

Sociological Characteristics, Personnel Practices, and Development-Orientedness of Thai Civil Servants: An Empirical Test*

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I. Introduction

The effort of every Thai government (regime) for the past two decades has been toward national development. Thailand's first national economic plan, which was later than most comparative countries, was put into effect in 1961. At the present time the government is implementing the fourth plan (1977-1981) and has just put the fifth plan on the national agenda intended to be implemented during 1982 through 1986. These past efforts at national development, however, can hardly be called a success. The reasons for this seem to be attributable to both external and internal factors. The external factors can be attributed to worldwide economic recession, deflation, devaluation of the American dollar, a decrease in the volume of foreign aid and assistance, and a decrease in the price of Thailand's food and agricultural products in world markets. Admittedly, these external factors are beyond the Thai government's control, a *force majeure*. This research will not be concerned with these external variables.

On the other hand, the problem of Thailand's economic and social development plans is also a result of internal factors—factors that the Thai government should (has to) be able to control if development is to take place. At least three internal factors can be singled out as significant in negatively affecting national, economic, and social development; the deficiency of the national economic and social development plans themselves; the defect of administrative structure and practices, and the sociological characteristics or values of the civil servants who implement the plan. In the pages which follow these internal variables will be examined systematically in order to understand better the Thai environment for national development. This study will concentrate on sociological and personnel system independent variables.

*For more detail, see Tin Prachyapruit, "Administrative Practices and Development-Orientedness of Civil Servants in Six Public Organizations in Thailand" (Ph.D. dissertation, Kansas University, 1982).

The deficiency of the national economic and social development plans has been reflected by several authorities in the field. According to Jamlong Atikul, the first Thai national economic development plan (1961-1966) was hastily drafted, following the recommendation of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, without any economic model to be used as a guideline. As a result, the plan contained only national economic development programs in the public national sector. Those in the private sector and within local governments were not yet included. Also excluded were social development programs. And even though social development and other development programs for private sector and local governments were later incorporated in the second (1967-1971) and the third (1972-1976) plans, all three national economic and social development plans remained deficient. The major deficiency was that the plans relied too heavily on some economic and social models, e.g., based on Keynesian economics, which assume that supply is given and hence effective demand is the only constraint to output. This assumption of economic and social development, according to Atikul, is not suitable for a developing country such as Thailand since the rigidity in supply has been known to exist.¹

In its special report recently published, *Sayamrath Weekly Critiques* also pointed out that the third development plan failed because the government had pursued a development inflation strategy which Thailand was unprepared to accommodate. By spending too much in order to accelerate economic growth without carefully watching price levels, the government's development expenditure itself was the main cause of inflation. *Sayamrath Weekly Critiques* went on to point to the deficiency of the fourth plan (1977-1981) was because it was "scratching the wrong place". While the plan pledged to lessen social and economic inequity, it fails because poverty has not been seriously taken as a target to be tackled.² This observation is shared by a first-hand national development observer of the National Institute of Development Administration, Chakkrit Noranitpadungkarn, who suggested that if the goal of the fourth plan was to be achieved, poverty and the poor had to be the first target.³

From this brief discussion, it is seen that deficiency of the national plans themselves is one of the major sources of the lack of national economic and social development in Thailand. But comparatively little is known about the critical variables which influence national development in Thailand. This study is an attempt to study carefully the forces which have influenced or hampered national development.

The problems of administrative structure and practices have been cited by both foreign and Thai scholars -- including the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development -- as being detrimental to Thailand's national economic and social development.

As early as 1952, the Public Administration Service has submitted, on request, to the Thai government a report, prepared by Messrs. Lyman S. Moore and Edmund F. Ricketts, delineating administrative problems faced by Thailand. Among them were the problems on capital budget, revenue administration, budget and accounting, purchasing, municipalities, use of staff, fixing responsibility, organization, province and district administrations, and on record keeping.⁴

Similarly, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, in its report made public in 1959, suggested to the Thai government that the organization and management problems be tackled if the goal of national development was to be achieved. By pointing to the Thai government that "Government administration presents its own additional problems," the World Bank had recommended that organization arrangements based on political considerations and adherence in the administration to traditional practices and to status relationship which tended to diffuse authority and responsibilities be dropped or improved if efficiency and economy for national development is to be realized. And at the end of the report, the World Bank stressed the problems of administrative structure and practices by stating that :

Just as good organization usually requires a specific agency to perform a specific function, so good management requires that someone supervise the work of different agencies, and, in particular, that he prevent them from working at cross purposes. Such coordination is inadequate in Thailand.⁵

Likewise, in its 1980 report, the World Bank once more called attention to the concern for the need of administrative reform conducive to national development :

Present institutional and administrative arrangements are likely to impede the Government's attempt to ensure broader participation in future development. In particular the highly centralized nature of the Government and the phenomenon of excessive functional duplication and overlap of responsibilities between government departments seriously hinder the public sector from dealing effectively with emerging issues of development; annual allocations of public resources tend to be influenced by historic patterns of expenditure and by institutional or informal pressures rather than by national development priorities. Many institutional difficulties will only be resolved by the gradual evolution and modernization of civil service practices and personnel administration, since these condition the behavior and attitudes of officials as well as affecting the efficiency of all public sector agencies involved in development....⁶

In addition, a group of Thai scholars from the Thai University Research Association have suggested based on the results of a seminar held at Pattaya, Thailand, in October 1978, that an "alternative development strategy" be adopted if national economic and social development is to be successful. Among others, they called for a reform in the bureaucracy and institutions dealing with development :⁷

(1) The existing administrative structure is obsolete and unable to accommodate developmental tasks. Additionally, it is organized in the same way as it was a hundred years ago when the duties of the government were basically confined to a few tasks, e.g., defense of the country, taxing, and maintaining law and order, the structure is presently not conducive to national development.

