

THE NORMATIVE BASIS OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

Pakorn Priyakorn*

1. Introduction

Theories of development are rarely, if ever, pure theories of becoming, that is, accounts of how one complex of socio-economic arrangements transforms itself into another, different complex. They usually include, explicitly or implicitly, some element of evaluation. Typically, most theories of development include the notion that development and the outcome of development are both desirable, or that, though development is painful, the outcome is good enough to over-compensate the painfulness of the process. "Critical" development theories, as their description implies, are also evaluative, and underline this by calling the outcome of the transformation process which they identify "underdevelopment". In order to discuss this evaluative element in development theory, some particular normative standpoint has first to be established. It obviously is not very sensible or helpful to disseminate one's opinions on which development theories have "the right approach" without first trying to ensure that one has a clear and reasonable definition of "right".

2. The Need for a Normative Basis

Before considering what this definition might be, there is an obstacle to surmount. When the question of appropriate values is raised in scholarly discussion, the standard response is that scholars must be impartial: social scientists like natural scientists must be neutral toward their subject matter. The adoption of a normative approach, it is implied, necessarily entails a lack of impartiality and thus a tendency to ignore or distort the facts. This response is, however, either irrelevant or insinuating. The use of a norm for the assessment of theory does not in any way imply a scholarship of exhortation in which truth may be suppressed and falsehoods permitted if convenient for the purpose of persuasion. So expression of horror at a scholarship of exhortation, which is the thrust of the standard response, either misses the point at issue and is thus irrelevant, or insinuates that the proponents of value-laden doctrines cannot be trusted to be fair and scholarly.

* Assistant Professor, School of Public Administration, National Institute of Development Administration

The point at issue is this: all discussion of socio-economy-including that of the history of ideas about socio-economy-presupposes some view of the kind of society and economy which is "best," in the sense of most compatible with human needs and interests. If this view is allowed to remain informal and incoherent, it may bias the ensuing discussion in ways that are difficult to detect. The aim of the introduction of values is thus not partiality, but impartiality in a higher degree. Precisely in order, then, to offer the reader every facility for intelligent disagreement, the normative basis of the present discussion is now explicitly considered.

If one were to ask oneself the question how right actions can be distinguished from wrong ones, there are several conceivable answers. One might reply that the distinction is given by intuition (or a "moral sense"), by knowledge of the divine will, or by considering whether the action's results increase the happiness or satisfaction of affected individuals. These three replies, the intuitionist, the theological and the utilitarian, all fail in different ways to give a reasonable account of what we mean by "rightness". The intuitionist fails because it makes no allowances for observed difference in moral feelings in different human groups, the theological because it involves an essentially circular argument about the goodness of God and the utilitarian because it assumes that virtue is indistinguishable from the calculation of advantage.

By contrast, a reasonable account of "rightness" must be universal in its applicability, not self-derived and not conditioned on the advantage of the doer. Such an account is given by the principle that right actions are those based on rules which could be reasonably willed to be universal laws. We are thus obliged to follow only those rules which could be so willed. Although right actions cannot be directly deduced from this principle, it does provide the essential criterion for examining whether any proposed rule of action is right. This principle has some very important corollaries.

(1) Reference to the interests of some group which is less than world-wide (that is, which excludes some people however few or apparently insignificant) is never sufficient to determine which proposed course of action is right. One can never, for example, conclude that an action is right, in the last resort and in the final analysis, simply because it is in the *national* interest. The same applies with even greater force to the interests of region, tribe, caste group, locality, family and all other sub-national loyalties.

(2) It is therefore necessary to make a clear distinction between rules of prudence-rules which serve the interest of a person, a family, a community or of a bureaucracy, for example and rules of right, which prescribe duties obligatory in the last resort.

