

THE DYNAMICS OF PEOPLE'S PARTICIPATION IN THAI RURAL DEVELOPMENT: A CASE STUDY OF SAN PU LOEI RICE BANK*

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1. Introduction

1.1 Rationale

Decentralization for rural development is nothing new to Thai policy-makers and bureaucratic elites. Yet it was not until 1982 that decentralization in the sense of promoting people's participation in rural development has been stated clearly as a major development strategy in the fifth plan of national economic and social development (1982-1986). This endeavor reveals the acceptance by the government of the relative failure of the centralized development administration in solving the poverty of rural people during the past decades (National Rural Development Coordinating Center, 1982:10-16). The increasing pressure of rural poverty problem has forced the government in 1982 to launch new rural development strategies by giving top priority of rural development to the selected poverty-stricken villages and strengthening the ability of rural people to solve their problems by themselves. To implement the new approach to rural development, a new rural development administrative system has been established. In this system, participation by rural inhabitants has been acknowledged and institutionalized to increase the effectiveness of the government's developmental efforts. Villagers are able to make demands for development projects sponsored by the government through local administrative structures. They are also encouraged to actively take part in the implementation of development projects in their villages. In addition, rural dwellers are encouraged and supported by the

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government to initiate and implement their own self-help development projects. Since people's participation is a key ingredient to the success of rural development, it is therefore quite interesting to examine the extent to which participation at grassroots level under the new rural development administrative system has in practice occurred in any meaningful sense.

1.2 Objective of the study

The main objectives of this study are:

- a. To examine and evaluate the government's current efforts in promoting participation of the people in rural development.
- b. To understand the nature and characteristics of popular participation in rural development.
- c. To explore contextual conditions and constraints facilitating and inhibiting the institutionalization of participation at grassroots level.

1.3 Scope of the study

In order to understand popular participation in rural development, the rice bank project is chosen to be the case study. The project was initiated and implemented successfully by the people of a village in northern Thailand. The government then adopted and implemented the project in other villages throughout the country since 1977. The project is well known in terms of promoting people's participation in village development and alleviating economic hardship of the rural poor. This study was conducted in San Pu Loei tambon, Doi Saket district, Chiangmai province where a rice bank has been initiated and implemented by the people with the technical support of the government. San Pu Loei is a community in the Chiangmai-Lumphun valley floor where the problems concerning shortage of cultivable land and population growth are quite serious. Many inhabitants in the course of economic crises in recent years have become tenants and agricultural wage laborers. They are poverty-stricken people who lack enough amount of rice for consumption throughout the year. It is therefore interesting to see how the San Pu Loei rice bank helps foster the spirit of people's participation of assisting the poor people who are in need of rice for consumption. Although this study concentrates on aspects of people's participation in San Pu Loei rice bank or looks at the rice bank as a social self-help organization, the managerial capability of the rice bank as a business organization is also examined. To avoid an over-aggregating analysis of the operation of the rice bank, this study also consider how socio-economic and political contexts of San Pu Loei tambon have affected the nature and characteristics of people's participation in the rice bank.

1.4 Methodology

In my attempt to study popular participation in San Pu Loei rice bank, I primarily used an anthropological approach which involved an intensive fieldwork in the studied community. My fieldwork covered the period of October 1985–December 1985. I also visited other villages in Chiangmai–Lumphun valley, particularly Tha Som Poy village where the rice bank project was initiated for the first time. I wanted to gain a comparative view of people's participation in the implementation of rice bank and other development projects. The research methods used in collecting data are key informant interviewing, direct observation, unstructured interviewing, and documentary research. My informants included the rice bank committee members, members of the rice bank, tambon inhabitants, local and national officials, and academics and others who have knowledge of rice bank project and other development projects and have access to relevant comparative data on rural communities elsewhere in the country.

2. The analytical framework

Despite many recent writings on popular participation in rural development, there is little consensus on the meaning of participation and indicators measuring it. In this study, I follow the approach used by Norman Uphoff and his colleagues (1979). Instead of defining the term, they develop a practical way of conceptualizing it. Since they assume that participation is not a single phenomenon with its own quantities that can be measured quantitatively, they decide to regard participation in a descriptive sense. Participation denote "the involvement of a significant number of persons in situations or actions which enhance well-being, e.g., their income, security or self-esteem" (1979:4). To them, participation is "an overarching concept best approached by looking at it more specific components" rather than trying to "define the framework concretely to allow summary measurement by specific empirical indicators" (Ibid:302). In other words, participation is viewed in terms of an adjective describing whether certain kinds of development activity are participatory or how participatory they are. Uphoff and his colleagues elaborate the concept by making the distinction between dimensions and contexts of participation. Dimensions involve the kinds of participation i.e. in planning, in implementation, the person who is participating, and the characteristics of participatory process. The contexts of participation encompass the relationship between the rural development project's design and the patterns of actual participation that occur as well as the impact of the community's environment on emerging patterns of participation.

In applying the above approach to the study of people's participation in San Pu Loei rice bank, I deal with both dimensions and contexts of participation.

In terms of dimensions of participation, I will map out the socio-economic and political statuses of members of the rice bank. As for the kind and characteristics of participation, I will answer the following questions: Who did identify the need for the tambon rice bank? Did it flow from the people themselves or from local leaders? Who did decide whether the activity of the rice bank should be diversified? Who are members of the rice bank administrative committee? How were they recruited? What obligations do members of the rice bank have to fulfill? Who did receive the material benefits? Who did obtain personal benefits? And to what extent members of the rice bank could control the management and activities of the rice bank? In terms of contexts of participation, the impact of the socio-economic and political characteristics of San Pu Loei tambon upon the actual patterns of participation will be investigated. These analytical questions will be answered under the following topics: 1) Formation of San Pu Loei rice bank, 2) The administrative committee, 3) Activities of San Pu Loei rice bank, and 4) Control of the rice bank by the members.