(2) The administrative practices are "anti-development" in that every important decision has to be made by the Council of the Ministers and controversial ones by the Prime Minister himself.

Considering the suggestions and recommendations of both foreign and Thai experts, it becomes clear that the problems of national economic and social development of Thailand rests heavily on the administrative structure and practices which inspire the research of this study. This research, by necessity, can take up only one facet of administrative practice. That is, the research will explore administrative personnel practices as important variables in explaining development-orientedness of the civil servants under study.

Finally, according to Likhit Dhiravegin, the sociological characteristics of the Thai elite civil servants are the major variables in explaining their liberal or conservative political attitudes which, in turn, are inferred to be related to the prospect of modernization in Thailand. The more liberal the political attitude of the Thai elite civil servants, the more likely the prospect of modernization in Thailand.⁸ By using age, level of education, place of training, and father's occupation as independent variables and political attitudes, liberal/conservative (computed from a composite mean score of three measures of political attitudes : change, equality, and tolerance) as dependent variables, he found that both age and level of education are related to political attitudes of the elites whereas place of training and father's occupation are not. The elites included in Dhiravegin's study are 56 in number, drawn from three ministries (Interior, Education, and Office of the Prime Minister) at the "Super Grade" or the three highest grades, that is, grades 9 to 11. The holders of these grades range from Deputy Directors-General, Directors-General, Deputy Undersecretaries of State, to Undersecretaries of State.

de Guzman and Carbonell also include demographic characteristics and recruitment and career patterns of the Filipino administrators in the study of the latter's development-orientedness or value commitments to national development. In their study, development-orientedness is composed of 8 measures : change, action propensity, economic development, economic equality, citizen participation, conflict

avoidance, concern for nation, and selflessness. Based on 176 samples studied, de Guzman and Carbonell found that professional degree is related to conflict avoidance and concern for nation, and father's occupation is related to action propensity. On the contrary, work place, tenure, and education are not found to be related to any one of the development-orientedness measures.⁹

From the above discussion, it is evident that sociological characteristics are important variables in explaining development-orientedness of the civil servants. Therefore, an attempt is also made to test the hypothesized relationships between sociological characteristics of the civil servants studied and their development-orientedness in order to compare the result of the study with those of other studies.

One of the assumptions that underlines the view that development-orientedness or value commitments to national development is a function of sociological characteristics and personnel practices is that Thai public administration is gradually moving towards professionalism, as stated by Siffin :

The Thai case raises, but hardly answers the question : What is the nature and magnitude of force which must be brought to bear in order to change a bureaucratic social system? Actually, there may be a new Thai case in the making, as such forces as professionalism begin to permeate various sectors of the system a professionalism characterized by dedication to specific purposive aims and a rationale for pursuing them. Possibly evolutionary changes in the thematic value orientations of the system are occurring, but no one knows at present.¹⁰

According to Siffin, the Thai bureaucracy is not resistant to change provided that such change must be from outside and approved first from the higher-ups. Thai bureaucracy was and has been an established social system which is based on a hierarchical status, status quo, and authoritarianism. As such, it is not conducive to national development (e.g., productivity) unless it is stimulated by outside forces, e.g., traditional authority and effective political leadership. But because traditional authority and effective political leadership are not stable and institutionalized and they are still based on personalism, chances are the Thai bureaucracy will enjoy its status quo and serve its own self interest most of the time. This is so because while the outside forces have always come and gone, the bureaucracy stays on. To put it another way, the Thai bureaucracy is capable of fulfilling its maintenance function, i.e., preventing the society from collapse but it is unable to induce development or productivity. This is not to say that the Thai bureaucracy is totally anti-development. As observed by Siffin above, probably the Thai bureaucracy is moving towards professionalism by internalizing development values as its own without external intervention. For like any living organism, the Thai bureaucracy

must adjust its structural and functional aspects (status value vis a vis developmental value) in accordance with changes in today's changing world-- political awareness among educated populace, urbanization, population growth, and new material desires and expectation. Otherwise it will not survive amidst these turmoils. This observation will be considered again as the study progresses.

