureau do regularly, the decisions they make, the people they see, papers they sign, etc. The structure is not composed of the people and things themselves, but only of their actions. It does not include all their actions, but only those actions which relate to the goals and work of the bureau. And the bureau, of course, includes the actions of outsiders, those who are not officials in the bureau, but have to visit it, or are served by it, as a consequence of its activities.

By "function" I mean any consequences of a structure as they affect the system of which it is a part. For example, the function of a bureau concerned with rice marketing might be to facilitate the sale of rice, the regulation of prices, maintenance of quality standards, etc. The system might be the general economy, or the government as a whole. If the structure formed part of several systems, it might have different functions for each system. Our marketing bureau, for example, might have one function in the governmental system, such as safeguarding a source of revenue, and a different one for society, such as protecting rice consumers against unreasonable price rises.

While some functions, i.e. consequences of repetitive patterns of behavior, may be unnecessary or have little significance for their systems, others may be so essential that the system could not survive without them. We can see this most clearly in the case of biological functions in man. For example, unless we were able to take in oxygen and add it to the blood stream, we would die of asphyxiation. The lungs, by their action, are a structure specialized for this function, which we call respiration. Similarly, we must have structures to perform other essential, or "requisite" functions, such as assimilation, reproductions, locomotion, excretion, etc.

* For an explanation of this approach see Marion Levy, *The Structure of Society*. (Princeton Univ. Press, 1952).

Obviously, there are several ways in which some functions may be performed. For example, a fish is able to carry out respiration from water by the use of gills, whereas we do it from air by the use of lungs. There are similar differences in the cultural structures by which we facilitate the performance of these functions. In eating, for example, we can pick the food up with our fingers, or use extensions of the fingers, such as a pair of chopsticks, or a spoon and fork. These are alternative structures for a single function. Sometimes one structure serves several functions. Thus eating with silverware not only enables one to take food, but also reveals one's social status and background.


In a traditional agricultural society, a single structure, such as the family, may serve many functions: not only the biological ends of reproduction, but also educational, economic, political, social and religious functions. In modern industrial societies, by contrast, rather distinct structures have been devised to serve these functions, such as schools, markets, governments, clubs, churches, etc.

Structures are "functionally diffuse" when they serve many purposes; "functionally specific" when they serve only one. Let us call a society which has only one structure for all its functions, fused; and one which has an indefinitely large number of specific structures, each performing only one function, refracted. This terminology is taken from physics, where a fused or "white" light combines all wave-lengths, but refracted light is broken up into many separate bands, which we see as the colors in a spectrum or rainbow.

Admittedly no real society is ever fully fused or refracted, but we can say that a traditional folk society approaches the fused type, and a modern industrial society approaches the refracted type. These are, then, polar "constructed types," and all real societies might be classified at intermediate positions on a scale between these extremes. In real life we would not expect to find pure examples of either extreme but some kind of mixture, in varying degrees, of both.

Although all of the structures in an industrial society are inter-related, they are sufficiently differentiated—or refracted—so that it is possible and useful to think

of each type as though it were self-contained, i.e., behaved autonomously, in accord with its own distinctive principles. We also have academic disciplines which specialize respectively in each of these structures. The following figure illustrates this proposition:



The process of refraction goes so far that each of the disciplines becomes further subdivided as corresponding substructures appear. For example, specialization of government administration leads to the establishment of public administration as a field of study; rural sociology is distinguished from urban sociology; money and banking, business administration, etc. become distinct fields in economics.

When one looks for corresponding structures in traditional (fused) societies, he cannot find them. Consequently, the academic disciplines have not, so far, been adapted very well to the study of pre-modern societies. Instead, a special discipline emerged which makes the study of such societies as a "whole" its particular province, namely cultural and social anthropology. In order to see a fused society "holistically," the anthropologists started at the other end of the continuum, selecting primitive tribal communities where the basic cultural elements could be seen in their simplest form. In so doing they have, of course, made significant discoveries of far-reaching importance.

Having described these societies, however, the anthropologists began to turn their attention to more complex agricultural civilizations, seeking to use there the

models and techniques they had developed. They naturally chose peasant "villages" for particular study, because here the approach used to understand primitive tribes seemed relatively applicable. It could not serve so well as a model for understanding traditional cities, to say nothing of modern urban conditions.

It became apparent, therefore, that more complex models would be necessary in studying agricultural civilizations because the village turned out not to be really self-contained. It reflected important influences from the larger society and the urban centers. Hence it was necessary to include in the model the "great community" the elite and city culture as well as the "little communities" the village culture. As yet, however, the anthropological approach leaves many gaps and requires drastic change if it is to prove useful for the study of modern semi-industrialized countries, such as Thailand.


Meanwhile the other disciplines also began to be used for the study of so-called "underdeveloped" countries, largely spurred by the post-World War II emergence of vigorous nationalism, independence and a demand for economic progress in the new states of the non-Western World. Hence students of economics, government and sociology have begun to pay serious attention to these societies. Just as the anthropologists used their model of the self-contained primitive community for the study of agricultural villages, so economists, political scientists and sociologists looked for the equivalent of their specialized (refracted) structures in the emergent social, political and economic institutions of these societies. They selected political parties, banking and currency, the family and juvenile delinquency, civil service and the merit system, etc, for scrutiny as they might have done at home.

In each instance they found something roughly approximating what they were accustomed to dealing with, but yet something which behaved in unpredictable and, to them, "perverse" ways. Their inability to fit the facts of experience into the Procrustean bed of their intellectual models tended to confirm such outmoded stereotypes as the "inscrutable Orient," or reinforced their conviction that "backwardness", as a delayed stage of social evolution, could explain their difficulties.*

* See also my article, "The Social Sciences and Public Administration," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. 3 (April 1959) pp. 219-250.

An Intermediate Stage: Prismatic

We see the problem in a new light if we refer back to Figure 1. Obviously the differentiating process cannot happen suddenly, and at equal rates of speed, throughout a society. How, indeed, does refraction take place? What are the intermediate stages between the extremes? If we use the original image from which our metaphor comes, we might imagine a prism through which the fused white light passes to emerge refracted upon the screen as a rainbow spectrum. Can we imagine a position within the prism in which the refraction process has started but is yet incomplete. The separate colors, though differentiated, yet remain captive, "imprised." Let us, for lack of a better word, refer to such a stage as "prismatic." Figure 2 may illustrate our meaning.




The prismatic concept helps us see why the models devised to study both ends of this continuum are inadequate for intermediate situations. The specialized-structure disciplines are unsuitable because, although differentiated structures arise in embryonic or prismatic form, they scarcely function autonomously. One cannot, therefore, comprehend any one of these structures without taking into account the related structures which continually and drastically modify its behavior.

The family system, for example, impinges fundamentally on the political party, civil service recruitment, family enterprises and religious sects. Economic behavior is unintelligible without noting its interaction with politics and administration. Agricultural and medical practices are tied up with supernatural beliefs. Educational policies are deeply implicated in social status, politics, and productivity.


The anthropological diffuse-structure approach is equally handicapped in approaching an intermediate, prismatic society. The holistic concept is not too difficult to apply so long as social structures remain largely undifferentiated. Indeed, any other approach would certainly prove meaningless for a fused society. But in the prismatic situation the subsystems in all their complexity are already emergent, especially in those parts of the society that are most industrialized i.e., the urban centers. Hence the temptation of the anthropologist to restrict himself to the village, which remains nearest the fused end of the continuum, eschewing consideration of the urban end with its refracted institutions. But in so doing his results remain as fragmentary and partial as do those of his colleagues from the other disciplines who tend to concentrate on the city where the counterparts to Western specialized structures can be studied.

One is often told that to see the "real" Thailand one must get away from Bangkok to the rural hinterland. Yet in what sense is Bangkok unreal as a part of Siamese society? It is true that great differences exist between the city and the hinterland, but one cannot say that either is more or less "real" as a part of Thai society. Of course, the hinterland is closer to traditional social structure, the city more representative of recent trends, and a focus for external influences—but these influences are themselves among the important forces in Thai society, especially as they affect its patterns of change. What one can say that neither city nor countryside can be understood in isolation, just as the head or arms cannot be understood apart from the body of which they are parts.



If we could classify all individuals, or traits, in a given society on a scale extending between the fused and refracted poles, we would be able to construct a "frequency distribution" of a standard type. In both agricultural and industrial societies we would expect to find a fairly high degree of concentration around points near the fused and refracted poles, respectively. We could call such distribution patterns relatively homogeneous, as in Figure 3.


By contrast, a distribution curve for an "underdeveloped" or "semi-industrialized" country might show a wide range of variation between its still predominantly traditional hinterland, and many highly "modernized" features of its urban centers. We could represent this graphically, as in Figure 4.



Let us call a distribution curve of this type relatively heterogeneous. I believe such a curve is the logical pattern for a prismatic model. We would find in it examples of quite traditional, relatively fused, traits, as indicated by the area ABF in Figure 4. Similarly, we would find relatively refracted traits, as suggested by the area DEH in the graph. These extreme rural and urban patterns would, naturally, be the ones most easily identified by anthropology, and the other social sciences, respectively.

The most characteristic features of the model, however, would be those suggested by the area BDHE. These would, presumably, be found in both rural and urban settings, and especially in small towns and secondary cities. Yet it is for this type of situation that available models offer us the least help. Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to discover some of the characteristics which seem typically "prismatic," according to our deductive scheme, and then see whether or not they help us understand phenomena in the real world.