3. The rice bank project: the original and the officially sponsored models

Rice bank project was initiated for the first time in Tha Som Poy village, Tungfai tambon, Muang district, Lumpang province in 1973 through cooperation of villagers and village development committee members under the leadership of teacher Tao Na Lumpang, an advisor to the village development committee. The project was carried out at its early stage in the form of "Rice Savings Group to Help Poor People". The success of this project in Tha Som Poy, in terms of providing the poor with enough rice to eat throughout the year and creating cooperation among the villagers in the form of self-help organization in the self village, served as an incentive for the government to implement similar project in other villages. In fact, it was the King who upon learning of the success of Tha Som Poy rice bank recommended the government set up rice banks similar to the Tha Som Poy model in other poverty-stricken villages. A cabinet decision therefore was issued assigning the Department of Community Development as the promoter of the project. The Department has adopted and modified the Tha Som Poy model and promoted the formation of rice bank in various villages. From 1977 to 1985, the Department has set up about 2,390 rice banks in villages all over the country (Department of Community Development, 1985). Before I go into details about the formation and implementation measures of rice bank sponsored by the Department, detailed information of the original rice bank in Tha Som Poy is quite necessary for a comparative analysis of the San Pu Loei rice bank.

Tha Som Poy village is situated on an upper valley floor in the far northeast corner of Muang district, Lumpang province. The village is about 17 kilometers to the northeast of the city of Lumpang. According to village elders, the village was established some 100 years ago by a group of northern native Thai

or *Khon muang* who moved out from lowland villages around Lumpang city to seek new opportunities in peripheral area. Before 1945, Tha Som Poy was a small community consisted of about 40 households. The mainstay of village's economy then was wood-cutting and other forest products as well as rice-growing. After the second world war, the economy of northern Thailand was increasingly affected by the world economy resulting in the increasing demand of rice production for exporting and domestic consumption (Ingram, 1971). The expansion and differentiation of agricultural production together with the rapid population growth led to increase in demand of cultivable land and consequently created the problem of land shortage especially in lowland areas. This problem also resulted from the fact that land in valley floors is unexpandable. Under these circumstances, many became small peasants and landless peasants. A good number of them solved this problem by moving out of their original villages to seek new land in peripheral areas. Tha Som Poy, like other peripheral villages in the north, was inhabited by waves of immigrants from lowland areas. The village in 1970 was composed of 196 households with the total population about 750.

The rapid deforestation in Lumpang province in the 1950's had prompted the government to declare forest reserve areas in the province in 1960. The forest around Tha Som Poy was also included. This limited economic activities of Tha Som Poy villagers mainly to rice-growing. The situation became worse in late 1960's when Tha Som Poy peasants could grow rice only once a year due to the lack of enough water supply in the dry season. The pressure of population growth in 1960's also created the problem of land shortage in the village. The average size of land holding in the village was about 6 rai (1 rai = .6 acre). Many households became poor. According to teacher Tao Na Lampang, village households in early 1970's could be classified in terms of economic well-being into three groups. First, households that were able to produce surplus rice. This group constituted only 15 per cent of the total households. Second, those that could produce only enough amount of rice for household consumption throughout the year. This group represented 30 per cent of the total households. Third, households that did not have enough amount of rice for household consumption throughout the year. This group accounted for 55 per cent of the total. Some of them owned small plots of land (about 2-3 rai) and many of them had no land and hence had to hire themselves out in others' land or rent land from others. These households usually faced the problem of rice scarcity particularly before and during the rice-planting season. To make ends meet, they had to borrow money or rice from local moneylenders and private traders at an exorbitant rate of interest (about 40-100 per cent per year). Borrowing by means of selling rice before the harvest or locally known as "*Tok Kao Kiew*" (selling green rice) was not uncommon. The interest rate for *Tok Kao Kiew* was approximately 100 per cent per year. For poor peasants, production of

the following year would have to be used as debt payment which resulted in shortage of rice for household consumption and thus increased borrowing. According to teacher Tao Na Lampang, there were 58 Tha Som Poy households in 1973 being under this continuous vicious cycle.

Poverty problem and shortage of rice for consumption of about half of village households were the major incentives for teacher Tao and the village development committee to initiate and operate the "Rice savings Group to Help Poor People" Project in 1973. The main objective was to provide poor people enough rice to eat throughout the year at low interest rate. In the first year of its operation, 27 well-to-do villagers joined the group. Each member was asked to deposit 240 kilograms of rice annually for 5 year period. By the end of the fifth year, each member should be given the principle plus interests incurred. The "Rice Savings Group to Help Poor People" was under the management of a committee consisted of 9 persons. They were the village headman, village development committee members, village elders, the abbot of the village temple, and other wealthy villagers. They worked on the voluntary basis. Poor villagers were not required but encouraged to be members of the group. Every poor peasant was entitled to borrow rice from the group once a year usually at the beginning of the rice-planting season. Upon the approval of the project committee, each poor family could borrow rice up to 100 kilograms. They were required to repay the debt after the harvest season in the amount of 120 kilograms of grains. Besides the deposit of members, the committee solicited contributions of grains from individuals and foundations outside the village. Requests were made to the priests of the village temple for donation of grains deriving from various charities. In the early period of the project, grains were temporarily stored in private silo of villagers.

In 1973, the first year of operation, the total capital was 5,400 kilograms of grains. The group was able to provide loans to 34 families of poor peasants in the village. The business of Tha Som Poy rice bank went very well in accordance with the main objective. The bank was given both psychological and material supports from people and officials within and without the village. The Department of Community Development had publicized the idea of Tha Som Poy rice bank to other villages around the country in order that they might make an effort in implementing a project similar to the Tha Som Poy model. Teacher Tao Na Lumpang, the mentor of the project, had been invited to give talks about Tha Som Poy rice bank in several places. He also received a distinguished citizen award in 1976. With the financial support of 36,000 Baht from the Department of Community Development, a central silo was built in Tha Som Poy to store grains of the bank in 1976.

Tha Som Poy rice bank could be regarded as successful in assisting poor people to have enough rice to eat throughout the year. Its activity progressed from the starting period in 1973 with 27 members and 5,400 kilograms of grains to 38 members with about 14,000 kilograms of grains in 1978. The economic conditions of poor families had been markedly improved. They had enough rice to eat throughout the year and lessened their dependence upon local moneylenders. It is certain that the economic improvement of poor villagers did not depend entirely upon the rice bank project but upon projects implemented together as well. Such projects were land allotment for the landless, promotion of production by using new production techniques and using new high potency seeds to grow rice in the dry season, and the increased cultivation of rotating crops during the dry season. Nevertheless, the rice bank project could be regarded as the core of success. This was due to its being an initiating factor in stimulating the spirit of self-help organization in solving poverty problem in the village.