(3) There is a further distinction to be observed between rules of prudence, rules of right and rules of skill. Rules of skill are rules whose rightness is conditional on the prior rightness of an end. They are therefore hypothetical in form; for example, "If A is right, it would be right to do B as a rational means to achieve A". Rules of skill, which are sometimes called "hypothetical imperatives" or, more simply "technical imperatives" are important to recognize, as they include virtually the whole of conventional normative economics, including investment appraisal, macroeconomic planning, the theory

of public policy and so on. Recognition of these types of discourse as “technical imperatives” at once makes it clear that successful understanding of them centres on an understanding of the limits of their applicability. The failure to understand these limits, and thus to confuse technical imperatives with rules of right is the source of a very important error in development studies. This is “technocratism” or the claim to political power based on technical knowledge or expertise.

3. The Norm Applied to Socio-Economic Life

The norm or criterion of rule of rightness given above is a formal, analytic principle. One cannot, therefore, deduce from it directly the content of the idea of right action. But that does not mean that it can give no guidance about what sort of socio-economic life is best in relation to human needs and interests. In practice, the guidance results from an iterative process of testing proposed rules of action against the universalist requirement of the norm. For the present purpose of discussion, the major implications of the norm for socio-economic life can be suggested (though not proved) by asking what types of social behaviour would almost certainly be overruled by the norm.

By this procedure we are not trying to construct a positive ideal of socio-economic life, or a single exact blueprint to which a good socio-economic life is obliged to conform. We are proceeding, partially and negatively, indicating only types of social behaviour which one is obliged to try and avoid. This approach thus leaves room for a whole set of different socio-economic arrangements to be consistent with the norm. Such leeway is necessary precisely because reasonable people can and do have different tastes and preferences, which may be, from the viewpoint of the rule of right, matters of indifference. They are matters which can rightly be left for discussion and compromise agreement by the particular groups concerned. (The recognition of the fact of differences of taste and preferences and the importance of accommodating them is one of the attractive features of the utilitarian view, and should not be rejected just because, as a result of mis-specifying the rule of right, it exaggerates that importance).

It seems reasonable to suggest that at least three types of social behaviour would fail the test of compatibility with a universalist norm. They are human exploitation, the exercise of privilege and authoritarianism. Human exploitation can be defined as deliberately profiting from another person's disadvantage. Such behaviour cannot be willed to be a universal law, because no reasonable person would want to make himself vulnerable to exploitation by another. Adoption of universality as a criterion of the rightness of an action implies an equality among people both in the manner in which they decide upon the correctness of possible actions and in the manner in which they can be expected to be considered by other people making similar decision. The exercise of privilege, defined as an exclusive right or a vested interest, would fail the test for essentially the same sort of reason. Authoritarianism, defined as the forceful imposition of the will of one person or group on another person or group again could not be willed by anyone as a universal law. Apart from the argument from universality, it involves a

denial of the imposed-on person's group's ability to act rightly, and for that reason alone must be wrong.

What would the elimination of these three forms of social behaviour from socio-economic life entail? To answer this question one must consider particular examples of exploitation, privilege and authoritarianism in economic life, social relations and politics.

In economic life it is not hard to find examples of the exercise of exclusive privileges: all the different kinds of artificial monopolies and monopsonies and all the artificially created and maintained barriers to production and exchange which have been opposed with mixed success by liberal economists for the last two hundred years. Authoritarianism in economic life also is easily exemplified by the requisitioning of supplies and the conscription and direction of labour by the state or private interests.

Economic exploitation has, of course, been at the centre of a much fiercer and more significant controversy than has ever surrounded privilege or authoritarianism. The question has been, and remains, whether a whole social system can be squarely based on human exploitation without acknowledging it; and, in particular, the Marxian question whether a socio-economic system based on the private ownership of the means of production institutionalizes the exploitation of the mass of labourers, while being conveniently blinded by its own intellectual constructions* (e.g. utilitarian economics) from an awareness of this fact. This is too large a problem to resolve satisfactorily here. Suffice it to say that, if systematic exploitation is found proved, the obligation to abolish exploitation could not remain content with mere economic reform, but would have to involve the extensive restructuring of economic institutions. (This contrasts with the utilitarian view of right which actually would permit the exploitation of a minority if that promoted the greatest happiness of the greatest number.) Such a restructuring would imply a move towards greater collectivism and greater equality, although not a strict egalitarianism since the economic and technological inequalities which might remain in a nonexploitative economy are not objectionable *per se*.