The purpose of this research is not to understand and explain the weakness and strength of each economic model which guided or is guiding the national economic and social development plans in Thailand. Others in the field of economics are better prepared. This research's focus is on public administration and public personnel in Thailand as important variables that affect development in Thailand. The reason for this focus is because empirical research on the relationship of sociological characteristics and personnel practices of Thailand's national civil servants at all grades or position classifications to national development is lacking. The reasons for this gap in research are twofold. First, although the "major problems of administering the public services and public enterprises of the Kingdom" have been identified and "a program for overcoming these administrative difficulties" has been proposed by the Public Administration Service to the Thai government as early as 1952, the works of Thai scholars on personnel practices in relation to national development are almost nonexistent. Even though the Thai government has been "reinforced" twice by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, first in 1959 and later in 1980, as mentioned above, most major works on the topic have remained to be undertaken by American scholars, notably Kingsbury,¹¹ Siffin,¹² and Riggs¹³ to mention but a few.

Second, when the works on the above topic were carried out by the Thai scholars themselves, the content and research findings were still based mostly on intuition and/or normative substances without any empirical support, and they were out of touch with Thai administrative reality. An exception is probably the work of Dhiravegin. Another way of putting this matter is that most writers have borrowed some theories and practices in toto from other sources to serve as a model for Thai administration without bothering to consider its applicability to the Thai spatial and temporal settings. Hence the research is like putting a round peg in a square hole or *vice versa*. As Golembiewski contends :

Development suitable for the American goose..... was assumed to be good enough for the underdeveloped gander. If spoils politics were "bad" for America, why not just skip to "responsible political parties" in Southeast Asia, for example? Such developmental jumps were doubly dangerous. Thus, they assumed that development¹ = development², despite huge difference in culture and historical experiences. Moreover, such jumps often

were incautious. For example, spoils politics no doubt was useful in helping develop political parties, American style, and perhaps may have been similarly useful elsewhere.¹⁴

An excellent analysis of Thai personnel administration problems and the way in which such problems can be tackled were presented by Kasem Suwanagul.¹⁵ written in 1962, these "classical" works might have been adequate then. They seem to be outdated at present. Another work that deserves mentioning is the work of Sompong Kasemsin¹⁶ whose research on the problem of both military and civil services is adequate and well conceptualized. However, this work seems to be loaded with too many techniques which, from Sayre's perspective, might obscure the purposes on hand.¹⁷ In his *Modern Personnel Management*, Kasemsin tried to include almost every technique found in foreign-language standard textbooks on the field in every facet of Thai personnel policies and practices, ranging from recruitment to sanction, intended for use in both public and private Thai organizations. Although it was intended to be a "how to" textbook, the techniques included were not supported by concrete evidence. Kasemsin, however, did point out the need for research in the field.

Probably the works of Dhiravegin provide a departure point from most of his research peers. Unlike their works, Dhiravegin's were empirically based. Using a survey research based on a sample size of 56 drawn from three ministries, he found that some sociological characteristics--age and education--of Thailand's elite civil servants (grade 9 to grade 11 or from Deputy Director-General to Undersecretary of State) are related to their conservative or liberal attitude--an orientation which he inferred to be related to the elites' policy stand which, in turn, impinges upon the prospect of modernization in Thailand.¹⁸ More comments will be specifically made on this work later on as this study progresses. In another work of a similar type, Dhiravegin also found that the composition of Thailand's civil service, based on a sample size of over 4,000 and drawn from first-and special grade civil servants, is made of the members of the elite backgrounds : 40.98% are from the "bureaucratic" families; 31.44% from business-commerce backgrounds, but only 5.60% and 0.18% from peasant and labor families, respectively.¹⁹ Viewed from this perspective, Dhiravegin concluded that the Riggsian contention of Thailand as a bureaucratic polity²⁰ has been confirmed.²¹ All three of Dhiravegin's works are empirical ones, but his first work (*Political Attitudes...*) only uses a small sample size of 56. This may have had some effect on the usefulness of his data. Dhiravegin also confined his research to elites in studying Thai national service. By limiting his study only to the upper echelon of the bureaucrats, the larger picture of Thai civil service is not well understood. For the success or failure of modernization of a country does not necessarily depend only upon the predisposition and action of the elite ranks alone. Rank-and-file civil servants also have their own predisposi-

tion and action, and hence their contribution to modernization. This is very similar to a situation where one cannot describe an iceberg by observing only its tip. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development has cautioned the Thai authorities on this point :

A decision (of the elite) on policy is the first step toward its execution. But a top level decision remains only a declaration of interest until it is effectively followed through (by those who implement it). In Thailand there are a number of factors which have tended to diminish the effectiveness with which public policy is administered.²²

After reviewing the contemporary writings on personnel, H. Brinton Milward comes to the same conclusion :

As the growing literature on implementation points out, policies are not self-implementing. Those who wish to see these problems adequately addressed should not only try to understand the causal links between policies and solutions but should also seek to understand the policy consequences of the administrative subprocess such as personnel.... on public policy outcomes.²³

In light of the above account, the author feels very strongly that the study of sociological characteristics and personnel practices of the Thai national civil servants at every grade level or position classification in relation to national development is necessary. This research is an attempt to generate new data, insight and perception on the relationship between personnel policy and development-orientedness. Milward speaks to this in a recent criticism made of public personnel administration :

One of the most striking things about an introduction to public personnel is that there is no shortage of literature describing what should be done, but there is little that deals with what is done in personnel systems.

The gaps are astounding : there is no empirical work on how a personnel agency operates, no systematic treatment of how personnel procedures affect other aspects of an organization, and little or no attempt to integrate any findings of the social or behavioral sciences into public personnel.....