In 1978, the end of the five year period, there were only 4 families requesting for loans from this bank. As the demand of rice from the bank had declined, some members wanted to withdraw their investment. When the ratio of poor people had declined with the majority enjoying better standard of living and being more equalled, this situation naturally affected the standard of the well-off villagers as their standard had become comparatively lower than before and their spirit of cooperation in helping the poor consequently tended to decline. Some wealthy persons saw no need to help the poor through the operation of the rice bank any more. Teacher Tao and some committee members, however, wanted to convert the bank's capital to be village development funds. Through the influence of the abbot, the committee sold the bank's asset and spent the money as a supplement to the setting up of electricity in the village in 1979. At present, there is no need for the operation of the rice bank in the village. It should be noted that the success of Tha Som Poy rice bank depended mainly upon the community leaders especially teacher Tao. They possessed a strong will and sacrificed themselves for the community. Teacher Tao himself has gained respect and trust from village dwellers and been able to win the minds of villagers, both the wealthy and the poor, to cooperate in labor and spirit so as to develop the village. In addition, these village leaders were able to initiate and implement other development activities that directly responded to the village's ingrained problems thus bringing about the improvement of poor peasants' economic conditions.

As for the rice bank project under the supervision of the Department of Community Development, the objectives of the project are similar to those of the Tha Som Poy model but its implementation measures are far more bureaucratized. Before setting up a rice bank, community development workers together with the Tambon council committee should assess local problems, the necessity of a rice bank,

and its managerial feasibility. The request for a rice bank will then be submitted to the Committee for Rice Bank at district level for an approval of the formation of a rice bank in a particular tambon or village (Rice bank can be set up either at tambon or village level). The Tambon council committee or the village development committee will organize the project in their respective tambon or village by specifying rules and regulations concerning the recruitment of rice bank members and the administrative committee members, the capital accumulation, the borrowing and payment, the distribution of benefits, and the control measures over the rice bank's management. The operation of the rice bank is subjected to the periodical evaluation of the Rice Bank Committee at district level (Wattana Israngul Na Ayuthaya, 1981: 8-11).

In general practice, after an approval has been made to set up a rice bank in a given village or Tambon, an administrative committee of the rice bank would be elected. To obtain rice as the initial capital, inhabitants of the village or tambon will be called for a meeting and asked to subscribe as members as many as possible and to deposit rice as stocks. Requests would also be made to temples in the community, government agencies, the private sector, foundations, charity organizations and charitable individuals for donations of rice to the bank. Rice obtained will be kept at the central silo which is built mainly by the villagers via their donations of materials and labors. In some cases, government budget may be provided as a supplement. If a central silo can not yet be built, rice would be kept in private silo of the bank members.

In depositing rice, specifications and conditions may vary in each area. Some might specify the minimum quantity of rice to be deposited each year while there is no limitation in others depending upon the capability of members. The duration of deposit is usually fixed for 5 years before depositors can withdraw their investment plus interest. In some areas, however, depositors may not receive interest as it is donated to use in other development activities in the community. In terms of loan provision, poor inhabitants are usually allowed to borrow rice from the bank during the beginning of the rice-planting season, the period in which rice shortage for consumption occurs and the price of rice is very high. The administrative committee will consider loan application according to the suffering of each applicant and the quantity of rice available in the bank. The payment of rice to borrowers is usually done within one day as to facilitate the work of the committee members who usually receive no remuneration. The repayment of principle plus interest is usually done shortly after rice in the community is harvested. Although the interest rate may vary from place to place, the average is approximately 20-30 per cent.

When a rice bank has been successfully operated with larger number of members and a fat bank asset and there could be rice surplus for the community inhabitants, the bank committee may provide loans to rice banks in other villages

facing with rice shortage or they may channel the surplus to the market when the price is favorable and spent the money in other development activities. In some areas, rice bank may be set up jointly with other principle projects such as a rice bank being a part of a savings group or a farmers' association. Rice bank in several villages and tambon in the north is usually taken place in the form of the latter.

4. San Pu Lœi Rice Bank

Before going into details of San Pu Lœi rice bank, a brief sketch of economic contexts of Doi Saket district, Chiangmai province in which San Pu Lœi Tambon is located will be a useful informational background for understanding of rice shortage problem in the area.

Chiangmai province is located in the northern region of the country. The mountainous terrain of the province is broken by river valleys and the city of Chiangmai, the provincial capital, is situated on the northern edge of the valley floor on which it is located. In 1986, Chiangmai province is administratively divided into 19 districts and 1 sub-district. These include 182 *tambon* (communes) and 1,465 *muu baan* (villages) Although a good number of hilltribesmen live in the province, the majority is the lowland native Thai people of northern origin. As in all provinces in the country, there is also a fairly large, more or less assimilated, Chinese minority. Most of Chiangmai lowland people are Buddhists, but there is also a Christian minority due to intensive missionary efforts in the province.

There is considerable diversity of economic activities in the province especially since the second world war, the period in which Chiangmai's economy began to be intensively affected by the world economy. As the province is forested, forestry and related occupations are a source of income for those in remote areas. Land cultivation, however, is the basic pursuit of the lowland inhabitants. Rice, especially glutinous rice which is preferred by the local residents as a staple, is the most important crop. Other cash crops include tobacco, sugarcane, soybeans, groundnuts, onions, garlic, and chilli. Orchards which produce a variety of fruits, such as longan and orange are also commercialized in recent years. Cottage industries such as silk-weaving and wood-carving are well known around Chiangmai area.

Doi Saket district is about 14 kilometers northeast of Chiangmai city. The district consists of 13 *tambon* and 91 villages with the total population of 59,577 in 1985. The majority of the district's area is situated on the edge of a long range of mountains with its western portion lying on the Chiangmai valley floor. Rain water is thus not retained by the land but is drained into the western lower part of the district. Sudden floods in the lowland area of the district in the wet season is usually not uncommon. There is an irrigation dam located in the northern part of

the district to conserve water in Kuang river, the only river running through the district, for agricultural production. The dam can supply water in the wet season for about 67 per cent of the district's cultivable land. In the dry season, the dam can not provide enough supply of water for cultivation because it is diversion dam, not storage dam. Many farmers in the district, especially those in villages far away from the dam, do not have enough water supply for cultivation in the dry season. Although they have built traditional irrigation dams along the Kuang river to draw water into their fields, the relative small amount of water in the river in the dry season has made these dams useless. Farmers in the district can thus grow rice only in the wet season. With the exception of well-off farmers who use power pumps, those who took chance on growing crops in the dry season by relying on water in the river tended to have low yields. As a result, many have to find seasonal jobs in towns to earn extra income. Poor people have no choice but hire themselves out as wage laborers.