It should be added that Figure 4 also helps us to see how a prismatic model can be located on the scale of refraction at a specific point, C, when its traits are widely distributed over the full length of the scale. Obviously, this point refers only to the most characteristic or modal behavior in the model, represented by the high point G on the curve. Curves based on data from any real country might, of course, assume quite different and varied forms, as in Figure 5.



In view of these propositions, I would suggest that the study of "transitional" or prismatic societies requires a "holistic" approach that is more comprehensive in scope than the established academic disciplines, including anthropology. All the social science disciplines, as now understood, employ models which trap us, limit our view of social realities in transitional societies, and hence mislead.

Terminology and the Disciplines

In outlining some of the characteristics of the prismatic model, I shall necessarily draw on insights and concepts from a variety of social science disciplines. Yet the approach taken is not just "inter-disciplinary" in the sense of adding strips of disciplinary lore to each other, as in a layer cake or a piece of plywood. The result should be a new kind of model, and set of related theories, although the ingredients

may turn out to be familiar items drawn from the storehouse of existing academic concepts, hypotheses, and models.*

In developing the prismatic model it is necessary, from time to time, to coin new words, or give a new or more restricted meaning to a familiar word. There is so much unnecessary "gobbledegook" and jargon in contemporary social science writing that one hesitates to add to the confusion.

Certainly neologisms should be avoided if any commonly known word will convey the idea intended, but I do not believe that the avoidance of neologisms should be made a fetish.

1. Communities: Poly-Communalism

The prismatic society tends to be "poly-communal." It is necessary to be clear about the word "society," as used in this hypothesis. It is a word with many meanings, one of its primary ones referring to those who live together in the same environment. The word stresses their interaction or interdependence with each other. In this sense there is today a world society, a Thai society, an American society, a Bangkok

* The term "prismatic model" means something like "underdeveloped," "semi-industrialized," or "transitional" society. However, it is important to keep the differences in mind. The term "underdeveloped" refers primarily to countries which have started, but not advanced very far, in economic development. Because of the unfavorable connotations of the expression—many poor countries, for example, have nevertheless a highly sophisticated culture so far as art, literature, religion, etc., may be concerned—a number of substitutes have been offered, such as "less developed," "developing," "newly developing," etc. Each of these terms has its own drawbacks, since it tends to suggest either too much or too little.

An expression like "semi-industrialized" is more exact in its economic significance, but does not help us understand related cultural and political phenomena, unless one takes a position of "economic determinism," assuming that all other aspects of society are derived from the economic. In my terminology, a prismatic society would be "semi-industrialized," but this would be only one of its many typical characteristics.

The term "transitional society" is a useful one, suggesting a type between "traditional" and "modern" societies. I would use it as an inductive or "real" type, based on observation of actual societies. Thus the prismatic logical or constructed model should be compared with transitional real societies, just as the folk and industrial societies are examined in relation to the fused and refracted models respectively. It should be born in mind however, that the concept "transitional" refers only to an intermediate condition, and should not be taken to imply a necessary movement toward some other condition, such as "industrial" or "modern."

society, etc. In this usage Thai "society" includes everyone who lives in Thailand. Hence alien residents, ethnic minorities, etc. are a part of Thai society.

The interaction may involve participation in trade and commerce, utilizing the post office or other government services, traveling on the same roads, etc. All members of Thai society are not Thai citizens, they need not like each other, think alike, speak the same language, share the same faith. But they do interact with each other in the same environment, and this makes them a society. (Other uses of the word are perfectly proper but not intended here. They can be distinguished by context, as if we speak of a medical society, high society, a primitive society, my cousin's society, etc.)

To be sharply distinguished from the concept of "society" is the concept of "community." Often the word is used as a synonym for society, but here only one of many possible meanings is intended, namely those who frequently "communicate" with each other.* All media of communications may be used, ranging from face-to-face oral conversation to the mass media, such as radio and newspapers.

In one "society" there may be many "communities," and one person may belong to several communities. Moreover, members of one community may well be linked to communities outside their own society, so we may speak of a community that transcends its society.

To form a clear image or model of the nature of the community structure in a prismatic society we may contrast it with the community structure in traditional (fused) and industrialized (refracted) societies.

In the fused society mass media of communications are not available, and hence most of the population is not "mobilized" for mass communications. Every village or tribe is a small community with very few contacts outside. In the political capitals and the main market or urban centers of agricultural civilizations, or semi-fused societies, however, there may develop "larger" communities and, by the use of written messages and literacy, elite groups scattered throughout the society are brought into these larger communities.

* This definition, and concepts of "mobilization" and "assimilation" are based on the pioneer work of Karl W. Deutsch, notably in *Nationalism and Social Mobilization*. (N Y Wylie 1953.)

The typical pattern of a traditional fused society, therefore, may be one or more "great communities" and innumerable "small communities." In large part interaction between these two types of communities is highly attenuated. Indeed, it is possible to study the "great traditions" of the great community, as expressed in its literature, art, philosophy and history, by literary methods which almost ignore the "little traditions" of the "little communities," which are best studied by the field methods of social anthropology.

In an industrialized or refracted society, by contrast, almost everyone is mobilized for mass communications, and assimilated to the dominant language and myths of the society. Hence one can speak of a "national community," i.e., the community is co-extensive with the society.

No doubt in any real industrial society minority communities exist, and may be linked with other communities outside the society. Normally this fact does not create major problems, and may be safely ignored in most contexts. However, occasionally, as in the re-location of Japanese Americans during World War II, the existence of such a minority is considered—whether rightly or wrongly—a problem. The basic assumptions and models of politics, economics, and sociology, nevertheless are predicated on the existence, substantially, of a national community. Accordingly, the focus of study can properly be on social functions and corresponding structures, as identified by the academic disciplines. Broadly speaking, however, this should be seen as a special case, rather than as typical for the world.

The prismatic society falls intermediate between these extremes and has a distinctive character of its own. The introduction of mass media and widespread fundamental education causes the partial mobilization of the population. The rate of assimilation to the symbol system of the elite, however, tends to be slower than the rate of mobilization. Hence several large communities tend to arise within the society. The elite of one community is "dominant," and the counter-elites of the "differentiated" or "deviant" communities, lacking access to the dominant elite, engage in various forms and degrees of oppositional activity, ranging from apathy and non-cooperation, through bribery and sabotage to open violence and revolution.

One may speak of such a society as "poly-communal," because it is composed of several communities. The term "plural society" has been rather widely used for this phenomenon, especially in the writings of J. S. Furnival. However, in the present usage, there are several communities in one society, not several societies.

The elites and counter-elites are not only in more or less violent opposition to each other, but tend to be in fairly intensive communication with communities outside the society. Thus all the problems and tensions of a prismatic society tend to be implicated in the conflicts of the external communities with which the internal communities are linked, as by "osmosis." The international linkages of these communities may be referred to as their "osmotic" tendencies; and hence a group of residents, whether aliens or citizens, which communicates frequently with an external group may be termed an "osmotic community." The prevalence of osmotic communities in a prismatic society involves the society in international rivalries.

The poly-communal character of the prismatic society modifies every social structure, often leading to paradoxical results, which are the opposite of those anticipated in industrialized Western societies.

Consider such a phenomenon as nationalism. In a national community, the sentiments and symbols of nationalism serve to unite most members of the society. They give rise to few major conflicts of loyalty or identification. If the society is poly-communal, however, "nationalism" uses the symbols of the dominant elite, causing alarm and fear on the part of the deviant communities and their counter-elites.

Moreover, insofar as the counter-elites belong to osmotic communities, they call on their overseas or foreign "communicants" to support and comfort them in their difficulties. Paradoxically, therefore, a drive to strengthen national unity through the promotion of "national" symbols may actually undermine national solidarity. It would be more accurate to call such movements "communalism" rather than "nationalism."

Consider another problem, economic development. Insofar as a deviant community may be specialized in entrepreneurship—a frequent occurrence—its hearty cooperation in developmental efforts is essential. Characteristically, however, the tension between elite and counter-elite makes such cooperation quite difficult to achieve. Measures intended to strengthen the economic position of the dominant community and elite at the expense of the deviant are met by sabotage which often takes the form of official corruption. Neither private capital nor public enterprise behave as predicted in the economic models of Western national communities.

Underlying Causes

The mainsprings of poly-communalism may be studied in the most remote villages as well as in the urban centers of government and commerce. Indeed, this pervasiveness distinguishes any basic feature of a society from the merely exotic or temporary.

In the traditional little community trade is minimal, self-subsistent production for domestic consumption maximal. To the extent that local specialization in production takes place, exchange is governed by custom, gift-giving, and hereditary rights and obligations.* Entrepreneurship, shop-keeping, credit, and money-lending can scarcely exist because they conflict with organic features of the little community.

The way of life of traditional rural society is organized around the maintenance of harmony and solidarity in the little community. Elaborate procedures of etiquette, deference, generosity, conciliation and compromise, avoidance, reliance on "go-betweens" etc. serve to prevent outbreaks of hostility, which can be most devastating in the permanent and highly personal context of village society.

The industrialized Western world, by contrast, orients even its rural settlements about achievement norms, equalitarian ideals, and materialistic goals, and encourages specialization in production and reliance on the market apparatus. In such a context one can be a shop-keeper or a banker and still maintain cordial relations with his neighbors, even if they are creditors or debtors. More or less successfully, the rights and obligations of the market are detached from the rights and obligations of kinship and personal relationships. Contract obligations are strictly separated from those of family and friendship. This typical differentiation or refraction of structure has gone so far that Western man is scarcely conscious of the unusualness of a situation which he takes for normal; so much so that he actually regards any other condition as abnormal. Yet surely on any statistical distribution of world history, the "marketized" rural community is the exception rather than the rule.