It should be noted that the removal of privilege, exploitation and authoritarianism from economic life will not necessarily, or even probably, remove material scarcity. One would, however, expect the scarcity problems of the economy to ease somewhat in consequence, partly as a result of the initial redistribution of goods, but much more with the release of human creativity it would permit, some of which would help to stimulate invention and technical advance. (This point is taken up again when the relationship of the rule of right to a concept of development is considered.) As long as scarcity does persist some rule of allocation will be required, some combined criterion of desert and need.

The view of right which has been proposed leads to a central distinction between intrinsic values and relative values (expressed in market or other prices). Those things which have value in relation to human needs and preferences have a price, whereas intrinsic value attaches to rightness itself, and so to people in so far as they are capable of acting rightly (Paton (1956), p. 102). This idea of the intrinsic value or dignity of the moral person is the key to explaining how the rule of right would regulate social life. (It also usefully counters some of the wilder flights of utilitarianism into calculations of the

value of life, of affection, of children, and so on.) Since rightness itself, and people to the extent that they act rightly, are the only things of intrinsic value, it follows that social life should be governed only by mutual respect based upon the performance of obligations. Many other ways in which social life is actually regulated would be objectionable under the rule of right. All limitations on universal mutual respect deriving from considerations of class, personal wealth, religion, ethnicity or nationality, for example, would need to be avoided. The forms of social privilege, exploitation and authoritarianism which have been built up on the basis of such kinds of limitation would all be condemned to extinction, if not necessarily made extinct as a result.

In political life, the avoidance of authoritarianism is the most obviously applicable implication of the rule of right, as well as being the most revolutionary. What has been said already about differences in preference and taste requiring compromise and agreement suggests the need for some democratic form of government. More than that, the casting of the rule of right in a form which explicitly requires the needs of all other people to be taken into consideration makes it inherently a democratic rule. In terms of types of government, it must sweepingly reject all unrepresentative and non-consultative forms of monarchy and oligarchy, military or otherwise. A more rigorous attempt than the above has been made by John Rawls to set out the socio-economic implications of a universalist rule of right (*A Theory of Justice*, Oxford University Press, 1972). Initially, to simplify the problem, Rawls restricts his enquiry to a single, isolated society. Rawls defines human needs and interests thus: people have to live next to each other; they are roughly similar in physical and mental powers; they are vulnerable to a concerted attack by others; inputs and outputs are scarce in relation to people's demands; mutual cooperation is possible; each person has his own ambitions in life and these ambitions conflict; altruism is absent and there is a variety of different religious, social and political beliefs. The question he puts is what set of principles would people in that position agree is just if

- 1) they took no account of their own *actual* age, natural abilities, wealth, class position, personal ambitions and personal temperament, beliefs and culture; and if
- 2) the chosen principle must satisfy the criteria of generality, universality, publicity, ability to order conflicting claims and finality.

Rawls' answer is that, loosely phrased, two (and only two) principles would be agreed:

i) that there be equal liberty for all, including equality of opportunity, as well as an equal distribution of income and wealth

ii) that any departure from equality in the basic structure of institutions will not be permitted unless it can be shown to maximize, or at least contribute to the long run expectations of the least fortunate group.

For Rawls, the main institutional implication of these two principles is political: they require effective institutions of constitutional democracy. (When a person's reason and will are absent, however, paternalistic intervention may be justified, provided it is guided by the principles of justice and by what is known about the subject's more permanent aims and preferences.) But there are socio-economic implications also:

a) The justice of distributive shares depends on the justice of the institutional mechanisms which generate particular shares.

b) Once a suitable minimum standard of life is guaranteed to all, it need not be unjust for additional income to be allocated through a price mechanism freed of monopoly and externalities.

c) It is not obligatory that the present generation saves simply in order to make the next generation better off. It is only just to demand saving from this generation in order to create the basic institutional structure which satisfies just principles. At the same time, it is obviously a mistake to believe that a just society *cannot* be created without first achieving a high material standard of living.

d) The criteria for just taxation depend on whether or not a just social order has been achieved.

e) In appraising the justice of specific economic policies, there is usually room for reasonable differences of opinion, because the precise application of principle (ii) requires a great deal of information that is very hard to come by. "Often the best we can say of law or policy (in the economic field) is that at least it is not clearly unjust."