Besides the problem of water shortage, the problem of land scarcity is quite alarming in Doi Saket district. As mentioned earlier that since the second world war northern Thailand has been undergone significant change in the nature and organization of production as a result of the penetration of capitalism. Commodity production has significantly increased and become more determined by domestic and world markets. The expansion and diversification of agricultural production, together with an increase in the population in the lowlands as well as on the hills, had led to an increasing demand for land and a problem of land scarcity. Land scarcity in Doi Saket district as well as others in the North is complicated and confounded by at least two factors. First, irrigable land is limited and cannot be expanded due to the nature of the physiographic givens of the North. As a result, landholdings are typically small. Second, Northern Thai rules of inheritance prescribe equal division of land among all children upon their parents' death. Thus, the size of landholding inevitably decreases when land is passed on to the younger generations (Vaddhanaputi 1984 : 166).

In 1980, while the average size of landholding in the upper north is 10.5 rai per family, the average size in Doi Saket district is around 6 rai per family (WSS 17,4,1980 : 36). According to the statistics given in WSS regarding landholding status of farming households in Doi Saket district in 1980, 45.3 per cent have their own land, 10.6 per cent own part of the land they farm and rent the rest, 23.5 per cent are tenant farmers who do not own land at all, and 20.6 per cent are wage laborers who work in others' land (Table 1).

Table 1
Land Tenancy in Doi Saket District (1980)

Types of farming households	per cent
1. Farmers with their own land	45.3
2. Farmers who partly rent land	10.6
3. Tenant farmers who own no land	23.5
4. Agricultural wage laborers	20.6

Source: WSS 71, 4, 1980: 35.

San Pu Loei *tambon* is one of 13 *tambon* in Doi Saket district. It consists of 12 villages with the total population in 1985 of 7,040 living in 1,880 households. The *tambon* is about 10 kilometers from Chiangmai city and 6 kilometers from Doi Saket district seat. San Pu Loei is situated in lowland area of the district. Like other *tambon* in lowland area of the district, rice production is the mainstay for the inhabitants' economy. Again like their counterparts in other *tambon*, San Pu Loei farmers have currently been faced with the problem of water shortage in the dry season and the problem of land scarcity. Although there is no conclusive statistics of land tenancy in San Pu Loei *tambon*, the data in Table 1 of Doi Saket district is a good indicator of landholding status in the *tambon*. Despite the fact that the average production per rai of rice cultivation in San Pu Loei is relatively higher than the average production in the region (60 bushels per rai versus 50 bushels per rai), the small size of landholding usually results in inadequate amount of rice for consumption throughout the year. The situation is even worse for tenant farmers who have to divide half of the production to pay rent. During the year of draught or flood, these categories of farmer suffer enormously. They have to borrow rice or money from local moneylenders at high interest rate. Borrowing by means of *Tok Kao Kiew* in San Pu Loei also drives poor farmers to become poorer. Purchasing price of rice being depressed by middlemen constitutes another cause of poverty problem in San Pu Loei.

The relative lack of bargaining power against middlemen in selling rice and the shortage of rice consumption throughout the year of small farmers and landless farmers in the *tambon* were the major incentives for the *tambon* council committee to initiate the rice bank project in 1981 to alleviate the said problems. There is also another motivation for the *tambon* council committee to set up the rice bank in the area. San Pu Loei rice bank has been used as a supplement activity to strengthen the San Pu Loei farmers' association. The farmers' associa-

tion was formed in 1979 to promote cooperation among farmers in the *tambon* in selling agricultural produces, to provide agricultural inputs at low costs to members, and to give credits to members through loans from the Bank of Agriculture and Agricultural cooperatives. Like most of farmers' associations and agricultural cooperatives in the country, San Pu Loei farmers association has failed to reach its main objectives. Although intended to be multi-purposes, the farmers' association has performed well mainly in one single activity, that is, credit-giving to its members. The cooperation among farmers, specifically between the wealthy and the poor, in other self-help activities has been far from impressive. The *tambon* headman and the *tambon* council committee thus expected the rice bank activity would strengthen the operation of the farmers' association.

Although the idea of setting up a rice bank in San Pu Loei was originated from the *tambon* leaders, the establishment of the rice bank was done through measures laid out by the Department of Community Development. After the Rice Bank Committee at district level had approved the establishment of rice bank in the *tambon*, an administrative committee of San Pu Loei rice bank was elected. The committee consisted of five persons. The *tambon* headman was the chairman ex officio. Three former teacher of the *tambon's* primary school were the treasurer, the secretary, and the social secretary. Another person served as an administrative member. To facilitate the operations of the rice bank, the village development committee of each village in the *tambon* were also appointed as honorable committee members. The administrative committee has as its duty to specify implementation rules and regulations and manage the rice bank.

As for regulations governing rice deposit, San Pu Loei rice bank specifies a deposit of 10 bushels of rice for one share each year. Members can also deposit money to the rice bank, one share values of 300 Baht. A member can hold no more than two shares. Each member is requested to hold his or her shares for the period of five years after which he or she will be able to withdraw the rice deposited. Regarding to interest for depositors, the bank committee has not yet specified any regulation in this matter. The *tambon* headman, however, informed me that it might be in the form of dividend payment to shareholders. In 1981, the first year of its operation, the committee could persuade 277 persons to register as members with the capital of 2,770 bushels of rice.

As for borrowing, the rice bank offers loan to members twice a year, in August and November, the beginning of planting season and shortly before the harvest season. Those who are not members of the bank can be given loans but only being guaranteed by at least two members. Each shareholder can borrow rice up to 10 bushels of rice in one year. However, those who are members for more than three years can borrow up to 20 bushels of rice in one year.

Borrowers are required to repay the debt after the harvest season in the amount of 11 bushels of rice. In other words, the interest rate is 10 per cent per annum. In 1982, the bank provided loans to 70 members. Rice obtained in 1981 was stored in a silo belonging to the *tambon* headman. With the financial support of 70,000 baht from the Rural Employment Generation Programme (*Khor Sor Chor*), a central silo was built in the *tambon* community center to store rice of the bank in 1982.

Regarding to the development of the rice bank from 1981 to 1985, the bank's members have increased from 277 in 1981 to 318 in 1985 with the total shares of 321 (Table 2). As for loan-giving, the picture is not quite impressive. The number of borrowers were 70 in 1982, 225 in 1983, 27 in 1984, and 14 in 1985 (Table 3). It should be noted that there has been no loan application from non-members thus far.