* These traditional economic institutions are fully described by Karl Polanyi, Conrad Arensberg, and Harry Pearson in their remarkable work, *Trade and Market in the Early Empires*, (Free Press, 1957).

In a prismatic society the homogeneity of the little community is disrupted by the intrusion of the market, but the community as a whole is only partially marketized, just as it is only partially mobilized. Indeed, these two processes are complementary for, without mobilization for larger-scale communications, the extension of market forces in the rural community is not possible.

The attitude of the agricultural community toward the market is strongly ambivalent—on the one hand there is a desire for the new consumer goods and the liberating forces introduced by the market, but on the other there is resentment of the disruption which it brings to established relationships.

A ubiquitous problem arises from the need for credit. The shopkeeper is caught on the horns of a dilemma, for if he denies credit to neighbors without cash, he will lose trade and goodwill; but if he grants credit, he may lose his stock and, if he tries to recover, he will still lose good-will. Thus the relationship between a shop-keeper and an unmobilized rural community is impregnated with causes of tension with "inner contradictions." If the shop-keeper tries to retain village linkages, it is almost impossible for him to thrive as a merchant. If he decides to operate on a "business-like" basis, he must cut himself off from his neighbors, refusing to honor traditional obligations. In this context good-will is not just a business asset but a requisite for membership in the little community.

When an "outsider" tries to take over this entrepreneurial role, the odds in his favor as against an "insider" are very high. The members of the community do not expect him to participate in their network of traditional obligations and he does not expect to become a member of the community. They will accept him in his specialized role because of the usefulness of his function, but they will not assimilate him to their community. Indeed, the role of the "outsider" may become institutionalized and specialized for entrepreneurship to such an extent that the stranger who assimilates cannot be an entrepreneur, and he who takes the entrepreneurial role remains (or becomes) an outsider.

Here, then, is one of the dynamic aspects of the prismatic society which contributes toward its poly-communalism. The outsider-entrepreneur naturally forms

bonds with other outsider-entrepreneurs, heading up in the metropolitan center of the society, often with osmotic communal links abroad. In Thailand this phenomenon has become specialized to the Chinese community, but elsewhere Jews, Greeks, Maltese, Goans, Indians, Parsees, Armenians, Copts, and other "ethnic" groups are specialized in the same way.

The national and inter-national linkages of the rural outsider-entrepreneur are basic elements in the pattern, for in isolation the shop-keeper cannot sustain his position. He would fall into a traditional pattern, as a member of the little community, or else, during a crisis, be driven from the community.

With outside support, however, including the protection of a government which, in hopes of spurring economic development, sanctions and protects contracts, the shop-keeper is able to maintain himself. Moreover, as the granting of credit leads to money-lending and the repayment of loans is taken in crops rather than cash, the shop-keeper finds himself becoming a middle-man. To succeed he needs extra-village associates, both to supply goods and to buy crops.

Symbiosis: Antagonistic - Cooperation

Thus the development of the outsider-entrepreneur is an integral aspect of the emergence of the deviant community in the national society. Poly-communalism, in other words, has both micro-cosmic and macro-cosmic aspects. It is just as misleading to exclude the outsider-entrepreneur in a study of village society as it is to exclude the alien community and counter-elite from a study of the national society. In other words, the relationships involved are not parasitic but symbiotic. One can eliminate a parasite and the host will become more healthy as a result of the operation, but destruction of a symbiote leads also to the destruction of its partner.

Clearly the wholeness of the prismatic society cannot be comprehended in terms of models based on the primitive tribal community any more than on those derived from highly mobilized and marketized societies in which entrepreneurship is merely a functional, and not also a communal, specialization.

It should also be apparent that in significant respects, different communities in a poly-communal society exhibit not only contrasting but also antagonistic specializations. One may be included, the other excluded, from legal participation in political processes, from actual engagement in entrepreneurial roles, from religious and educational life. In language, values, family structure, social stratification, international identifications, etc. striking contrasts manifest themselves. The deviant communities, of course, may include linguistic, religious and other ethnic "minorities" as well as "alien entrepreneurs."

Let us pass on to another aspect of our prismatic model, namely its class structure.

2. Class Structure: Kaleidoscopic Stratification

In every society there are a set of values, such as wealth, power, prestige, righteousness, learning, military prowess, skill, sexual pleasure, popularity, etc. which are highly prized by its members.* Some of the values, notably wealth and sexual satisfaction, are quite individualistic in the sense that they may be enjoyed by some at the expense of others. In contrast, other values, such as prestige, righteousness, and popularity depend for their attainment upon the good will or deference of others. In most societies, the temptation of selfish and egotistical men to seek the satisfaction of individualistic values at the expense of others is counteracted by imposing restraints upon all activities involving the quest for private pleasures, the satisfactions of the "flesh."

In traditional (fused) societies this is accomplished through a complex set of mores and folkways, traditions and taboos, whereby certain forms of behavior are sanctioned by immemorial custom and tradition. The freedom of the individual to do as he pleases is restricted at every step by social pressure.

In contrast, the societies which pioneered in industrial development were able to achieve a high level of economic productivity by setting almost no limit to the amount of wealth a man could accumulate, and allowing those who acquired wealth to rise in social prestige and power. Similarly "romantic love" was made the basis of

* For more analysis of these "power" values see Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society*. (Yale, 1950), pp. 55-102.

marriage rather than family convenience. This emphasis on "individual freedom" provided the dynamic element for a vast economic transformation. At the same time, economic criteria were stressed in assigning men their station in life: in other words, the class structure came to be determined in the main by wealth. The "romantic love" concept also weakened the hold of the extended family, permitting individuals to rise or fall in social position according to their economic success or failure.

The consequences of this principle of social organization could, of course, be devastating. Consequently, although the "market" and "economic man" were given a wide sphere of autonomy, they were also necessarily brought under a degree of control, especially through the "rule of law" and politically imposed regulation. This, of course, helps to explain the extreme proliferation of governmental services and regulations in the more industrialized countries. Indeed, in their more "statist" or "totalitarian" forms, industrialization could be achieved primarily as a result of governmental action rather than in response to the free competition of individual entrepreneurs through a market system.

In studying the prismatic model we may well ask how a society could make the transformation from a system in which private values—economic and sexual—are embedded in social norms to one in which they are separately institutionalized and given considerable autonomy. If we bear in mind the heterogeneity of our prismatic model, we can perhaps expect a wide variety of behavior patterns. In the rural hinterland we should find quite traditional types of folk society in which custom and respect, family position and age, etc. stand in the way of radical changes in the family and economic system. In the metropolis, by contrast, would be found "nouveau riche" types who have made their fortunes by market operations and present claims for recognition in a new class structure.

Differences might also be found in the class stratifications within each of the member communities of a "poly-communal" prismatic society. Certainly in the alien entrepreneurial group, status based on wealth might be firmly established. But in the dominant community, with its stronger ties to land and religion, more traditional, aristocratic values would inhibit the growth of a stress on wealth as a primary value.

Rather, political and military power and religious eminence might continue to take first place as the most respected social goals. Taken as a whole, one could not give any simple characterization of such a class structure. Rather, it would offer the appearance of a chaotic and continually changing system that might best be called kaleidoscopic stratification.

To obtain a more intimate view of the dynamics of this system let us examine rather closely three values, especially the relationships between power, wealth, and education.

In all societies wealth, education, and power tend to agglutinate: the possession of each reinforces one's ability to acquire the others. In Western democratic industrial societies the possession of wealth in particular, tends to confer power and education. This relationship has become so widely accepted in conventional thinking that one rarely conceives that it could be otherwise. Yet here again a broad historical view shows that in most societies the reverse relationship has prevailed, i.e. the initial acquisition of power confers wealth, whereas the man with mere wealth might not be able to acquire power, and hence would tend to lose his wealth.*

In general support of this position, note the concept of "property." In conventional thought we often equate property with wealth, but it seems more useful to limit the concept of property to the legally-sanctioned regime under which rights to the control of wealth are protected. The old and discredited slogan, "life, liberty and property" recalls a day when even in the West property was not secure, and certainly today we do not have so look far to see examples of confiscation and disregard of property, and social protection of those — "squatters," for example—who violate property rights.

For wealth to provide a secure basis for power, the protection of property is clearly requisite. When property rights are insecure, the man with power can seize wealth, the man with wealth must buy protection from the man with power. If, then, a society does not afford sure protection for property, we may expect its ruling class and elite to rest their position on other criteria more than on their wealth.

* I shall not attempt to justify this assertion with historical material but the reader might wish to look at Chang Chung-li's *The Chinese Gentry* (University of Washington, 1954) for an examination of this thesis at it relates to one of the best known "land-owning" aristocratic groups.

Here we must make sure that these terms are understood as used in this context. By the "elite" I refer to the power holders in a society. Obviously this is not a discrete group, but designates the end of a continuum on which one might range individuals according to the weight of their participation in making public policy decisions. The boundaries of the elite are not clear, and need not be. Next to the elite one might place the "semi-elite."

The "ruling class" must be clearly differentiated from the elite. The term refers to all members of a society from whom an elite are recruited.

Many members of a ruling class may be poor. It is another inference of our conventional thinking that, if wealth confers power, then the elite must be drawn from men of wealth. Of course, many members of a ruling class are also wealthy. Their membership in the ruling class, however, need not depend on their wealth.