Until personnel administration starts to view its role from a systemic perspective and asks questions in terms of effect rather than process, public personnel will remain at the peripheries of power.....²⁴

II. Conceptual Framework and Operationalization of Concepts

This research is an inquiry into the relationship between sociological characteristics of civil servants at all grade levels and personnel practices of six Thai national government organizations and their development-orientedness. Sociological characteristics include such components as department affiliation, work place, domicile, age, sex, religion, father's occupation, education, field of study, tenure, grade, position held and monthly salary. These sociological characteristics, demographic characteristics or background data are said to be either a promoting or hindering factor for modernization of Thailand,²⁶ as they were suggested for development-orientedness of the Filipino administrators²⁸ and for activeness and leadership of a crossnational sample of India, Poland, the United States, and Yugoslavia,²⁷ respectively. For the purpose of this study, sociological characteristics are independent variables.

The above sociological characteristics are operationalized as follows :

- (1) Department affiliation : The Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board=1 or national development policymaking agency; Department of Technical and Economic Cooperation and Chulalongkorn University=2 or national development auxiliary agencies; and Department of Local Administration, Department of Community Development, and Department of Labor=3 or national development policy implementing agencies.
- (2) Work place : Bangkok/Non-Bangkok.
- (3) Domicile : Central/ Non-Central.
- (4) Age : 18-30 years=low; 31-45=intermediate; and 46-60=high.
- (5) Sex : Male/Female.
- (6) Religion : Buddhist/Non-Buddhist.
- (7) Father's occupation : civil servant, military and police=bureaucratic; business/commerce, politics, agriculture, and labor=non-bureaucratic.
- (8) Education : No schooling to secondary vocational school=low; Military/police academies and B.A.=intermediate; M.A. and Ph.D.=high.
- (9) Field of Study : Social Science and Humanities=1; Science=2; Else=3.
- (10) Tenure : 1-15 years=low; 16-30 years=intermediate; and 31-40 years=high.
- (11) Grade : 1-3=low; 4-6=intermediate; and 7-11=high.
- (12) Position : Clerk=low; Section Officer to Section Chief=intermediate; and Division Chief and higher=high; and
- (13) Monthly salary : Bht. 1,080-4,000=low; 4,001-7,000=intermediate; and 7,001 and higher=high.

In addition, personnel practices are defined as the ways in which personnel policies are implemented or actually carried out in each of the six organizations under study. The components of personnel practices are grouped

under four headings : recruitment, personnel development, advancement, and sanction; each of these components is, in turn, subdivided into subgroups as follows :

- (1) Recruitment
 - initial contact,
 - types of examinations,
 - Perception on weight of examination marks (points) given to job requirements
- (2) Personnel Development
 - opportunity for training,
 - recentness of opportunity for training.
- (3) Advancement
 - opportunity for two-step salary increases,
 - number of opportunities for two-step salary increases, received
 - criteria used for two-step salary increases,
 - opportunity for grade progression,
 - criteria used for grade progression,
 - opportunity for promotion,
 - criteria used for promotion.
- (4) Sanction
 - perception on individual disciplinary action taken,
 - perception on overall disciplinary actions taken.

According to de Guzman and Carbonell's model, these personnel practices have a bearing on "development-orientedness commitments" of the Filipino administrators.²⁸ Using a similar approach the author would like to test this hypothesis by using Thai data.²⁹ For purposes of this study, personnel practices are also independent variables. The operationalization of personnel practices is shown in Table 1 below.

TABLE 1
Classificatory Scheme of Personnel Practices
in Thailand's Six Organizations

Components of personnel practices	Characteristics of personnel practices		
	Type I	Type II	Type III
1. Recruitment			
(1) Initial contact : via	relatives and friends (personal)	individual departments (semi-objective)	Mass media and CSC (objective)
(2) Types of examinations	status adjust- ment (personal)	expert (semi- objective)	Selective & Competitive (objective)
(3) Weight of exam- ination marks (points) given to job require- ments (as perceived by civil servants)	personal character- istics (personal)	general- education knowledge (semi- objective)	specialiation & skills re- quired for position in question (objective)
2. Personnel Development			
(1) Opportunity for training	Having no opportunity	—	Having an opportunity
(2) Recentness of training opportunity	not recent (more than 6 years).	intermediate (4-6 years)	recent (1-3 years)

(Table 1 cont.)

Components of
personnel

Characteristics of personnel practices

practices

Type I

Type II

Type III

3. Advancement(1) Opportunity
for two-step
salary increaseshaving no
opportunity

—

having an
opportunity(2) # of two-
step salary
increases
receivedlow (one
& not at
all)intermediate
(two)high
(three &
more)(3) Criteria used
for two-step
salary increasesnonperfor-
mance re-
latedperformance-
plus nonper-
formance
relatedperformance
related(4) Opportunity
for grade
progressionhaving no
opportunity

—

having an
opportunity(5) Criteria used
for grade
progressionnonperfor-
mance re-
latedperformance
plus non-
performance
relatedperformance
related(6) Opportunity
for promotionhaving no
opportunity

—

having an
opportunity(7) Criteria used
for promotionnonperfor-
mance re-
latedperformance-
plus nonper-
formance
relatedperformance
related

(Table 1 cont.)