Table 2

Number of San Pu Loei Rice Bank Members from 1981 to 1985

Village No.	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
1	16	20	20	20	20
2	20	20	20	20	20
3	36	37	37	37	37
4	26	26	26	26	26
5	102	102	102	102	102
6	7	7	7	7	7
7	16	16	16	16	16
8	4	4	4	4	4
9	3	3	3	3	3
10	31	31	31	31	31
11	25	28	28	28	28
12	24	25	25	25	25
Total	277	318	318	318	318

Table 3
Number of Borrowers from 1982-1985

Village No.	1982	1983	1984	1985
1	14	-	2	-
2	-	-	-	-
3	31	11	18	9
4	-	-	-	-
5	14	7	-	3
6	5	-	-	-
7	1	-	-	-
8	1	-	-	-
9	-	-	-	-
10	-	-	2	-
11	-	4	4	2
12	4	3	1	-
Total	70	25	27	14

The low borrowing has resulted in low interest earning of the rice bank. In order to increase earning of the bank and thus motivate members to deposit rice up to five years, some other activities of the bank have been done since 1983. Rice of the bank has been sold to local rice mills when the price is at its peak each year. Profit gained from selling rice has been brought to buy rice from farmers when the price is low, especially shortly after the harvest season. The rice bought has then been channeled to the market when the price is favorable. Besides these income-earning activities, earning of the bank has also derived from selling fertilizers to farmers. In 1985, for example, the rice bank bought chemical fertilizers for 210 baht a bag from the market and sold to farmers at 235 baht a bag. The bank has made good profits from these activities. In 1985, the bank's capital was approximately 457,800 baht and the retained earning was 91,102 baht. In February 1986, the end of the first five year period of its operation, the bank's members were given 340 baht dividend payment per share. Concerned officials and the bank's administrative committee have regarded the bank's operation as a successful self-help organization of the local people. The bank's treasurer informed me that the bank might launch new services to its members including credit-giving at low interest rate in 1986. To me, however, San Pu Loei rice bank is successful in terms of a business organization rather than a social organization even though it has been initiated and implemented mainly by the people, not government officials.

The latter has simply provided technical and psychological supports to the bank's administrative committee. My argument will be clarified when we consider the characteristics of people's participation in the rice bank project and the degree to which poor people in the *tambon* have benefited from the bank.

5. People's Participation in San Pu Loei Rice Bank

In examining of people's participation in the rice bank, I will follow the four analytical topics stated earlier as they represent the life cycle of the project.

5.1 Formation of the rice bank

The initiation for the formation of San Pu Loei rice bank was taken by the present *tambon* headman and men in his cycle. He learned of the idea of rice bank when he was looking for new development projects to be implemented in the *tambon*. A community development worker in the *tambon* gave the headman detailed information of how to initiate and operate a rice bank. Assistance to poor farmers who do not have enough rice to consume throughout the year was the major objective of the project. The operation of rice bank was also aimed to strengthen the farmers' association. Interests gained from depositing rice to the bank and other benefits obtained i.e. credits and cheap agricultural inputs, for example, were expected to be baits drawing farmers, participation in the rice bank and the farmers' association as well. With technical assistance from the community development worker, the *tambon* council committee channeled a request for the formation of a rice bank to the Committee for Rice Bank of Doi Saket district in late 1980. The establishment of San Pu Loei rice bank was officially approved in early 1981. Its operation has thus been under the supervision of the government officials at district level. From interviews with both members and non-members of the rice bank, the following was how it started:

Upon the idea of setting up a rice bank initiated by the *tambon* headman was agreed upon by the *tambon* council committee, the *tambon* headman then told headmen of all villages in the *tambon* to inform people in their respective villages about the officially approved rice bank project and to collect as many names as possible to be members of the rice bank. In collecting names, each village headman called on a meeting of farmers in his village. The dissemination of information about the rice bank in villages was performed in the manner similar to the way government information is usually transmitted to villagers. Each village headman just sent his men to inform and ask villagers to attend a meeting. Those who attended the meeting were told of objectives, operations, and benefits of the rice bank. They were then convinced to become members of the bank. There was no intensive dialogue between village headmen and villagers to recognize the rice shortage problem

considerable number of households in each village so as to stimulate cooperation among villagers to help poor people. Since those who attended the meeting in each village tended to be farmers, many *tambon* inhabitants who did not join the meeting and especially those who do not farm the land have not possessed detailed information about the rice bank. They were just aware of the existence of the rice bank in their *tambon*. Some even did not know of its existence. Although the idea of setting up the rice bank was initiated by the local people, not the government officials, it was of the leaders of the *tambon*, not the ordinary villagers. This together with the top-down approach used in the recruitment of the bank's members could well explain why the bank has been able to draw only a small number of members. With the exception of village no. 5 which is the *tambon* headman's residency, the number of members from other villages was quite low (Table 2). Some of those who had given their names said that they did so upon the pledge of their village headmen to whom they feared to displease or *Kreagjai*. In other words, they have become members of the rice bank not by their own willingness but rather by the manipulative force of village headmen, the powerful persons in the villages.

Although there is no conclusive data concerning the economic status of all members of the rice bank, interviewed data suggested that most of them were well-to-do farmers who produced rice surplus and thus were able to deposit rice to the bank. Only a small number of those who could not produce rice surplus did enter into membership. From interviews with some members, I learned that they joined the rice bank mainly to get interests from their investment rather than to receive loans of rice at low interest rate and to help poor families that do not have enough rice to eat. This attitude toward the rice bank as a source of investment has apparently reflected in the low borrowing and its continuous decline since 1982 (Table 3). When asked "Why did you join the rice bank?", some members responded that "to invest some of rice surplus for interests"

The attitude toward the rice bank as a business enterprise among San Pu Loei farmers has been so strong that a similar organization was created in a village of the *tambon*. In village no. 3 or Pa Kui village, 16 well-to-do farmers set up what they called a "rice savings group" in 1984. Its operation was somewhat similar to that of the rice bank but its only one objective was to generate income for the group's members. Each member of the group is required to deposit 50 bushels of rice annually up to five years. Rice collected will then be channeled to the market when the price is favorable. Money received will then be used to buy rice from fellow farmers when the price is low. The rice bought together with those collected annually from members will be sold when the price is high to earn profits. After so doing for five years, earnings will be divided equally to members. The head of the group informed me that they followed what San Pu Loei rice bank has done to increase earning. To them, the rice savings group is in essence a

business organization through which members join only to make an investment. All members of the group know very well about San Pu Loei rice bank and none of them bother to become a member of the bank. When asked, "Why don't you join San Pu Loei rice bank?", they replied that it was not convenient for them to carry rice to deposit in the central silo since it is not located in their village and that the operation of their rice savings group could produce more profits. Another point of interest is that they were confident they could control the management of their rice savings group.