Moreover, especially in a poly-communal society, many men of wealth, notably those of the deviant communities, may be specifically barred from elite status—as aliens are in Thailand. Of course, they may exercise influence, but they have to do it through the "back door," not by right and authority, i.e., as members of a counter-elite, not of a ruling class.

What are the criteria, then, for membership of the ruling class? I offer the hypothesis that higher education, plus membership of the dominant community, is requisite for elite status in most prismatic societies. Virtually without exception no one in Thailand can attain high position in government—whether in politics or administration—unless he is culturally defined as a Siamese—and many members of the Thai society are not Siamese.

He must also have a higher education. Such an education involves formal schooling in models, concepts and hypotheses, facts and values, which are predominantly foreign in origin and inspiration, although they may be given a surface coat of color. It may, of course, be either a civilian or a military education. All the major social goals—economic development, nationalism, freedom, equality, even property—however much they strike a responsive chord, originate in the industrialized Western countries. Moreover, the techniques, skills and knowledge needed to implement these

goals—both in government and outside—are largely to be obtained through formal higher education. Small wonder that such training is requisite for elite status. Such a class—those educated in a foreign learning—may be termed an intelligentsia.

I would suggest, therefore, that the ruling class in Thailand is the Siamese intelligentsia. Virtually all members of the elite are recruited from this class, although all intelligentsia may not gain access to the elite.

Indeed, a major source of instability in a prismatic, poly-communal society arises when members of the intelligentsia who could not attain elite status, discover a way to become a powerful counter-elite by putting themselves at the head of a body of dissatisfied people—a “subject population” or an “internal proletariat,” to use Toynbee's phrase. The Huk movement in the Philippines may be considered such a phenomenon. Fortunately for Thailand no such revolutionary community has yet formed.

The Uses of Wealth

There is no doubt a high degree of correlation between wealth and intelligentsia status. Indeed, if men of wealth without education could become elite members, we might conclude that wealth rather than education determined membership in the ruling class. Of course, the wealthy have an advantage in financing education for themselves, but talented and diligent persons without wealth, through hard work and scholarships, may obtain a higher education and thus enter the ruling class and the elite. Military careers offer many examples of this possibility. There seem to be fewer examples of wealthy men without education joining the elite.

We may see the relationship between wealth and education better by analyzing the relation between power and different forms of wealth. It is apparent that the term wealth is quite general, referring to many different things with varying attributes. These attributes include such economic characteristics as capacity to satisfy consumer demand and ability to produce more wealth. Wealth also has many non-economic characteristics, such as differing degrees of intrinsic security, capacity to confer social status, direct ability to secure power, and educational requisites for effective exploitation.

In a fused traditional agricultural society the economic attributes of wealth are minimized, the non-economic tend to be maximized.

By contrast, in the refracted industrialized society, the economic attributes of wealth are maximized, the non-economic minimized. Of course the non-economic factors do not disappear, but a powerful myth or ideology in the society seeks to equalize the non-economic attributes of all forms of wealth, thereby permitting the economic attributes, especially the "marginal utility" of wealth, to become the primary if not exclusive determinant of value.

For example, if property laws and contract enforcement are widely enforced, all forms of wealth are equally secure, both in the short- and long-run. Insofar as wealth confers power and status, the monetary value of wealth becomes a simple index and lever for the acquisition of power and status. It is unnecessary to distinguish the status or power implications and relative security of different forms of wealth.

If each form of wealth is exploited so as to maximize its economic potential, it is generally necessary to contribute to each a determinate amount of technical and managerial skill. That skill may be obtained by apprenticeship and practical experience as well as by higher formal education. It is the skill and knowledge rather than a degree that counts. Moreover, higher education will be adapted to the particular technical requirements for profitable use of the form of wealth involved. Educational costs may therefore be computed as a part of the investment requisite to full exploitation of any specified item of wealth. Non-economic considerations are thus either equalized or reduced to economic form.

In the prismatic society, however, economic and non-economic factors related to the acquisition and use of wealth are inter-twined. Thus, where wealth is to some extent insecure, preference is naturally given to those forms which are more secure. Insofar as power confers wealth, an important consideration in the acquisition of wealth is its capacity to confer power and status. Some less productive forms of wealth, such as land, often confer status and power to a greater extent than more productive wealth, and are also more secure. Hence they will be more highly valued.

This distinction is highly significant, and contrasts strikingly with the situation where wealth is secure and tends to confer power in all its forms, so that the most highly valued forms of wealth tend to be those which are most productive. A penchant for conspicuous consumption and even for the squandering of wealth may be

explained in these terms as a behavior that helps to secure status and power, and hence assures the future acquisition of wealth.

If this analysis is correct, we may conclude that the elite in a prismatic society will tend to monopolize and specialize in those forms of wealth—especially land and conspicuous consumption—which augment their power-potential rather than their productivity—potential.

Moreover, those who specialize in other forms of wealth will be those who cannot acquire the power-producing forms, i.e., members of deviant communities. If our reasoning is correct, moreover, these forms of wealth are precisely the forms which are most productive. Hence those who are politically penalized tend also to become wealthy. However, because this wealth is insecure, they are always subject to the threat of confiscation, and therefore must perennially buy security.

Thereby the vicious circle, which we have referred to in discussing poly-communalism, is reinforced. The wealth of the elite tends to be secure but less productive, while that of the counter-elite is more productive but less secure. The resulting suspicion and tension between the two communities is, correspondingly, aggravated, especially when attempts are made, under the impetus of nationalist sentiment, to transfer wealth from the hands of counter-elites to elites.

Non-economic criteria affect the use, as well as the acquisition, of wealth in a prismatic society. Any given item of wealth may be used in many ways. One way of classifying such uses is by the degree of conservation. A high degree of conservation involves utilization of wealth to increase productivity, and may be termed capitalization. Wealth which is rapidly consumed in such a way as to reduce productivity is mined, i.e., subject to a low degree of conservation.

Although the mining of wealth takes place in every society, industrialization depends on a relatively high degree of capitalization of wealth. The premium on productivity noted above is directly related to this tendency. In a prismatic society, however, the capitalization of wealth requires habits of spending—austerity and parsimoniousness—which interfere with the acquisition of status and power, and disrupt traditional social solidarity. On the other hand, the mining of wealth, while it lowers productivity, often increases power potential, and hence makes it possible to acquire more

wealth through exploitation of one's power. The wealthy members of the dominant community in a prismatic society then, not only tend to acquire forms of wealth which, though low in productivity potential, are high in power and status potential, but they also tend to mine rather than to capitalize on that wealth, hence further reducing even that productivity potential which their wealth has.

Returning to the implications of wealth allocation for the intelligentsia, where elite-controlled wealth is prized more for its security and power-potential than for its productivity, the education provided by the wealthy for themselves will also be chosen for its power-potential more than for its productivity-potential. Land, especially tenant-operated absentee-owned land, requires minimal knowledge and skill for its exploitation, and similarly wealth used for conspicuous consumption does not require technical training.

Education which confers social prestige and which has utility in government administration and politics is preferred. The tendency for bureaucratic power to thrive is particularly strong in prismatic societies, as I have argued elsewhere.* And admission to the bureaucracy characteristically requires attainment of academic rank—whatever else may be required—especially in the prismatic society. Hence students seek that type of formal education which will help them gain access to the Bureaucracy. Even technological training, such as in agriculture or engineering, tends to be used to get government jobs rather than to farm or obtain private employment.

This general pattern seems to apply to Thailand. Observers have often noted a strong desire for education, but lamented the stress on degrees at the expense of learning. This observation acquires new meaning in the light of the hypothesis that the intelligentsia forms a ruling class.

The Uses of Scholarship

These considerations should throw some light on the basic problem of research, and the apparent fascination of foreign academic models. If the intelligentsia as a ruling class is really more concerned with the power struggle than with the direct application of learning to the problems of productivity and society, then it values schooling chiefly as a key to elite status rather than as a door to scholarship.

* See "Comparative Bureaucracy" (mimeo.) 1958; and "Power, Policy and Personnel," *Occasion Paper No. 1*, IPA, University of the Philippines 1959.

The test of learning lies not so much in its validity for understanding reality as in its utility for attaining power. Cliches and stereotypes are always better adapted to the needs of the careerist and climber than are novel and unconventional ideas—they can be more easily graded by formal examination, and they threaten less the vested interests of those who have already achieved elite status. Insofar as the elite seek power, rather than scholarship, their learning is chiefly used as a measure of status, not operationally.

A vicious circle arises: the more artificial and remote from reality the alien models, conventional wisdom, and cliches accepted by an entrenched intelligentsia elite, the more difficult it becomes for realistic thinking and scholarly research to gain acceptance—the more “subversive” such activities appear to be.

Unless this vicious circle can be broken, however, there appears to be no way in which a more valid understanding of the nature of the prismatic society can be obtained. And without such an understanding, governmental measures will continue to be adopted on the basis of foreign models and misleading hypotheses, so that deliberately adopted laws and policies often aggravate the very evils they are intended to counteract.

It is instructive to study the conditions under which scholarship has been most original. Usually it has not been where education provided a key to power for then higher education truly becomes a preserve of the power-hungry and the aggressive. When the chief paths to power and wealth lie outside the university graduate school, then advanced research and scholarship is left to the “philosophers,” i.e., those who love learning for its own sake. The “long hairs” and the “grinds” may never achieve worldly eminence, but they make discoveries which can illumine public policy and shed light on all man’s problems.