4. Some Criticisms Considered and Rebutted

There are four potentially damaging lines of attack on the normative basis outlined so far which need to be considered, and, if what has been proposed so far is to stand, rebutted convincingly. These four lines of criticism are the claims that the rule of right is parochial, despite its apparent cosmopolitanism; unrealistic despite its apparent reasonableness; incoherent despite its apparent precision and eclectic despite its apparent analytic purity. These criticisms now have to be looked at in turn.

(i) Parochialism

Is the rule of right fundamentally parochial, belying its superficial cosmopolitanism? Is it, in other words, the kind of norm or principle which could only give an account of the moral behaviour of a specific kind of culture? Does it presuppose a culture which places high values on rationality, impartiality and non-discrimination, and thus give no account of the many other cultures whose social values are completely different?

There is, of course, a trivial sense in which the proposed normative basis *is* parochial. It originated in one particular cultural location (northern Europe), and is perhaps best known and understood there. That is hardly very interesting because every set of norms is parochial in that sense. The interesting question is which, if any, of the existing trivially parochial norms can, at least potentially, transcend its origins and act as a rule of right on a world scale at some future date. The criticism of parochialism, to be effective, would have to deny this possibility to the proposed rule of right. It would have to claim successfully that the rule of right could never transcend its cultural origins.

Such a claim, however, is not very plausible. The form of the rule of right is precisely such as to make it the one agreeable norm in any competition of trivially parochial norms, provided only that the choice were to be made reasonably. Thus our

underlying assumption is that reason is the most likely human characteristic to be the bond of a world community. If that assumption is true, that is, if human unity is likely to be a unity of discourse before a unity of feeling or belief, then the rule of right must be, as it claims, a potentially universal norm. This conclusion is not disturbed merely because, as is obviously true, many moral judgements are presently given from quite diverse cultural standpoints.

(2) Unrealism

The criticism of unrealism derives from the following argument. It is nonsense to say that people have an obligation to do something of which they are incapable: "ought" implies "can". But the rule of right assumes an unrealistically high degree of human altruism. It thus cannot correctly describe the notion of "rightness" among people whose benevolence towards others is strictly limited.

The reply to this criticism would have to be that what one is interested in is not the presently observable level of peoples' altruism, but what can be gauged of their capacity for benevolence towards others, which may considerably exceed it. In addition, it is important not to allow the altruism requirement of the rule of right to be exaggerated. The whole notion of a rule of right presupposes the continued existence of conflict of individual and group interests, in the sense that if it did not exist, the rule of right would be redundant. This is quite apart from the continuation of differences in people's tastes and preferences, and the conflicts that would arise from the inevitable failure to follow the rule of right. Therefore it is misleading to characterize socio-economic life under the rule of right as a conflictless nirvanā in which (a logical impossibility) everyone abrogates his interests, tastes and preferences in favour of everyone else.

(3) Incoherence

The charge of incoherence is in fact primarily directed against the notion of a conflictless nirvanā as a social ideal, and to that extent a denial that such an ideal is implied by the rule of right disposes of it. It may well be true that a conflictless human society is unimaginable, or a society with no distinction between civil relations and political relations. But, as explained previously, what is repugnant to the rule of right is political (and other) authoritarianism, not politics or political apparatuses as such.

(4) Eclecticism

One further line of possible criticism concerns the treatment of "systematic exploitation" in the previous discussion. This may be regarded as running together a part of Marxian thought with ideas of right to which it is fundamentally opposed, and therefore as proposing merely a muddled eclecticism.