Regarding reasons for not joining the rice bank, well-to-do farmers in several villages who were not members of the bank said that they were not sure whether the amount of interests incurred from their investment in the rice bank would be more than those they would receive from commercial banks. Some said that they did not need to borrow rice from the rice bank. Others did recognize the rice shortage problem of poor families in villages but the *tambon* is so big that they did not quite sure poor families would really be assisted. These answers reflect the relative lack of understanding of the real objectives and operational procedures of the rice bank and the relatively loose relationships among the people in the rather big *tambon* resulting in the low spirit of people helping people. In other words, these wealthy farmers have lacked both material and psychological incentives to join the rice bank and to help the poor people in their *tambon*.

From an interview with the headman of Pa Kui village, I was told that he did not even know about the correct number of the rice bank's members who lived in his village as well as the total number of the bank's members. He simply said that his duty was to persuade farmers in his village to join the bank and to inform members of depositing and borrowing periods in each year. These answers imply the prevalence of a bureaucratic-oriented attitude among the rice bank's administrators. They have run the rice bank in the same way the Thai officials run a government department and shown little care to induce villagers' participation in the bank's activities. Even a member of the rice bank administrative committee has not actively conducted the activities he is required to do. How can San Pu Loei rice bank draw more members and encourage them to cooperate sufficiently with each other to help their poor fellow farmers?

5.2 The rice bank administrative committee

After each village headman collected as many names as possible in his respective village, those who had given their names were then called by the *tambon* headman to meet together at the *tambon* agricultural extension office. The headman *tambon* informed members of the bank about the objectives and operational procedures and regulations of the rice bank. The rice bank administrative committee members were then elected. As stated above, the majority of the committee

members are members *ex officio*. They occupy *tambon* and village administrative positions, that is, *tambon* headman, village headmen and men of prestige. There were thus only four elected members. They are the treasurer, the secretary, the social secretary and the general administrator. Those who were elected were persons in the upper echelon of the *tambon*. Three of them used to be school teachers, a prestigious position in Thai society, and the other was a wealthy person. Interestingly, all of them live in village no. 5, the *tambon* seat, in which the *tambon* headman, the chairman of the rice bank is also a resident. These persons were elected in 1981 and have been re-elected into office year after year since then.

Like other associations and groupings in Thai villages, administrators of San Pu Loei rice bank are wealthy and influential persons. This partly results from the nature of power structure in rural communities in which few people are able to control power, resources, and opportunities in the communities while the majority of people are not able to do so (Na Chiangmai, 1985: 351-70). Being constrained by such local power structure, ordinary villages, especially the poor who tend to lack bargaining power, are less likely to compete with powerful persons in election of administrative members of public associations. The patron-client relationships, a type of social relations in Thai society, also determine what kind of persons villagers would elect to be committee members. Villagers tended to elect those who they think have resources to help them when they are in need. They elected the rich with the hope that the latter would use their wealth to support the associations. They elected those who have personal connections with government officials and powerful people outside their villages in order that these people could use their connections to obtain privileges for the associations and the members. Also, they elected their patrons or would be patrons to repay the social debts or to exchange for benefits in the near future (Hanks, 1975 : 197-218).

By putting these wealthy and powerful persons into administrative positions of the bank, the bank's members especially the poor ones, were hardly able to control the bank's management in accordance with its main objectives. Instead of enacting regulations and putting efforts so as to recruit more members and to give loans to poor people who are rely in need of rice, the committee members have tended to operate the bank to serve their vested interests by putting more emphasis on increasing the bank's earning. The bank's chairman himself, though repeatedly spoke of the assistance to poor farmers as the most important function of the bank, has paid more time and energy on activities that would increase the bank's profits rather than those that would help poor people who are faced with rice shortage and not able to borrow rice from the bank. Under this situation, most of the bank's members, who are relatively powerless, could do nothing. Some members interviewed even said that the only thing they were interested in

was the progress of the bank and thus the interests they would obtain from their investments. This phenomenon certainly has a negative impact upon the operation of the rice bank in terms of assisting poor people in the *tambon*.

5.3 Activities of San Pu Loei rice bank

As stated earlier, the most important function of a rice bank is to provide loans to poor people who are faced with rice shortage for consumption. The implementation of this activity by a San Pu Loei rice bank, however, has been less effective. Only a small number of members borrowed rice from the bank. In fact, San Pu Loei rice bank has not provided loans to poor people, whether they are farmers or not, who are non-members but are in a real need of rice for consumption. As indicated in Table 3, the number of borrowers has continuously decreased since 1983. Several reasons account for the bank's failure to reach its most important objective. First, the majority of members tended to be farmers who could produce rice surplus, while poor inhabitants, whether they are farmers or not, who are in need of rice did not become members. This is simply because they do not have rice surplus to fulfill the annual depositing requirement. Second, although non-members can borrow rice from the bank by having at least two members as guarantors, this measure was quite impossible for non-members to use. Like their counterparts in other villages where people are increasingly loosely tied together and the value of individualism has increasingly been strong, San Pu Loei poor people have been stripped away many of the economic and social ties that previously bound them to large farmers and landlords (see also Scott, 1985 : 184-185). From interviews with some poor people who were non-members, I was told that they did not borrow rice from the bank mainly because they could not find any guarantor. They have therefore depended upon local moneylenders as usual when in need of rice. The rice bank administrative committee and many wealthy members have tended to discourage the bank's members to support non-members. They insisted that borrowers should be members only. If non-members were encouraged to borrow rice, they would not have any incentive to enter into membership. Many people in the *tambon* would then become free-riders and thus seriously affecting the development of the rice bank.

Third, borrowing regulations and procedures appear to be inconvenient and rather unfamiliar to villagers. Like those of other officially-sponsored organizations in rural communities, the administrative structure and processes of San Pu Loei rice bank are bureaucratized. A borrower has to submit a written application form during specified period of time and wait for the approval of the bank's committee. After his loan application is approved, he has to wait until the rice payment day has come before he can have rice. He then has to carry the rice home at his own expense. After harvesting season, he has to repay debt to the

rice bank in the specified repayment day. These procedures are quite different from those of indigenous social organizations. To participate effectively in these as well as other procedures of the rice bank, villagers have to be equipped with sufficient knowledge of and experiences in modern bureaucratic organizations. Unfortunately, to most of San Pu Loei people, especially the poor, these procedures appear to be too complicated.