A distinction needs to be made here between two types of scholarship. Where the basic models and hypotheses are already established and accepted, official research, in the sense of data collection, verification and elaboration, is often quite successful. But the unorthodox insight, the sudden illumination and formation of new models and hypotheses seem to thrive best among scholars who cannot hope to capitalize on their ideas. Perhaps because no one cares what they produce, they are really free to innovate.

The problem of research is desperately urgent for a country like Thailand. Unless an atmosphere permissive and even conducive to original thought and analysis can be created, the insights needed to cope effectively with Thai problems may not become available. Yes, as we have seen, the intelligentsia outlook is inherently hostile to such an atmosphere. And, so far as foreign scholars are concerned, they too are largely fettered by their own models. However well adapted these models may be to the analysis of their own society's problems, they are ill-adapted to the needs of a prismatic, poly-communal and intelligentsia dominated society.

3. Organization: The Prevalence of "Clects"

In discussing the intelligentsia as a ruling class and source of the elite reference was made to the family connection of those in and seeking power. In doing so we touched on another aspect of prismatic society which requires discussion.

Traditional societies were largely structured around diverse types of kinship systems. It is not necessary to discuss the various types of such systems here. Perhaps it is enough to say that the "kith and kin" types of primary solidarity structure has been dominant in most societies throughout world history, and remains an important force even in the most industrialized countries.

Modern Western industrial societies, however, assign relatively much more weight to a new type of formal, secondary organization, which we may call "associations." These groups tend to be functionally specific, open to voluntary contract-based membership, and equalitarian in their attitude toward the rights of members. The primary kith-and-kin structures are reduced to subordinate roles in political and economic organization.

In the prismatic, poly-communal society we might expect to find something intermediate. First, we may anticipate a wider distribution of types than in either the traditional or industrialized societies, i.e. more variety, less homogeneity. Primary groups would predominate in traditional societies; secondary in industrialized; but both types would be important in transitional societies, the primary especially in rural hinterlands, the secondary stronger in major urban centers.

The prismatic model leads us to suspect also the existence of an intermediate category which cannot be well characterized as either "primary" or "secondary." It would, I suppose, have some characteristics of both the association and the primary group. The district associations among the Chinese come to mind as an example. These groups are voluntary associations in form, yet the basis for membership is not a specific function but the district of origin. Yet it is scarcely a "kith and kin" group. It is not an organic biological unit growing naturally in the agricultural countryside. Rather, it seems to be an exotic plant, blooming far from home in the alien soil of an overseas, some-what hostile environment. Drawing on the familiar—the family ties which served so well in the original rural setting—but instituting the new pattern of an "association," a group of men with a common origin draws together for a wide variety of activities: economic, for mutual aid; political, for mutual protection; social, for recreation; perhaps religious, educational, mortuary.

Intermediacy

Are there any other counterparts to the district association? Groups which are partially primary, partially secondary in their make-up and operations? Consider, for example, the ethnic chamber of commerce, whether Thai, Chinese, American, British, Japanese, or Indian. In an industrialized country you would expect to find a single chamber, representing the shared business interests of all entrepreneurs regardless of nationality, religion, or race. But in a poly-communal society it would not be surprising to find a variety of chambers, one for each community in the society. Every ethnic chamber would, of course, not only be striving for the economic prosperity of its members, but would also tend to attack and perhaps seek restrictions on the activities of its rivals in different ethnic groups. Thus its program would be intermediate between the particularism of a kith-and-kin group, and the universalism of an association; something which I call selectivism.

We will find similar phenomena in many kinds of organizations, whether we think of trade unions, professional societies, recreational and social clubs, or political parties. Indeed, a survey of the organizations of the Chinese community in Thailand will reveal almost a complete set of duplicates for all the kinds of organization to be found among the Siamese population, with, of course, some notable exceptions.

Let us consider the organization of government in the light of this type of mixed organizational relationship. Characteristically, a prismatic government would recruit most, if not all, of its officials from the dominant community, excluding members of the deviant communities. We have already spoken of the fact that members of the Thai elite must be Siamese. The point is repeated here, not in order to criticize or be invidious, but to indicate a characteristic phenomenon, and to suggest some of the consequences. For example, all groups whose members belong to the dominant community would naturally have much better access to officials than those from alien or deviant communities. The latter would tend to rely on extra-legal or other means to secure their interests, including the use of violence and money as means to obtain what they could not get through normal political and administrative channels.

The internal organization of a government agency itself takes on somewhat diffuse characteristics over and above those related to its specified program goals. In a refracted society, the administrative agency is supposed, ideally, to put the effectiveness and efficiency of its work above any other goals. In real industrialized societies we know that this ideal is not realized, but it is often approximated.

In a prismatic society, however, we expect the agency to be governed by powerful forces which qualify, and sometimes even compromise its ability to carry out program objectives. Diffuse, family-like attitudes become powerful, and affect recruitment of new members, who must fit easily into the existing group structure, as well as proposals to discharge those who fail to perform their duties. Indeed, the head of a section or division might well think of those in his unit as he would of his children, whom he might discipline, but not expel from the home because of inefficient work.

It is convenient to have a word which we can use to refer to such intermediate type organizations, having some of the large-scale characteristics of associations, but the functionally diffuse behavior of family, or kith-and-kin, groups. After a long search, I was unable to find a suitable word, although I discovered such related concepts as club, clique, and sect. Consequently I decided to make a new word from the sounds common to these words, as well as in such terms as eclectic and collect: namely cllect. Although you will not find it in a dictionary, you will not have trouble remembering it if you think of these other similar words.

The value of having such a word is that it immediately suggests a number of interesting hypotheses and applications. To what extent, for example, can the organizations to be found in Thailand be classified as "cleets," rather than as primary or secondary organizations? What light does this throw on the social, political and administrative problems of Thai society?

It is apparent that, in the process of modernization, older traditional loyalties to family and locality cannot be easily abandoned. They offer many real values which their members would be foolish to discard. At the same time the urgencies of modern times, the impact and the threat of Western military and economic power, dictate the need to create new organizational structures modeled after those used with such effect by foreigners. Unavoidably, organizational arrangements appear in which something of the traditional is merged with features of the newly imported way of life. There is not enough space to catalog the many and complex patterns of interaction among officials belonging to the same cleets, and between them and citizens who may, on the one hand, share membership in a cleet or, alternatively, belong to cleets identified with one of the deviant communities. Such relationships may concern matters of buying and selling commodities, the enforcement of regulations, the grant of permits and licenses, recruitment and promotion to positions in the public service, the control and use of funds, etc.

The reader will supply his own examples and illustrations. Meanwhile let us go on to consider a closely related topic, namely the value system by which members of a prismatic society evaluate their actions.

4. Values: Poly-Normativism

In "Agraria and Industria"* I attempted to indicate some of the characteristic ways of viewing the world of traditional agricultural and modern industrial societies. For example, the agricultural society tends to see the world predominantly in sacral, the industrial in secular terms; the former views society hierarchically, the latter in terms of equalitarian ideals; the former sees itself in relation to environment organismically, the latter individualistically and collectivistically; the former relies on status to order relationships, the latter on contract; the former copes with environment by ritual, the latter seeks rational means to achieve goals.

* Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration, Indiana University, Department of Government, 1957.

In the prismatic or transitional society the latter set of values and ways of viewing the world have been introduced but the former set, while undermined, have not been displaced. Hence the characteristic idea and value system of the prismatic society may be called "poly-normative."

The distribution of value systems, of course, varies considerably within the prismatic population, and as between its communities. For example, the intelligentsia is strongly oriented toward the secular, equalitarian, individualistic, contract, and rational symbol and value system; but powerful residues of the contrasting orientations remain at sub-conscious or repressed levels of consciousness.

In contrast, the rural peasant remains predominantly sacral, hierarchic, organismic, status and ritual oriented, but fragments of the contrasting new orientations enter his consciousness, through elementary school instruction, contact with a public health clinic, agricultural extensionist, community development worker, etc. All degrees of intermixture between these two extremes are also to be expected.

Are there other ways of viewing the environment which can be characterized as intermediate rather than just a mixture of these contrasting orientation? Confucius once remarked that it was easy to act but difficult to understand. This saying contained a profound insight, for it is truly difficult to take an original look at the world and actually see what is there. We tend to structure our image of reality in terms of the models which come conveniently to hand, often enough ready made in the very language we use. Hence the dangers, already discussed, of relying on established models for understanding the prismatic society. It is much easier to mix together the traditional and industrial ways of looking at the world than it is to figure out a new way, more appropriate to the intermediate prismatic situation.

An example is provided by the public health worker who tries to induce peasant to abandon the idea that disease is caused by spirit possession and substitute a belief in germs, with corresponding acceptance of modern medicine. In practice, the peasant continues to believe in spirit possession, but accepts the proposition that some diseases—malaria or small pox, for example—can be overcome with the aid of the doctor's pills and injections. An M.D. in a remote district, for example, may find it useful to become also a sorcerer in order to gain fuller acceptance for his science. There is little possibility here of an intermediate set of beliefs and values, but the overlapping of incompatible outlooks cannot help but have its effect on both.

Mimesis, Charisma and Normlessness

I believe the effect of overlapping symbol systems is, at least in part, to corrode the effectiveness of both. The traditional set of beliefs and practices is undermined but not abandoned. Hence it loses its consistency and rationale. The believer represses from consciousness elements in the system which can no longer be accepted, but perpetuates elements which can. To take a common Western example, one often knocks on wood after making a proud boast, but he cannot explain the action. If told that this was a propitiatory gesture to appease his guardian spirit, he would emphatically deny this as a ridiculous "superstition." Thus rituals become ritualistic. Having lost their sacral core, they become empty fossils, relics.