It is perfectly true that Marx himself attacked the idea of the rule of right, in his rejection of all philosophy as ideology. To defend the extended view of economic exploitation suggested above would obviously involve opposing a schematic version of the Marxian theory of ideology in which bourgeois thought is rejected *in toto* as the apologetics of capitalism. Without doubt it has strong apologetic elements, which have to be identified

and rejected. But one would want to argue that bourgeois thought included other elements which transcended the economic base which gave them birth. To support this argument, it is enough to appeal to the very structure of Marxian thought itself. Marxian thought is essentially normative in that it not merely delineates successive modes of production, but also asserts the superiority of each succeeding mode over the previous one. The superiority of the socialist over the capitalist epoch derives precisely from the elimination of capitalist exploitation which the socialist epoch is to bring. Thus the normative basis of Marxian thought itself is the rejection of exploitation, a value which derives directly and logically from the rule of right. It is contradictory therefore to dismiss the rule of right as a worthless element of bourgeois ideology. Some may try to resolve this contradiction by accepting a strong version of the theory of ideology and presenting Marx as a positivistic analyst of capitalism's interior workings. Such a reading is not really sustainable, however, and it is more faithful to the text to combine a normative interpretation of exploitation with a weak version of the theory of ideology.

5. Change, Growth, Progress and Development

Having explained and defended a particular view of the normative basis on which social studies and policy rests, one is now in a position to ask what bearing this normative basis has on certain crucial concepts of social dynamics—the concept of change, growth, progress and development. These terms are often used as if they were virtually inter-changeable. The view proposed here is that they have quite distinct and different meanings, which are to be discriminated with the aid of the normative ideas already outlined.

(a) Change

Change is the simplest and least complicated of these four concepts of social dynamics and the most intuitively appealing one. But social change need not imply social growth, social progress or social development.

For example, acknowledgement of social change may combine with a fundamentally undynamic vision of society, in a doctrine of *illusory change*. This doctrine argues that social change is superficial—i.e. is confined to the vagaries of fashions, manners and techniques, beneath which lies a constant and immutable social structure or set of social functions. The idea here is of a society with its own set of interacting mutual support systems which cannot be *fundamentally* affected by social change without inducing a social collapse.

Social change may also be interpreted as *cyclical* in character. The idea here is that societies or civilizations essentially repeat the same basic pattern of rise and fall, or constitution, florescence and disintegration, and that world history is the history of these repetitions. Other possible variants of an idea of social change which excludes growth, progress or development are the idea of *random* change (inexplicable, directionless history) and that of *theocentric* change (divinely directed history).

The only evaluative significance of all these ideas are the negative/positive ones attached to change and fluctuation *as such* by those who do/do not value equilibria, stability or conservation, as ends in themselves. The normative basis already sketched makes

it clear that it cannot be right to give equilibrium or stability the status of ends.

(b) Growth

Growth as a dynamic concept has two distinct meanings. The first is simple *quantitative increase*, in the sense in which one speaks of economic growth or population growth. The second links quantitative increase with structural change, a meaning which is based on the biological analogy i.e. a concealed comparison between social change and the growth of plants and animals (including humans). But biological growth is a very special case of quantitative increase. That is because plants and animals do not just grow anyhow; rather growth for them is a process of successively approximating some standard form. (The acorn will grow into a "normal" oak tree, not an apple tree or an oak tree 500 feet high).

The evaluative significance of the concept "growth" thus tends to be a concealed one. Its use in relation to socioeconomic affairs brings with it the crucial assumption of biological growth, i.e. that the process of quantitative increase has its own natural end, its own well-known and desirable standard form, which is often (again implicitly) concretized as some other, different "successful" society—the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. and China being the most popular examples.

To expose this assumption is immediately to discredit it. At the abstract level, it is clear that socio-economic growth assumes its form either as a result of human negligence, or of human will. Thus one either needs to make a special argument (of the kind attempted by utilitarian economics or revolutionary politics), that changes occurring under conditions of human neglect are desirable (e.g. "the invisible hand" reconciling private and social interests or "the verdict of history" as a moral indemnification); or one accepts that the evaluation of socio-economic growth requires some explicit norm to control and regulate human volition. At the concrete level, it always remains very unclear what constitutes the "standard form" of the any one society's historical experience. What was "essential" to that experience, and what was merely "accidental", is a question which seems to defy answer, even in principle, quite apart from the question of whether that "essence" could be reproduced in a different spatial and historical setting. History cannot tell us what is desirable, although it may illustrate the possibility of what one has come to believe to be desirable on the basis of other reasoning.