Components of personnel practices	Characteristics of personnel practices		
	Type I	Type II	Type III
4. Sanction			
(1) Individual disciplinary action taken (as perceived by civil servants)	monthly salary cuts & monthly salary step reduction (not considerate)	oral & Written reprimands (intermediate)	personal warning & giving advice (considerate)
(2) Overall disciplinary actions taken (as perceived by the civil servants)	punishment for wrongdoing & reward for outstanding performance are totally non-existent (not considerate)	punishment for punishment's sake only (intermediate)	across-the-board punishment in accordance with severity of wrongdoings (considerate)

Finally, development-orientedness is defined as value commitments to change, citizen participation, tolerance, equality, economic development, concern for nation, selflessness, action propensity, commitment to work, and to result-orientation.³⁰ Considered in aggregate, these measures of development-orientedness or value commitments amount to a professionalism of the civil service and are necessary for national economic and social development. This research is devoted to understanding better the variables which lead to a development-orientedness among the Thai civil servants studied. Thus, development-orientedness is the dependent variable.

The assignment of the measuring scales of low, intermediate, and high to development-orientedness is based on the mean score (the sum total of 27 questionnaire items on ten components of development-orientedness divided by 27 after 7 items have been dropped due to their t-value being not significant at .01 level). Since the highest score is 4.85 and the lowest is 2.93 ($\bar{X} = 3.648$), there are 192 units between them. Hence the classificatory scales of development-orientedness can be ranged as follows : 2.93 through 3.57 = low ; 3.58 through 4.21 = intermediate; and 4.22 through 4.85 = high.

III. Statement of Hypotheses

Based on the conceptual frameworks drawn from the value theories of behavior and on theories of public administration and public personnel mentioned in II, it is hypothesized :

1. That Thai civil servants, sociological characteristics are related to their development-orientedness. This hypothesis is broken down into 13 mini-hypotheses as following :

- Ho. 1.1 : Civil servants' department affiliation is related to their development-orientedness.
- Ho. 1.2 : Civil servants' work place is related to their development-orientedness.
- Ho. 1.3 : Civil servants' domicile is related to their development-orientedness.
- Ho. 1.4 : Civil servants' age is related to their development-orientedness.
- Ho. 1.5 : Civil servants' sex is related to their development-orientedness.
- Ho. 1.6 : Civil servants' religion is related to their development-orientedness.
- Ho. 1.7 : Civil servants' father's occupation is related to their development-orientedness.
- Ho. 1.8 : Civil servants' education is related to their development-orientedness.
- Ho. 1.9 : Civil servants' field of study is related to their development-orientedness.
- Ho. 1.10 : Civil servants' tenure is related to their development-orientedness.
- Ho. 1.11 : Civil servants' grade is related to their development-orientedness.
- Ho. 1.12 : Civil servants' position is related to their development-orientedness.
- and
- Ho. 1.13 : Civil servants' monthly salary is related to their development-orientedness.

2. That personnel practices are related to development-orientedness of the civil servants. This hypothesis is, likewise, broken down into 14 mini-hypotheses as follows :

Hypotheses on Recruitment and Development-Orientedness of the Civil Servants

Ho. 2.1 : The more objective the initial contact of the civil servants, the higher the level of their development-orientedness.

Ho. 2.2 : The more objective the examination of the civil servants, the higher the level of their development-orientedness.

Ho. 2.3 : The more the weight of examination marks (points) is perceived to be given to job requirements, the higher the level of development-orientedness of the civil servants.

Hypotheses on Personnel Development (Training) and Development-Orientedness of the Civil Servants.

Ho. 2.4 : Civil servants having an opportunity for training tend to have a higher level of development-orientedness than those who have no such opportunity.

Ho. 2.5 : the more recent the opportunity for training of the civil servants, the higher the level of their development-orientedness.

Hypotheses on Advancement and Development-Orientedness of the Civil Servants.

Ho. 2.6 : Civil servants having an opportunity for two-step salary increases tend to have a higher level of development-orientedness than those who have no such opportunity.

Ho. 2.7 : The higher the number of two-step salary increases received by the civil servants, the higher the level of their development-orientedness.

Ho. 2.8 : The more the two-step salary increases of the civil servants are perceived to be based on performance-related criteria, the higher the level of their development-orientedness.

Ho. 2.9 : Civil servants having an opportunity for grade progression tend to have a higher level of development-orientedness than those who have no such opportunity.

Ho. 2.10 : The more the grade progression of the civil servants is perceived to be based on performance-related criteria, the higher the level of their development-orientedness.

Ho. 2.11 : Civil servants having an opportunity for promotion tend to have a higher level of development-orientedness than those who have no such opportunity.

Ho. 2.12 : The more the promotion of the civil servants is perceived to be based on performance-related criteria, the higher the level of their development-orientedness.

Hypotheses on Sanction (Discipline) and Development-Orientedness of the Civil Servants.

Ho. 2.13 : The more considerate the individual disciplinary action taken against the civil servants is perceived by them, the higher the level of their development-orientedness.