New rationalizations are offered to account for them. The mistletoe no longer exerts its potent sacral and fertility powers, but is hung as a pretext for kissing games. The English language contains a host of sacral relics. To be "spirited" is merely to be lively; to be "possessed" means to be neurotic; to be "charming," "glamorous," "inspiring," "fascinating" or "bewitching" is no longer to exhibit occult powers. This suggests a counterpart to the ritualistic, namely the rationalistic. When to be rational is valued, one tries to rationalize the irrational.

Economy of effort is also involved in these developments. Classical ritual always involved elaborate system and discipline. To be truly rational also requires arduous scientific method. But to be both rationalistic and ritualistic is relatively easy, if one is not disturbed by inconsistency.

Ritual requires an intuitive, synthetic approach, often attained only after long practice and self-discipline. Rationality requires long schooling and experimentation in the analytic method. The intermediate method is mimetic. It involves chiefly borrowing or appropriation of what others have done--one's ancestors or the foreigners. The doctor who practices sorcery, the lawyer astrologer, the engineer spiritist are intelligentsia counterparts of the farmer who takes improved seed from the extension worker, but employs a spell to make sure his crops will grow to full size and weight.

As for the sacral-secular dichotomy, perhaps a distinctive intermediate outlook is possible, which we might call charismatic. Gone is the original sacral view that a king's or official's powers derive from his possession by a god, but in its place remains reliance on the magical properties of the leader. The secular view humanizes the monarch but not to the extent of reducing him to the level of an ordinary man.

The charismatic relationship characterizes the clect and community also in the prismatic society. Given the functional diffuseness of a clect, it is not possible to choose and change leaders by formal processes—elections and appointments—as one does in an association. Nor are leaders biologically chosen as they are in a kinship structure. Hence clect leadership tends to be charismatic—it rests on personal magnetism more than formal designation. Changes in leadership, therefore, may be highly traumatic for the clect. If a charismatic leader is compelled by formal rules to retire, he often retains effective power, exercised through a protege who steps into the official position he has vacated. When a charismatic leader dies, the succession struggle may fragment his clect.

The various communities also may produce their own charismatic leaders, with the result that both intra- and inter-community relationships often become highly personalized through the interaction of these leaders. A confusing aspect of poly-communalism arises from the divergence which frequently exists between formal and effective leadership, with the result that the outside observer has difficulty distinguishing real decision-making processes from pseudo-decision-making which merely places the stamp of authority on decisions previously made by hidden procedures.

The poly-normative state is characterized not only by the fossilization or attenuation of the more vigorous norms of fused and refracted societies, but also by a condition which might be called "normlessness." The older customs—the folkways and mores—which once fully regulated social and sexual behavior, tend to become mere decadent customs, survivals clung to only by the older generation, the "reactionaries," "arch-conservatives," or "ancient-minded."

The new laws and regulations and the ethical standards introduced from abroad tend to remain "formalistic". Administrative resources for their enforcement by the government are lacking, and they are not sufficiently rooted in popular understanding and support to win voluntary compliance. A no-man's-land or limbo develops in which men feel free to disregard both the old and the new norms—they rely more on their cunning, use of violence or insolence. To squat, smuggle, bribe, cheat, indeed to take what one can, to save oneself, and the "devil take the hindmost," becomes the prevalent rule.

Such an attitude, of course, is probably found in all societies. Social norms and sanctions are everywhere necessary if human nature is to be socialized. But the prismatic society is characterized by the relatively large sphere within which normless behavior predominates.

Formalism and Non-Consensus

One major result of poly-normative behavior is what may be termed formalism.

It is part of the self-image of Western societies that the law and governmental institutions provide both tolerably faithful representations of actual social behavior and an effective means of social control. When sharp deviations between law and practice are uncovered, pronounced social shock results, as in the instances of Prohibition and, more recently, in regard to racial integration in the United States. One result is the illusion—not too far from reality—that by studying the law one can understand government and social behavior. Another result is a preoccupation with legislation as a means to effect social change, and the heavy weight given to legal study and the law profession.

If a society is poly-normative, however, a substantial divorce appears between the formal and the effective, between the theory and practice, the law and its implementation, between authority and control. Legislation and manipulation of the law often fails to achieve the result intended—sometimes its exact opposite. This is what we mean by “formalism.” In a poly-communal society, for example, legislation to restrict a deviant community forces the counter-elite to intensify its efforts to buy protection. Hence the laws are subverted, administration corrupted, and the deviant community becomes more deviant, its counter-elite more suspicious and hostile.

Ironically, the legal profession receives even more emphasis in a prismatic society where the law is thus divorced from practice than it does in a refracted society where law provides an effective lever for social control. Perhaps this is because with formalism the law tends to become more an end in itself than a means to an end.

Where the political process and social pressures are well organized, every law is upheld by clientele groups prepared to battle for interpretations of the law which will implement the objectives that lie behind its enactment.

But when laws are drafted on the basis of inadequate data or a misunderstanding of the local problem—perhaps through mimesis of foreign models—the intent of the law remains obscure or its goals unfeasible. Administrators called upon to enforce the law sometimes resort to literal interpretations. This offers practical advantages to those who are legal adepts, for they can generally fabricate interpretations which permit them to do what they, or their clients and proteges, wish.

From this follows the twin phenomena of overconformity and non-enforcement. Formally polar opposites, these are actually alternative responses to the same problem, what to do with formalistic laws. “Ritualistic” overconformity, indeed, can be used to raise the price for non-enforcement.

In this context, a goal-oriented administrator is trapped by red-tape and proceduralism. The lack of clear-cut political and policy guidance leaves him bemused and floundering. The lawyer, however, less concerned with the goals than with the form and intricacies of the legal text, is able to manipulate the rules to his own advantage, with power and wealth as potential by-products for the skillful initiate.

The law can thus become a kind of mystery religion which generously indulges its votaries. The free-wheeling character of the prismatic society's legal superstructure offers a splendid opportunity for joy-rides to its jurist-elite.

Formalism is related to the lack of consensus. In both the traditional (fused) and industrialized (refracted) societies, there exists a fairly high degree of consensus on fundamental goals and the way in which political authority can be acquired. Hence those in power, the elite, are able to exercise control by virtue of legitimacy, everyone in the population virtually concurring in the obligation to obey those in authority. In the prismatic model, by contrast, poly-normativism carries as a corollary the lack of consensus. Since there is little agreement about what the goals of the state should be, or who should have the right to rule, we conclude that control is exercised in large part by coercion, by violence, money, and "charismatic" leadership. When legal and constitutional procedures and forms are employed, they tend to be difficult to enforce. Not only the public at large but even the government officials themselves often do not accept them or use them only as tools for their self-interest.

Obviously whenever such a condition prevails it is difficult to obtain a true picture of real conditions, since much of what is formally or legally supposed to happen does not, in fact, take place, and it may often be dangerous to inquire too closely into the hidden ways of the informal, the actually practiced. Thus formalism affects the university world as well as the government and society as a whole, in our prismatic model. The academic adventurer and reifier easily takes advantage of formalism and normlessness for his personal advantage, but the serious scholar finds only a few crumbs left for him at the banquet table of learning.

Conclusion

The foregoing account of the prismatic model by no means completes the enumeration of its salient characteristics.*

* A complete account, for example, would deal with its economic and political characteristics. I have published elsewhere a discussion of these features. See "The Bazaar-Canteen Model," *Philippine Sociological Review*, Vol. VI (July-Oct., 1958), nos. 3 and 4; and "Politics, Policies and Personnel," Occasional Papers no. 1, Manila, Institute of Public Administration, 1959. A more comprehensive general discussion is contained in *Ecology of Public Administration*, New Delhi, Indian Institute of Public Administration, 1961.

Enough has been given, however, to enable the reader to judge whether or not existing models, based on experience in the Western, industrialized societies, provides an adequate basis for the study of Thai society and administration, and whether or not the approach here described, and the "prismatic model" may or may not prove more useful for this purpose.

The material presented has, of course, been focused primarily on the general analysis of a society, with only incidental attention to its implications for the study of public administration. Throughout, however, I have implied that every administrative system is an integral part of its society, and therefore bears, to a greater or less degree, its essential characteristics. If, therefore, we can attain to a more profound understanding of the nature of a society, we will at the same time reach a deeper insight into its administration.*

Although the primary interest in the prismatic model is for its explanatory powers, the method may also have some utility in efforts to reform and "modernize" public administration. The method suggests some of the inherent limitations of all reform efforts. If a particular difficulty in administration can be shown to be directly related to a social characteristic—poly-communalism, elects, poly-normativism, etc.—then it becomes apparent that attempts to change the administrative behavior complained of must be accompanied by a program designed to change these inter-related features as well. Thus at the same time that this approach helps us to discover some of the inherent limitations on administrative reform, it also enables us to discover some indirect means by which administrative change might be accomplished.

If this possibility is granted, it follows that considerable time and effort ought to be devoted to further research, both to test and amplify the model outlined in this and related papers, and also to revise and improve the model in the light of further thought and research work, thus making it more applicable and useful for the study of Thai society and public administration.