(c) Progress

The idea of progress is that of irreversible improvement of the human condition over the very long run. It thus involves both a generalization about history and a prediction, based on that generalization, about the future. It raises two immediate questions. How do we know what constitutes an improvement? To what aspects of the human condition does it apply?

The persistence of references to "so-called 'progress'" and of programmes requiring a reversal of long established patterns of socio-economic organization (e.g. ecologism, Gandhian policies) suggests that the first question is, at least, not entirely redundant. It is also clear that the concept of progress does not supply its own criterion of evaluation. It implies a normative basis outside itself, and independent of the historical changes which

it generalizes. The norm outlined earlier provides the basis for rational discrimination between real and merely apparent progress.

It also helps us to answer the question, "To what aspects of the human condition does the idea of progress apply?" There is a very wide spectrum of areas of human endeavour which have been cited as evidence of progress, or possible spheres for its future advance. It ranges from the accumulation of knowledge and technical skills through economic advances and improvements to social and political organization to the increased morality of human behaviour and even enhancement of man's capacity for physical, moral and spiritual action. (Pollard (1971), p.11-12). Using the norm already outlined, commits us to a very comprehensive, if not totally comprehensive definition of progress. It includes the advance of knowledge and technique, but does not stop there. It includes economic advances and improvements in socio-political organization but does not stop there either. Instead we are committed to the position that real progress also, and simultaneously, requires an increase in the morality of human behaviour. Without that, technological advances might become nightmares, welfare might become corruption and a more organized society a more impregnable prison.

It does not seem logical to extend the idea of progress any further, to include improvements in human capacity for moral action. To believe, with Condorcet, that "the perfectibility of man is truly infinite" and that "Nature has set no term to the perfection of human faculties" would be to open oneself much more seriously to the objections to the present approach which were considered under the heading of "unrealism."

(d) Development

The central concept of development studies is not change, growth or progress: it is "development." This concept, unlike the other three, is quite explicitly teleological, that is, a concept which involves an "end" (in Greek, *telos*) or "final cause."

Since the language here is rather confusing, a little clarification will be useful. The words "end" and "final" are not to be understood in a purely chronological sense. The "end" or "final cause" is a kind of internal paradigm, comparable to chromosomes in organic reproduction, which is present in the phenomena in transition right from the start of its "development". Using a computer analogy, it is a master programme which controls all phases of the process of becoming something. The concept of development explicitly presupposes an end in this sense, and thus is irreducibly teleological. (This does *not* mean that it asserts the well-known "teleological argument", that the natural world was divinely designed for mankind—a proposition long discredited and irrelevant (Glacken (1967), pp. 504-551).

If to use the term socio-economic *development* (rather than change, growth, or progress) is necessarily to assert the appropriateness of this biological or computer analogy, the reasons for the alleged appropriateness should be examined. At first blush, they are not very obvious. People do not appear to possess any innate instinct determining them without any conscious rational purpose to elaborate codes of rational social behaviour. In the absence of this how can a (world-wide) society unfold in accordance with a pre-existing internal paradigm?

One can make a limited appeal to the law of unintended consequences, by arguing that when individuals pursue selfish aims the resultant conflict may, at some point induce more moral and more rational treatment of others, and eventually embody this in just institutions at the national level. The same argument can then be further applied to relations between nations. Despite a spontaneous disposition to attempt national victories, states may find themselves promoting an international constitution that embodies peaceful and honourable treatment of other nations. Kant, for example, argued that international rivalry ensured that not one state "can relax its efforts at internal development without losing, in comparison to the other, in power and influence"; he also held that "as the power of money is perhaps the most dependable of all the powers...states see themselves forced, without any moral urge, to promote honourable peace" (Friedrich, (1949) 128; Beck: 114). This is the argument of associability self-compelled to discipline itself, and it provides one answer to the question of how a rational development process could exist, already as it were "built-in" within human society. The "telos" which this argument posits for mankind is nothing less than the full unfolding of Man's rational, and therefore moral, faculties, an unfolding brought about entirely by his own efforts.