Ho. 2.14 : The more considerate the overall disciplinary actions taken against the civil servants are perceived by them, the higher the level of development-orientedness.

IV. Data and Statistical Treatment

Other than the background data which are collected from interviewing and published sources, the data used in this study are obtained via mailed questionnaire or hand delivered to civil servants in six organizations--the Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board (national development policymaking agency), Department of Technical and Economic Cooperation and Chulalongkorn University national development auxiliary agencies); and Department of Local Administration, Department of Community Development, and Department of Labor (national development policy implementing agencies). A total 600 questionnaires were sent to these civil servants stratifically and proportionally selected in accordance with their position classifications, of which 382 or 63.67% of the total sent had been returned. However, among these 382 questionnaires, only 345 are usable; the rest of them having too many "no answers".

The questionnaire itself has been pretested for its objectivity to 18 civil servants in the Bureau of the Budget, stratifically and proportionally selected as are the real samples. A "method of internal consistency" was administered in order to obtain a t-value or discriminatory power in each item on measures of development-orientedness. As a result of this, only 27 out of 34 original questionnaire items on development-orientedness were retained the other 7 items were dropped for their t-value is not significant at .01 level. The remaining 27 items were then tested for their reliability by a Cronbach's "coefficient alpha". The result of the test reveals that the remaining 27 questionnaire items have a high reliability (r_{kk}) of .9509. But for the validity of the questionnaire items, the author has relied on factual circumstances and his own personal experience and on critiques from colleagues at Chulalongkorn University.

Statistical treatment used in this study are crosstabulation, chi square test and Pearson's r via the SPSS computer program. A relationship between variables significant at least at .05 level is accepted. However, a significant at .10 level is also reported even though the hypothesis in question is still rejected.

V. Some Findings

Based on criteria and operationalization of concepts set forth in II and/or statistical treatment mentioned in IV, it is found :

1. That seven out of 13 sociological characteristics of the civil servants the author studied are related to their development-orientedness. Department affiliation, work place, domicile, tenure, grade, position, and monthly salary, all have a strong relationship with development-orientedness (chi square and r are statistically significant at least at .05 level). Therefore, Ho's 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.10, 1.11, 1.12, and 1.13, respectively are confirmed by our study. In addition, even though we rejected Ho's 1.4 (age and DO), 1.5 (sex and DO), and 1.7 (father's occupation and DO), there is a tendency that the independent and dependent variables in these three hypotheses seem to agree with each other; for r in each of these cases is significant between .05 and .10 levels (though chi square is not significant). But because we set our criteria for statistical significance at .05 level and provided also that chi square must first be significant, we have to let the data speak for themselves. Hence Ho's 1.4, 1.5, and 1.7 were rejected. On the other hand, we did not find

the following independent variables to be related to development-orientedness : religion, education and field of study. Therefore, Ho.'s 1.6, 1.8, and 1.9, respectively were also rejected. Furthermore, some of our findings are in contrast with a previous study carried out on Thai elites by Dhiravegin (*Political Attitudes...*) in that whereas he found age and education of the elites to be related to their liberal/conservative attitudes, this study found only a weak relationship between age and development-orientedness while education has less to do with the development-orientedness of the civil servants we studied, as will be seen in Table 2 below.

TABLE 2
Summary of the Relationships Between Sociological Characteristics
of the Civil Servants and Their Development-Orientedness

Sociological Characteristics \ DO	Statistics		Remarks : Hypothesis confirmed/rejected :
	Chi square and df.	Pearson's r	
(Ho. 1.1) Department affiliation	12.20*, df=4	0.15**	Confirmed
(Ho. 1.2) Work place	11.42**, df=2	0.15**	Confirmed
(Ho. 1.3) Domicile	7.51*, df=2	0.10*	Confirmed
(Ho. 1.4) Age	4.39, df=4	0.08 [†]	Rejected
(Ho. 1.5) Sex	4.34, df=2	-0.09*	Rejected
(Ho. 1.6) Religion	0.22, df=2	-0.01	Rejected
(Ho. 1.7) Father's occupation	2.15, df=2	0.08 [†]	Rejected
(Ho. 1.8) Education	3.45, df=4	0.05	Rejected
(Ho. 1.9) Field of study	2.52, df=4	-0.05	Rejected
(Ho. 1.10) Tenure	11.02*, df=4	0.08 [†]	Confirmed
(Ho. 1.11) Grade	46.98**, df=4	0.14**	Confirmed
(Ho. 1.12) Position	19.91**, df=4	0.06	Confirmed
(Ho. 1.13) Monthly	21.42**, df=4	0.11*	Confirmed

NOTE : (1)** means the relationship between variables is significant at .01 level.

(2)* means the relationship between variables is significant at .05 level.

(3)[†] means the relationship between variables is only significant at .10 level.