* This point of view has been tested in several of my articles which relate to specific aspects of administration. See, for illustration, "Prismatic Society and Financial Administration," in *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 5 (June 1960) no. 1, pp. 1-46. "Economic Development and Local Administration: A Study in Circular Causation," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. 3 (1959) no. 1, pp. 86-146 (reprinted, with abridgments, as "Circular Causation in Development and Local Government," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, vol. VIII (July 1960), no. 4, pp. 389-418; and "A New Look at Government Documents," *Bulletin of the Association of Special Libraries of the Philippines*. Sept.-Dec. 1958, pp. 6-15.

ย่อเรื่อง

ศาสตราจารย์ริกส์ เป็นผู้หนึ่งที่สมควรที่จะได้รบเกียรติว่าเป็นผู้ริเริ่มการศึกษาวิชา
รัฐประศาสนศาสตร์เปรียบเทียบ ข้อเขียนของท่านเรื่องสังคมกสิกรรมกับสังคมอุตสาหกรรม
(Agraria and Industria) ซึ่งพิมพ์ขึ้นในปี 2500 ได้มีอิทธิพลสำคัญต่อการศึกษาเปรียบเทียบ
ทางรัฐศาสตร์และบริหารในแง่ที่เกี่ยวกับการวิเคราะห์องค์ประกอบทางสังคมวัฒนธรรม, วัฒนธรรม
และประวัติศาสตร์ แทนที่จะเป็นการศึกษาในลักษณะอธิบายสถาบันทางการเมือง
และสังคมซึ่งเป็นแนวการศึกษาที่ใช้กันอยู่แต่เดิม "อกราเรีย" และ "อินดัสเตรีย" *
เป็นแต่เพียงแบบอย่างเท่านั้น อย่างแรกเป็นแบบอย่างของสังคมกสิกรรมแบบดั้งเดิม อย่าง
หลังเป็นแบบอย่างของสังคมอุตสาหกรรมสมัยใหม่ "อินดัสเตรีย" มีลักษณะคล้ายคลึง
กับสังคมอุตสาหกรรมที่พัฒนาไปมากแล้วทางตะวันตกบางสังคม แต่ "อกราเรีย" นั้น
จะไม่เหมือนกับสังคมปัจจุบันแห่งใดเลย สังคมที่เคยเป็นสังคมกสิกรรมแบบดั้งเดิมทุกสังคม
ในโลก ต่างก็กำลังอยู่ในขอบเขตที่จะเปลี่ยนแปลงอย่างค่อนข้างจะรวดเร็วไปในอดีตจะทำให้
ให้เกิดอุตสาหกรรมขึ้น เพื่อให้เป็นไปสอดคล้องกับความเป็นจริงดังกล่าว ศาสตราจารย์ริกส์
จึงหันความสนใจมาพิจารณาถึงเรื่อง "กระบวนการเปลี่ยนแปลง" (transitional process)
ของสังคมและบทความเรื่องนี้เป็นความพยายามครั้งที่สองที่ท่านได้เขียนขึ้นเพื่อจัดตั้งแบบ
อย่างของการศึกษาดังคมไทย ซึ่งอาจจะเรียกได้ว่าเป็นตัวอย่างทั่วไปของสังคมที่กำลัง
เปลี่ยนแปลง

บทความเรื่องนี้ไม่ง่ายนักที่จะอ่าน และก็ไม่ง่ายนักที่จะทำการย่อ แต่ก็เป็นเรื่องที่
ควรค่าแก่การศึกษาและอภิปรายอย่างรอบคอบ ย่อความนี้จึงได้แต่ชี้จุดสำคัญ ๆ ในการ
วิเคราะห์สังคมที่กำลังเปลี่ยนแปลง (transitional or prismatic society) ของริกส์

ในสังคมกสิกรรมแบบดั้งเดิม องค์การหรือสถาบันเพียงสองสามแห่งจะทำหน้าที่ได้
หลายอย่าง ดังตัวอย่าง เช่น ครอบครัวจะทำหน้าที่ทางการศึกษา การเศรษฐกิจ สังคม
ศาสนา และทางบันเทิงอื่น ๆ ส่วนสังคมอุตสาหกรรมสมัยใหม่มีลักษณะว่ามีองค์การทำงาน
เฉพาะหลายแห่ง แต่ละองค์การทำหน้าที่อย่างเดี่ยวหรือทำหน้าที่เกี่ยวของกันเพียงสองสาม
ชนิด ประเทศไทยเป็นแบบของสังคมที่อยู่ในระหว่างกลางของสองขบวนการ จำนวนองค์การที่ทำ

หน้าที่เฉพาะ (เช่น กระทรวง ทบวง กรม สถาบันการศึกษา ตลาดสินค้า ฯลฯ) กำลัง
เพิ่มขึ้นอย่างรวดเร็ว แต่ความสัมพันธ์ปฐมภูมิ (primary associations) เช่น ครอบครัว
และหมู่บ้าน ยังคงปฏิบัติหน้าที่ทางสังคมและเศรษฐกิจอีกหลายอย่าง

สังคมที่กำลังเปลี่ยนแปลง หรือพริตมาติก จะประกอบด้วยชุมชน (communi-
ties) เล็กๆ เป็นจำนวนมาก ทั้งนี้เพราะการขาดการคมนาคมขนาดใหญ่ ทำให้ชนบ
ประเพณีและวิถีชีวิตยังเป็นอยู่อย่างเดิม นอกจากนั้นชุมชนย่อยๆ ชนิดจะเป็นกลุ่มซึ่งรวม
กำลังกันต่อต้านคอกกลุ่มผู้นำหรือผู้ปกครองด้วยวิธีการและความแข็งขันต่าง ๆ กัน วิกส์เรียก
ชุมชนเล็กๆ เหล่านี้ว่า “เป็นกลุ่มเบี่ยงเบน หรือพวกไม่ตามผู้นำ” (deviant group
or counter-elites) ถ้ากลุ่มเบี่ยงเบนมีความชำนาญพิเศษทางการค้าหรือการเป็นผู้จัดการ
(เช่น คนจีน) แล้ว ความตึงเครียดระหว่างผู้นำและพวกเบี่ยงเบน จะทำให้ความร่วมมือ
ระหว่างกันยุ่งยากยิ่งขึ้น ความเจริญทางเศรษฐกิจการค้า มีแนวโน้มที่จะทำให้เกิดความ
แตกแยกในระหว่างชุมชนเล็กๆ ที่เคยเป็นอันหนึ่งอันเดียวกัน ชาวชนบทต้องการซื้อเครื่อง
อุปโภคบริโภคใหม่ ๆ ที่เขาเห็นวางขายอยู่ในตลาด แต่เขาก็มีความซัดเซงใจที่ตลาดสินค้า
จะทำให้ความสัมพันธ์ที่ฝังรากแน่นแฉดต้องเปลี่ยนแปลงไป เรืองนี้จะเห็นได้ชัดจากปัญหาของ
การซื้อของด้วยเงินสด ถ้าเจ้าของร้านค้าปฏิเสธไม่ยอมให้ซื้อเชื่อ เขาก็จะขายไม่ออกหรือ
ถูกค้าไม่คิด แต่ถ้าเขายอมให้ซื้อเชื่อ เขาก็อาจจะเสียดังสินค้าและลูกค้า

การแบ่งชนวรรณะในสังคมหนึ่ง ๆ จะเปลี่ยนแปลงไปเมื่อเกิดมีการอุตสาหกรรมชน
ในสังคมกสิกรรมแบบดั้งเดิม ชนบประเพณีและความเชื่อในฐานะของครอบครัวและป็นอายุ
วุฒิการศึกษา ฯลฯ เป็นเครื่องกำหนดชนของบุคคล ส่วนในสังคมอุตสาหกรรม ชนของ
บุคคลจะถูกกำหนดโดยความมั่งคั่งเป็นสำคัญ ในประเทศไทยเราจะพบการแบ่งชนทั้งดั่งของวิ
ประปนกันอยู่ นักเป็นสังทรักส์เรียกว่า การแบ่งชนหลายสีหลายอย่าง (Kaleidoscopic
stratification) คือระบบที่กำลังเปลี่ยนแปลงอยู่อย่างดิ้นรนตลอดเวลา วิกส์แนะว่าในเมือง
ไทยนั้น เครื่องวัดฐานะว่าใครจะเป็นบุคคลในชั้นปกครองหนักคช การศึกษาสูงเด่น รวมทั้ง
การเป็นสมาชิกของกลุ่มที่กล่าวถึงเรื่องอำนาจอยู่

ในการอภิปรายถึง “การใช้ความรู้” (the uses of scholarship) นั้น วิกส์เนอร์ว่า เมื่อชนชั้นปกครองมีความสนใจในทางการต่อสู้เพื่อช่วงชิงอำนาจยิ่งกว่าการที่จะใช้ความรู้ไปในทางที่จะแก้ไขปัญหาการเพิ่มผลิตผลและปัญหาทางสังคมแล้ว สังคมไทยก็จะยึดถือการศึกษาว่าเป็นกุญแจสำคัญที่จะนำคนไปสู่การเป็นชนชั้นหัวกะทิ ยิ่งกว่าจะไปสู่พรรคแห่งการเป็นนักปราชญ์ “พวกร้อยล้านกะลาวัน และพวกหัวอ่อน นั้น ย่อมสามารถปรับปรุงตัวให้เข้ากับความต้องการของพวกข้าราชการประจำ และคนทะเลาะเถียงกันได้ดีกว่าคนที่มีความคิดใหม่ และความคิดนอกกลุ่มเก่าแก่ — พวกแรกนั้นอาจจะสอบเข้ามารับราชการได้โดยง่าย และเป็นพวกที่เป็นภัยหรือคุกคามต่อผลประโยชน์ของพวกชนชั้นหัวกะทิได้น้อยกว่าพวกหลัง... วงจรร้ายก็จะเกิดขึ้น กล่าวคือ ยิ่งพวกชั้นผู้นำจำนวนน้อยยอมรับพวกlässมัธยมหรือพวกประจบสอพลออย่างไม่คำนึงถึงว่าจะห่างไกลและจอมปลอมจากความจริงเพียงใด ก็ยิ่งเป็นการยากที่จะยอมรับนับถือการวิจัยอย่างหนักที่ศึกษาและความคิดที่ตรงตามความเป็นจริง — และการกระทำในทางที่ถูกที่ควรก็จะยิ่งคล้ายกับเป็น ‘การบ่อนทำลาย’ พวกผู้นำยิ่งขึ้น”