There are two comments to make about this argument. The first is that it is not a complacent or optimistic view, as it may at first appear. It does not deny the reality of conflict, seek to minimize its significance or to justify it as in any way desirable. It is not a *deus ex machina*, like the "invisible hand", reconciling selfishness with the public good. Nor is it a secular theodicy, teaching the acceptance of suffering and evil. On the contrary, it argues that only when our awareness of suffering and evil are most intense are we likely to act more morally.

The second comment is that, although when Kant formulated this argument he made it so, it is not necessarily a deterministic argument, and indeed subtracts from its own force by appearing deterministic. As expressed above, the argument is clearly hypothetical. It cannot be comfortably assumed that it has the status of a "general law of nature or society." Rather, what it says is that associability must be self-compelled to discipline itself on a global scale or development simply will not take place. Alternatively, if there is to be socio-economic development (or "progress" in the sense already given) - of which there is absolutely no guarantee-this is what it must involve. In this form, the struggle of the individual to act rightly is not affected by any knowledge about ultimate vindication or otherwise, which is consistent with the original account of the rule of right. Also, the hypothetical form preserves the logical consistency of our account of the rule of right as an *internal* paradigm acting as a socio-economic final cause.

6. Conclusions

No doubt the practical persons in development studies are a ; ready demanding to know the relevance to them of such airy-fairy stuff. Will it make two blades of grass grow where only one grew before? Certainly not, and there will always be some degree of mutual impatience between those who want to get on with raising that second blade and those who want first to define the conditions under which its cultivation is desirable.

Yet the definition of the conditions under which technoeconomic changes are desirable is something with which the practitioner of development studies must concern himself/herself, often precisely because the agronomist, the irrigation engineer or the marketing executive of the multinational chemical firm does not. Even the unwilling practitioner is being constantly confronted with conflicting normative approaches, official and unofficial, at a very high level of abstraction. Should she/he accept the objective of "meeting basic needs", or "growth with redistribution", or is the first priority a "new international economic order"? Are all these wrong and is the ending of neocolonialism or the achievement of national economic independence the *sine qua non* of global progress? If the attempt to resolve such questions does not occur within the four walls of development studies, who else will resolve it for us? And the bread and butter work of the development specialist—on development indicators, social accounting, the organization of planning, to mention a few areas for illustration—does in many quite direct ways depend on some resolution of such general questions being achieved.

The implicit argument here has been that many in development studies back away from the responsibility of examining at all closely the values they are relying on in their own sub-disciplines, relativism and determinism being perhaps the two most popular escape routes. Where they do not, they operate with a normative basis which is, like utilitarianism, seriously defective in ways some of which have been indicated in the parentheses of this paper. This conjunction of value-phobia with a non-*value* which gives central place to calculation has bred the technocratism of the typical development expert. This is not the frank amorality of the technician who says: "Tell me what you want done, and I will tell you how to do it." It is the deception of others and/or self of securing political influence by a claim to value-free specialist skill, and then using that influence to promote values which are never acknowledged, let alone democratically discussed. The consequences are muddle, waste and the strengthening of elitist tendencies in the socioeconomic organization of poor countries.

Basically, this paper makes two claims. The first is that development studies should be a humane and moral education at least as much as, and possibly more than, a technical education in how to apply techno-economic knowledge in certain parts of the globe. The second is that development will never be achieved only by the planning of people, or teaching people how to plan the lives of others. But it may be achieved by pursuing self-realization in ways that do not obstruct the self-realization of others and teaching others, as clearly and as fully as possible, what those ways are. This might be called planning with others, collectively, democratically and on a global scale.

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