2. That only two measures of the personnel practices -- criteria used for two-step salary increases and perception on overall disciplinary actions taken -- were found to be related to the development-orientedness of the civil servants, for chi square and r in both instances are significant at least at .05 level. This means that objective, performance-related criteria used for two-step salary increases and considerate overall disciplinary actions taken are related to development-orientedness of the civil servants. Hence, Ho.'s 2.8 and 2.14 respectively are confirmed by the data of the study. Furthermore, it was also found that criteria used for grade progression, criteria used for promotion, and individual disciplinary action taken seem to be congruent with development-orientedness, for r is significant either at .05 or .10 level. But because chi square in these three instances is not statistically significant at an acceptable level, Ho.'s 2.10, 2.12, and 2.13 respectively had to be rejected. In addition, it was also found that there is a strong relationship between opportunity for training and opportunity for two-step salary increases and development-orientedness of the civil servants. But because such relationships were inversely associated (a minus value of r 's), Ho.'s 2.4 and 2.6 had to be rejected on a logical ground. On the other hand, the following personnel practice measures were not found to be related to development-orientedness : types of initial contact, types of examination, perception on weight of examination marks (points) given to job requirements, recentness of opportunity for training, number of opportunity for two-step salary increases, opportunity for grade progression, and opportunity for promotion, for both chi square and r were not statistically significant at an acceptable level. Therefore, Ho.'s 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.5, 2.7, 2.9, and 2.11 respectively were all rejected, as will be seen in Table 3 below.

Table 3
Summary of the Relationships Between
Personnel Practices and Development-Orientedness
of the Civil Servants

Personnel Practices \ DO	Statistics		Remarks : Hypothesis confirmed/rejected?
	Chi square	Pearson's r	
Recruitment			
(Ho. 2.1) Initial contact	5.27, df = 4	0.04	Rejected
(Ho. 2.2) Type of exam	0.47, df = 4	0.02	Rejected
(Ho. 2.3) Weight of examination marks (points) given to job requirements	0.86, df = 4	0.01	Rejected
Personnel Development			
(Ho. 2.4) Opportunity for training	11.18**, df = 2	-0.18**	Relationship confirmed, Ho. rejected
(Ho. 2.5) Recentness of opportunity for training	0.54, df = 4	-0.03	Rejected
Advancement			
(Ho. 2.6) Opportunity for two-step salary increases	12.17**, df = 2	-0.19**	Relationship confirmed, Ho. rejected
(Ho. 2.7) No. of opportunity for two-step salary increases received	1.69, df = 4	0.07	Rejected.
(Ho. 2.8) Criteria used for two-step salary increases	11.83**, df = 4	0.18**	Confirmed.
(Ho. 2.9) Opportunity for grade progression	0.10, df = 2	-0.02	Rejected.
(Ho. 2.10) Criteria used for grade progression	7.23, df = 4	0.17**	Rejected.

(Table 3 Cont.)

Personnel Practices	DO	Statistics		Remarks : Hypothesis confirmed/rejected?
		Chi square	Pearson's r	
(Ho. 2.11) Opportunity for promotion		0.67, df = 2	-0.04	Rejected.
(Ho. 2.12) Criteria used for promotion		5.78, df = 4	0.16**	Rejected.
Sanction				
(Ho. 2.13) Individual disciplinary action taken		2.15, df = 4	0.08 ⁺	Rejected.
(Ho. 2.14) Overall disciplinary actions taken		9.40*, df = 4	0.15**	Confirmed.

Note : (1) ** means the relationship between variables is significant at .01 level.
 (2) * means the relationship between variables is significant at .05 level.
 (3) ⁺ means the relationship between variables is significant at .10 level.

3. That the development-orientedness of the civil servants studied is quite low. Of the 345 civil servants drawn from six organizations under study, 10.7% belong to the High-DO group; 55.4% to the Intermediate-DO group; and 33.9% to the Low-DO category (see Figure 15). This finding seems to be consonant with those of other scholars, e.g., of Ayal and Komin and Smuckarn on Thai data, Ho on Asian data, and of de Guzman and Carbonell on the Philippine data.

4. That the relationship between some sociological characteristics of the civil servants--especially those which they have acquired after joining the public service, including department affiliation, work place, tenure, grade, position, and monthly salary--and their development-orientedness or value commitments to national development points to a tendency that the Thai civil service is gradually moving towards more professionalism which, in turn, is defined herein as a thematic

value orientation or an internalization of and dedication to development. Likewise, the finding that some measures of personnel practices, e.g., objective rewards and punishment (based on performance-related criteria) which are, in part, the characteristics of a profession also indicates that probably the Thai civil service is moving toward professionalism. However, the inference on this matter is made with some reservation, for this study is not intended to research the professionalism of the Thai civil servants directly. An in-depth study on this topic needs to be made before a statement of this nature could be made with some confidence.

(5) That based on the findings of this study, sociological characteristic variables are more important factors than are personnel practices in explaining the development-orientedness or value commitments to national development of the Thai civil servants under study.

VI. Concluding Remarks : Policy Implications of the Findings

Although Thailand's personnel policies have been based on a merit system for over fifty years, the fruit of which is still unevenly distributed. As commented by one Thai personnel expert, even on its fiftieth anniversary, the Thai public personnel administration is still "backing forward and backing backward (sic)." What he means by this is that while some impressive progress in Thai public personnel has been pushed forward there is always some pulling factors that hinder its progression.⁸¹ In other words, there is some progress in Thai public personnel but only at a snail's pace. Undoubtedly, this phenomenon of Thai public personnel administration will have ramifications on other policies as well, as suggested by the findings of this study. However, it is not suggested herein that the Thai public personnel system be based on a full-fledged, objective criteria and/or affirmative action⁸² as practiced in the West in order to lessen the "suffering of those who are within and without the organization"⁸³; for being a developing country, Thailand can hardly afford such a luxurious administrative philosophy. Rather, what it is intended to suggest in this study is that there is still room for improvement even in the existing merit system, Thai style, in order to serve the national goal, namely, national development.