ในสังคมดั้งเดิม จะปรากฏว่าสิ่งที่สังคมนั้นถือว่าดีงาม และโลกทัศน์ต่างๆ (value systems and ways of viewing the world) ประปรกกันอยู่ ชำนาญในชนบทจะรู้สึกเกี่ยวข้องกับความมหัศจรรย์ของความอุดมสมบูรณ์ การเกิดและการตาย, น้ำท่วม, ฝนแล้ง, การเก็บเกี่ยว และทุกวิถีชีวิต เขาต้องปฏิบัติตามความรู้ดั้งเดิมที่เคยถูกอบรมสั่งสอนมา (intuition) และจารีตต่างๆ เพื่อเป็นการเอาอกเอาใจผู้ดำรงเทวดาซึ่งอาจให้คุณให้โทษแก่เขา ความเชื่อเช่นว่านย่อมจะถูกความรู้ทางวิทยาศาสตร์และความเชื่อและคำอธิบายที่มเหตุผลมาแทนที่อย่างช้าๆ ยกตัวอย่างเช่นแม้ว่าชาวนาจะยอมรับความจริงว่า มาเดเรียและไซทรพิช อาจจะรักษาด้วยยากิน ยาฉีดสมัยใหม่ แต่เขากยังคงเชื่อว่า พวกภูตผีปีศาจเป็นผู้ก่อให้เกิดโรคเหล่านี้ พวกเขาจะยอมใช้เมล็ดพืชพันธุ์ต่างๆ ที่หนักถ่วงแผนใหม่ นำไปแจก แต่ก็ยังคงนิยมใช้คาถาอาคมไปเสกได้ เพื่อให้แน่ใจว่าพืชพันธุ์เหล่านั้นจะเติบโตเต็มที่ ความเชื่อถ้อยแบบโบราณนี้จะค่อยเลือนลางไปบ้างแต่จะไม่ถูกตัดทิ้งไปทันที

ผลของการผสมผสานระหว่างสิ่งที่ถือว่าดีงามและความเชื่อต่าง ๆ นั้น จะทำให้ชนบ
 ประเพณีเก่าๆ ซึ่งครั้งหนึ่งเคยนำมาใช้เป็นกฎเกณฑ์การประพฤติปฏิบัติของสังคม กลายเป็น
 ประเพณีที่ค่อยๆ เติบโตไป คงมีแต่คนรุ่นเก่าๆ ยึดถืออยู่ ส่วนกฎหมายและระเบียบ
 ใหม่ๆ รวมทั้งมาตรฐานแห่งจริยธรรมซึ่งนำเข้ามาจากต่างประเทศก็จะมีท่าทีว่าคงเป็นแต่
 ตามทางการเท่านั้น กล่าวคือ มีผู้ปฏิบัติตามแต่ทางกายกรรม แต่ทำไปโดยไร้ความหมาย
 หรือสัมรรถภาพ “ จะเกิดเขตแดนที่ว่างเปล่าขึ้น คือคนจะมีความรู้สึกฟรีที่จะไม่ยอมรับคต
 ทั้งเก่าและใหม่--พวกเขาจะหันเข้าหาวิถีคิดโกงใช้เล่ห์เหลี่ยม, การใช้กำลังรุนแรง และความ
 กระด้างหยาบคาย ” เมื่อเป็นเช่นนั้นพระราชกำหนดกฎหมายก็จะไม่ประสพผลดีตามความคาด
 หมาย และในบางครั้งกลับได้ผลตรงข้ามกับความคาดหมายเขาเสียเลยทีเดียว ดังตัวอย่าง
 กฎหมายที่จะจำกัดพวกรัสนิยมชนชาติแย้งกลับเป็นเหตุให้พวกรัสนิยมที่จะชวยการคุ้มครอง
 บัองกันยิ่งขึ้น “ ดังนั้น กฎหมายจะถูกบ่อนทำลาย, ข้าราชการจะทุจริต, และชุมนุมชน
 ชาติแย้งจะกลับกลายเป็นพวกชาติแย้งยิ่งขึ้น กิจกรรมต่อต้านผู้นำชนทัวะทั้นก็จะเป็นที่น่า
 สงสัย และเป็นอริกันมากขึ้น ”

เมื่อกฎหมายเป็นแต่แบบพิธีเป็นตวงหนึ่งข้อ และไม่ผลบังคับตนเองด้วยการขัดแย้ง
 ของคุณค่าและความเชื่อของประชาชนที่เกี่ยวข้อง - แล้วพวกมีอาชีพทางกฎหมายก็จะได้
 รับความสนใจเป็นพิเศษ ตามความเห็นของดัทชินิยมแบบแผน (formalism) ดัวบทกฎหมาย
 ก็ทำที่จะกลายเป็นวัตถุประสงค์ (end) ไป แทนที่จะใช้กฎหมายเป็นวิถี (means) ที่จะนำ
 ไปสู่วัตถุประสงค์ เมื่อกฎหมายได้ถูกร่างขึ้นมาบนมาตรฐานที่อ่อนแง่นม้หลกฐานไม่เพียงพอ
 หรือมีความเข้าใจในปัญหาที่ถ้งถันผิดพลาดไปแล้ว เจตนารมย์ของกฎหมายก็จะคงคลุมเครือ
 และไม่อาจใช้บังคับได้ และบรรดาข้าราชการก็จะถกความต่ำช้า และดัทชิแก่ระเบียบ
 (proceduralism) เป็นชวาทหนามกตถนการปฏิบัติการอกด้วย

ดัทชินิยมแบบแผนมีส่วนสัมพันธ์กับการขาดความยินยอมหรือข้อขัดถงว่าจุดหมาย
 มีอย่างไรบ้าง ในกรณีที่มีความถ้งถงหรือขาดข้อขัดถงว่า จุดหมายของรัฐควรจะเป็น
 อย่งไร หรือใครควรจะเป็นผู้ม้สิทธิที่จะปกครองแล้ว การควบคุมบังคับบัญชาจะ
 เป็นไปในทางใช้กำลังบังคับ ใช้จ้รุนแรง เงิน หรือ บุคลิกภาพของผู้นำที่ถ่มนำใจคน
 (charismatic leaders)

ในบทสรุป ศาสตราจารย์ริคส์อธิบายว่า วัตถุประสงค์ของบทความนี้ไม่ใช่เป็นการ
เสนอข้อแก้ไขปัญหาทางการบริหารของประเทศไทย แต่เป็นการอธิบายถึงลักษณะมูลฐาน
ของสังคมที่กำลังเปลี่ยนแปลง ท่านคิดว่าการศึกษาถึงเรื่องรัฐบาลและการบริหารของไทย
นั้นยังไม่ถดถอยเพียงพอ และในบางกรณีอาจเรียกได้ว่าเป็นไปในทางชวนให้เข้าใจผิด เพราะ
ว่าการศึกษาเหล่านี้ถูกอิทธิพลของแบบอย่างตะวันตกครอบงำมากเกินไป ความพยายามที่
จะปฏิรูปหรือปรับปรุงประเทศไทยให้ทันสมัยจะต้องมีรากฐานอยู่ที่ความเข้าใจสังคมไทยเอง
ถ้าข้อเสนอเป็นความจริง ความต้องการอันเร่งด่วนอย่างยิ่งอย่างหนึ่งสำหรับประเทศไทยนั้น
ก็คือการวิจัยอย่างนักศึกษา (scholarly research) และบทความเรื่องนักควรมีส่วนกระตุ้น
การวิจัยในลักษณะนี้บ้างไม่มากนัก

ข้อความโดย โจเซฟ บี. คิงเบอร์
แปลเป็นไทยโดย อมร รักษาศัพท์

△ คนทุกคนได้รับการศึกษาสองประเภท - คือชนิดที่คนอื่นให้กับ
เขา และอีกชนิดหนึ่งคือชนิดที่เขาให้แก่ตัวของเขาเอง ในสองประเภทนี้
ชนิดหลังเป็นชนิดที่มากกว่ามาก แท้จริงแล้วมันเป็นอย่างที่ทำให้คนเป็น
คนมีค่า เขาจะต้องพยายามศึกษาและเอาชนะวิชาด้วยตัวเอง นั่นแหละ
จะเป็นสิ่งที่จำเป็นอย่างแท้จริงและอย่างดีที่สุด สิ่งที่เรากล่องอนนั้นจะ
ไม่มีใครได้รับประโยชน์ในทางบำรุงฝึกฝนจิตใจ เมื่อเทียบกับสิ่งที่เรากล่องอนให้
แก่ตัวของเราเอง △

จิม - ปอล ริชเตอร์