Given the fact that San Pu Loei *tambon* is a rather big community consisting of 12 Villages, people who do not live in village no. 5, the *tambon* seat, find it quite a long walking distance to the rice bank office. They were unwilling to walk a long distance back and forth from their places to the rice bank office several times before getting the rice. The specification of borrowing day for only two days in a year tends to discourage villagers to use this service of the bank. Many poor people, members or non-members alike, who were in an urgent need of rice for consumption, could not wait for the rice borrowing days. They had to borrow rice or money from neighbors and local moneylenders even at relatively higher interest rate. An informant, who was a poor farmer and did not join the rice bank, told me that poor people did not join the bank because they wanted to borrow money, not just rice. They need money to spend on rice, utensils, and other necessities. Poor people not only need rice but also other things in order to survive.

Fourth, in the last three years the price of rice in the country has been decreased because of the lower demand of Thai rice in the international market. Under this situation, the cost of borrowing rice from the bank is not markedly cheaper than that of borrowing rice from the private sector. This effect together with other inconveniences said above have induced prospective borrowers of the rice bank to depend upon private sources of credits to obtain rice rather than borrowing rice from the bank.

Regarding to other activities of the rice bank, they are all aimed primarily to increase earnings of the bank not to help poor people who lack enough rice for consumption throughout the year. Although San Pu Loei rice bank can be viewed as successful in making large profits out of these activities, it is the administrative committee members and well-to-do members who gain the benefits accrued from the bank's operations. To them, the rice bank serves as a source of long-term investments in the *tambon*. The more the bank's earnings are, the more divideden payment they will receive at the end of the bank's five year operation. The bank's committee members themselves also receive the per diem of 30 baht in managing activities aiming for the bank's earnings. Besides these material benefits the administrative committee and well to-do members of the rice bank have obtained social benefits by having been regarded as those who have sacrificed their own resources to help poor people in the *tambon*. As for the committee members them-

selves, the management of the rice bank has not only increased their knowledge and experiences in running public organizations but also strengthened their personal connections with government officials and their social status and power in the *tambon*. In other words, the operation of the rice bank in San Pu Loei has in effect reinforced the current power structure in the *tambon* in which only a small number of people control access to wealth, power, status, and opportunities.

In short, San Pu Loei rice bank has been far from successful in terms of a local self-help organization providing loans at low interest rate to poor people who lack enough rice for consumption and are usually dependent upon local moneylenders. Although it is a local organization initiated by local people, it has relatively failed to stimulate adequate cooperation among the *tambon's* dwellers so as to improve the economic well-being of the poor. Rather, the operations of the rice bank have been geared toward increasing the bank's earnings which will subsequently benefit those members who are likely to be well-to-do farmers in the *tambon*. The existing borrowing regulations and procedures have tended to discourage even the members to borrow rice from the bank, let alone the non-members. Many poor people of the *tambon* therefore have no motive to join the rice bank at all.

5.4 Control of the management by members.

The readers may have already realized from the above passages that there has hardly been any control of the rice bank's management from below. This situation results from the fact that the members are structurally constrained in attempting to control the management and that the bank's administrative committee members themselves are quite unwilling to be supervised and controlled by members. Although there is the annual meeting of members to elect four committee members and approve the proposed activities of the rice bank, the social structures of the *tambon* has tended to inhibit the members' controlling capability. In such meeting, the committee members, who are wealthy and powerful elites, were likely to dominate discussions and decisions. From interviewed data, it was the bank's committee members, especially the chairman, who initiated regulations and procedures of the bank as well as activities intended to increase the bank's earnings. The members coming from various villages and not knowing each other very well remained silent and raised their hands to agree with almost everything suggested by the bank's committee, those of superior status. In elections of committee members, competition rarely occurred, thus resulting in old faces were re-elected into office year after year.

Although a good number of members, particularly small farmers and poor villagers, have been quite dissatisfied with the way the committee has run the rice bank, they, however, did not dare to challenge the management. Since

they come from several villages and differ from each other in terms of economic well-being and ability to cope with one's own household's economic crisis, they are thus unable to organize themselves coherently to voice their demands against those of the bank's committee. They are also likely to lack sufficient knowledge of and experiences in the administrative system of officially-sponsored organizations. Many members are less educated and thus unable to speak and write official language, the language used in conducting the bank's affairs. In addition, the value on avoidance of overt show of hostility toward other people; and the persistence of marked inequalities in the control of wealth, status, and power; together with the relative absence of impersonal guarantee of physical security in the *tambon* tend to turn poor villagers away from challenging powerful local people publicly. Like the weak in other rural communities, their weapons include back-biting and slander as well as avoidance of interaction with the powerful (Ibid : 186-240).

Many members of the rice bank were also not interested in controlling over the management. Their experiences of being members of other associations initiated and controlled by government officials in which they have rarely been able to participate effectively have tended to make them perceive that the rice bank, like those associations, does not belong to them. They were therefore barely conscious of their responsibility for supervising activities of the management. Since the information of the bank's affairs were limited to a group of five persons, the working committee members, ordinary members were thus not sufficiently equipped to keep a close watch on the management of the rice bank.

As indicated above, San Pu Loei rice bank is organized at the *tambon* level. Village headman and deputy village headman of each village in the *tambon* are the rice bank's committee members *ex-officio*. These committee members are required to act as the linkman between the five working committee members and ordinary members in their respective villages. The role of these committee members in the management of the bank has been minimal, limiting only to recruitment of new members and transmission of news to members. They have tended to perceive and perform these roles similar to those formally assigned to them by government departments. They act as representatives of the state rather than as representatives of their fellow villagers who take a very good care of their people's interests (see Moerman, 1976 : 251-72). Interviewed data indicated that not all of them attended every bank's committee meeting. They therefore did not encourage the members to control the management of the rice bank, for they themselves were not interested in so doing.