Thailand's national goal is economic and social development, and public personnel administration is one among other means through which national goal can be achieved. This study has been constructed to contribute to that goal. On the one hand, the findings on the relationship between sociological characteristics and development-orientedness of the civil servants can be used as a guideline for recruiting competent and qualified personnel into national development-related agencies. The findings clearly show that such personnel can be found in the national development "auxiliary" agencies, in the Bangkok work place, from those

who have place of origin in the Central region, have longer tenure, higher grades, hold higher positions, and higher monthly salaries. On the other hand, the findings on the relationship between personnel practices and development-orientedness of the civil servants suggest that more objective performance-related criteria used for advancement and considerate overall disciplinary actions taken can contribute to a higher level of development-orientedness.

ENDNOTES

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3. Chakrit Noranitpadungkarn, "New Concepts in Community Development," a first-prize winning article of the National Institute of Development Administration, dated December 1979, p. 8
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5. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *A Public Development Program for Thailand* (Baltimore : The Johns Hopkins Press, 1959), p. 225
6. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Thailand : Toward A Development Strategy of Full Participation* (Washington, D.C., 1980), p. xii.
7. Narongchai Akrasanee, "Alternative Development Strategy for Thailand," *A Summary Report of the Seminar on Alternative Strategy for Thailand, October 13-15, 1978*. Thai University Research Association, Bangkok, Thailand, December 21, 1978. pp. 12, 18-19.
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12. Siffin, *op. cit.*
13. Fred W. Riggs, *Thailand : The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity* (Honolulu : East-West Center Press, 1966).
14. Robert T. Golembiewski, *Public Administration as a Developing Discipline, Part 1 Perspectives on Past and Present* (New York : Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1977), p. 148.
15. Kasem Suwanagul, "The Civil Service of Thailand," (Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 1962); see also his *Nature and Concepts of Modern Public Personnel Administration* (Bangkok : The Social Science Association of Thailand Press, 1962).
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17. Wallace S. Sayre, "The Triumph of Techniques Over Purpose," *Public Administration Review*, Spring 1948, pp. 134-137.
18. Dhiravegin, *op. cit.*, pp. 49-50.
19. Likhit Dhiravegin, *The Bureaucratic Elite of Thailand : A Study of Their Sociological Attributes, Educational Backgrounds and Career Advancement Patterns* (Bangkok : Wacharin Press, 1978), p. 61.
20. A polity or governance in which appointed personnel (bureaucrats) in the executive branch have more say in the affairs of the state than their counterparts in the other two branches of the government, namely, judicial and legislative.
21. Likhit Dhiravegin, "The Bureaucrats' Role in Thai Politics : The Bureaucratic Polity Confirmed?," *Journal of Social Science* Vol. XV, No. 3 July-September, 1978, pp. 119-133.
22. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *A Public Development Program for Thailand*, *op. cit.*, p. 219., brackets added.
23. H. Brinton Milward, "Politics, Personnel and Public Policy," *Public Administration Review* July/August 1978, p. 392.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 395.
25. Dhiravegin, *Political Attitudes*, *op. cit.*
26. de Guzman and Carbonell, *op. cit.*
27. The International Studies of Values in Politics, *Values and the Active Community* (New York : The Free Press, 1971), pp. 29, 355-356.
28. de Guzman and Carbonell, *op. cit.*
29. In a sense this study is similar to what Grumm has called a "policy impact" study--J.C. Grumm, "The Analysis of Policy Impact," in F.I. Greenstein and N.W. Polsby (eds.), *Handbook of Political Science* Vol. 6, (Reading, Mass. :

Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1975), p. 443. The study of personnel policies' impact on individual Thai civil servants and their contribution to national development is wanting. And no one has ever taken up this study before even though such policies have been carried out for over fifty years. This probably stems from the barrenness of the field on the one hand and the emphasis on the formation of policies and their solution without bothering to observe their consequences on the other. For the barren nature of public personnel administration, see Donald E. Klingner and John Nalbandian, "Personnel Management by Whose Objectives?", *Public Administration Review* July/August 1978, p. 366. For policy consequences, Milward, *op. cit.*, p. 392.

30. These development-oriented commitments have been eclectically chosen from the following sources : de Guzman and Carbonell, *op. cit.*, Ch. 1; Dhiravegin, *Political Attitudes...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 4, 79-84; V.A. Pai Panandiker and S.S. Kshirsagar, *Bureaucracy and Development Administration* (Bombay : The Book Centre Ltd., 1978), p. 147; and The International Studies of Values in Politics, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-31.
 31. Amara Raksasataya, "Thai Public Personnel Administration : Fifty Years of Backing Foreward and Backing Backward (sic.)," *Thai Journal of Development Administration* Vol. 19, April 1979, pp. 320-321.
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