The administration of San Pu Loei rice bank as laid out by the regulations appears not to give significance to the idea of the management's accountability. Besides the annual election of four working committee members,

there were no clear regulations and procedures of how the members could control the management of the rice bank's activities. In practice, the working committee members have conducted all activities of the bank and acted as its representatives in dealing with outsiders. Ordinary members, especially the poor, have had very little chance and ability to have a say in the bank's administration. As for control from above, San Pu Loei rice bank has been operated with a minimal control from the concerned officials both at the *tambon* and district levels. An agricultural extension officer simply performed an annual review of the bank's financial statement. A community development worker provided suggestions regarding how to manage the bank's activities when asked by the bank's administrative committee. The officials have tended to concern with the increase of the bank's earnings, the important objective indicator of the bank's success from which they report their superiors for their annual performance evaluation, rather than the degree to which the bank has promoted people's participation in the rice bank.

8. Conclusion and Implications

This paper analyzes San Pu Loei rice bank as a case study of a self-help organization in rural development with the main concentration on the dynamics of people's participation in the organization. I have shown that San Pu Loei rice bank, like Tha Som Poy rice bank, was initiated by a group of local leaders. Although the San Pu Loei *tambon* council committee submitted the proposal for establishment of the rice bank through official procedures for an approval, the concerned government officials have not exerted either serious encouragement of people's participation in and technical supports of the management of the rice bank or overt control of the rice bank's administration. With an exception of the financial support from the Rural Employment Generation Programme to build a central silo of the bank, the concerned officials have remained in a distance and entered the scene only when their help was needed. The concerned officials seemed to pay more attention to the formation of the rice bank rather than its implementation as well as its fulfillment of the most important objective, that is, to provide starving villagers with rice at low interest rate.

In this paper, San Pu Loei rice bank is examined in the contexts of the local socio-economic and political structures as well as Thai culture. I argue that in order to understand the extent to which a rice bank promotes people's participation and the development of a given rural community, we should view it as both a business organization and a social organization. A given local public organization may be successful in terms of a business enterprise but not in terms of a social organization. A social organization here refers to a social grouping of rural dwellers that in its operations stimulates and facilitates cooperation among people of different socio-economic statuses in helping each other to solve their own

problems and that enhances the meaningful participation of the local people, particularly the weak, in its activities. As shown in the case of San Pu Loei rice bank that it has been successful as a business organization rather than as a social organization. It is found that, as a business organization, the capability of the bank's committee in managing the bank's finance has been quite impressive. The bank has made large profits from selling rice and fertilizers. As a social organization, San Pu Loei rice bank, however, is unable to provide adequate assistance to poor people who lack enough rice for consumption and to promote the true spirit of people helping people in the *tambon*. Many poor people have not been sufficiently motivated to join the rice bank. Bureaucratic regulations and procedures of the rice bank appear to be a major obstacle for members and non-members to participate actively in the bank's activities. San Pu Loei rice bank seems to benefit members who are well-to-do farmers rather than small farmers as well as poor people who are non-members.

As a rural development project, the case of San Pu Loei rice bank suggests that we should be cautious in what really constitutes development in rural communities. Although the meaning of the term "development" is diverse and unable to be measured quantitatively, one thing we learn from this case study is that development of a rural association can be seen either in terms of its financial progress or in terms of its social attributes enhancing people's participation and cooperation. To me, the development of a given rural community in the sense of grassroots development should encompass both economic and social improvements of the rural community. The ultimate goal of rural development is the state in which the rural people, especially rice bank depends heavily upon sincere cooperation among the local people. An average *tambon* in Thailand consists of about 10 villages and approximately about 1,000 households. A *tambon* is thus geographically and demographically too big for the likelihood of a successful self-help organization of farmers. Cooperation among people tends to be weakened in a big community in which inhabitants are quite diverse in their occupations and consequently relatively loosely tied together. A rice bank organized at the village level would be more feasible. In an average village, inhabitants are usually tied together in the web of social relationships, cooperation among them and the traditional spirit of people helping people are quite easy to be revitalized. The success of Tha Som Poy rice bank and those in villages elsewhere have confirmed the importance of geographical and demographical requirements of a successful participatory rice bank (see also Wechayachai, 1984).

Second, the creation of a successful rice bank should stem from the real need of village dwellers, especially the poor, regarding to the ingrained problem of rice shortage for consumption throughout the year. An intensive analysis of a

village's poverty problems done simultaneously by both the village leaders and villagers to identify major causes of the problems before setting up a rice bank in the village is a crucial basic requirement. There must be an intensive dialogue among villagers led by local leaders and concerned officials so as to make the people well aware of the necessity of their cooperation to help one another and their active participation in the management of the rice bank. Local leaders and government officials should realize that popular participation in a rice bank project is not only a means to develop a successful rice bank, but also an ultimate goal of the village's development.

Third, the success of a rice bank also depends upon the leader of a community, as seen in the case of Tha Som Poy rice bank. Such a leader has to possess a strong will and be able to win hearts and minds of his or her fellow villagers to cooperate in labor and spirit so as to help improve the standard of livings in the village. However, no matter how smart a community leader is a set of mechanisms in controlling the rice bank's management is necessary. There must be a practical set of regulations and procedures for controlling the management by the local people particularly the poor who lack both sufficient knowledge of modern organizational management system and bargaining power against the wealthy and the "local boss".

Fourth, the government officials have to accept the fact that there are increasing inequalities in the control of wealth, status, and power in rural communities. This type of rural social structure not only prohibits the effective participation of poor people in development activities, but also increasingly sharpens the division of social classes in rural villages (Na Chiangmai, 1984 : 67-80). Under these circumstances, the model of people's participation in rural development enacted by the national rural development committee since 1982 is unlikely to bear fruit if it is employed by the government officials in the usually mechanical fashion. Rural development efforts via entourage approach of group formation in villages hitherto used by the officials appear to benefit local elites rather than the poor mass public and enlarge the inequality gap in rural villages. Unless every class and group of villagers are promoted to have equal bargaining power and a voice in the initiating, implementing, and controlling of development projects in their communities, no meaningful people's participation in rural development under the new scheme of rural development administrative system is likely to emerge. The evidence of San Pu Loei rice bank well illustrates this point. In addition, the government officials have to give equal attention to every step of a given development project's life cycle, not just the formation of project as ever. Mechanisms for controlling of conflicts over benefits derived from development projects and conflict resolutions must be found and accepted by all concerned. To adopt this new orientation to rural development, the government has to limit the exercise of authority and power in controlling the administration of rural development project in villages. The

bureaucratization of village life through officially-sponsored development efforts currently performed by the government is the rural development of the government, by the government, and for the government, not development, of the people, by the people, and for the people. The meaningful popular participation in rural development thus depends solely upon whether the government is actually willing to promote it.

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