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BOOK REVIEW

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: HOW IT HAPPENS

Lucian W. Pye, *Aspects of Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966).

Charles W. Anderson, Fred R. von der Mehden, and Crawford Young. *Issues of Political Development* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967).

Dankwart A. Rustow, *A World of Nations* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1967)

The three books to be reviewed here all deal with a difficult subject. The lack of similarity among the books and their occasional disagreements with one another reveal the difficulties involved in writing about political development. A review essay provides a convenient way to call attention to important books and at the same time raise questions, point out problems, and comment generally on the subject at hand.

I

Aspects of Political Development by Lucian Pye is the oldest of the three books. It appeared in 1966, but includes rewritten papers that appeared as early as 1963. Because it is made up largely of separately written papers it is less a whole than either of the other two books. It does not have two or three main themes, but instead touches briefly though insightfully on several aspects of political development.

In the first chapter, which deals with political development from a historical perspective, Pye discusses the spread of the nation state concept and makes provocative comments on the relations between administration (or the bureaucracy or the civil service) and other political institutions. He observes: "The notion that nation building should properly follow up the development of competent administration remains in the philosophy behind much of the American foreign aid efforts." He himself has obvious reservations about this notion. "Our analysis suggests, however,

that public administration cannot be greatly improved without a parallel strengthening of the representative political processes." There is a noticeable lack of data that might substantiate this position, but it is an important hypothesis and deserves consideration. Even if one disagrees with Pye's ideas concerning the strength of the bureaucracy in developing countries and the relative weakness of other political participants it is beyond argument that the relationship between the bureaucracy and the rest of the political system is a subject of first importance in developing areas.

For readers unversed in the subject of political development the second chapter of the book may be the most useful. Here Pye attempts a survey of the many meanings that have been given to the term "political development" and then suggests the meanings most commonly found. Political development means increasing mass participation and popular involvement in politics and it means increasing citizen equality. Political development means increasing government capacity to carry out policies and programs. Finally, political development means increasing differentiation and specialization within the political system. It is clear from these meanings that political development is something more than simply political change. Development, in the eyes at least of Western scholars, implies change for the better, improvement, and improvement not unexpectedly means something akin to becoming more Western.

The chapter on the meaning of political development is followed by a less useful chapter on the need for theory. Here Pye's main point is that social science needs standards (absolute, universal standards) which can be used to judge political changes — are they for the better or the worse. One can agree in passing that such standards would be nice, but the chances of achieving them seem at best remote. The last part of this chapter contains a brief analysis of "crises of development," crises that must be dealt with on the way to becoming a modern nation state. The word crisis seems overdramatic, but surely modern nation states must achieve a sense of identity, must be able to maintain internal order, and must be able to serve their citizens.

After opening his book with rather general chapters Pye turns his attention to more specialized topics. All of these can not be discussed here, but simply mentioning the chapter titles may be a help to potential readers. "Democracy and Political Development." "Personality and Changing Values." "Law as the Source of Both Instability and Rigidity." "Insurgency and the Suppression of Rebellions." "Communications and Political Development." "Armies in the Process of Political Development." "The Prospects for Development."

In "Democracy and Political Development" Pye brings up several arguments that have been used to justify less than democratic rule in developing countries and questions them. At the start he raises the economic efficiency argument for non—

competitive politics: "The argument for a one party system and for administrative rule tends greatly to oversimplify the problem of economic development by assuming that development hinges largely on the more rational allocation of resources." Then Pye states his own position. "The goal of economic development can often be better realized if the functional requirements of the political system for integration and for adjustment are met by participation in competitive politics. When the gratification of the goals of economic development becomes also the prime means for realizing the functions of integration and adaptation, the result is likely to be a less efficient approach to the objective of development." What he seems to mean by this is that citizens as individuals and in groups may be brought into the political system and their support gained by giving them economic benefits -- by sharing economic resources with them -- or by sharing political power with them -- by giving them political resources -- by making them participants in the system. His position seems to be that using political resources to gain support and loyalty may free economic resources for other uses. To use economic resources to gain support and loyalty (political ends) as well as to achieve more directly economic ends may spread economic resources very thin and slow down the pace of economic growth.

But having put his point this way (and I hope I do not do too much damage to Pye's position) a problem can be pointed out. Sharing political resources to gain political ends may only delay the time when economic resources must be used for political ends. After power has been shared, those with newly gained power may well be in a position to demand economic benefits as a condition of support. Pork barrel politics in the United States comes to mind as possibly relevant. A more general point that needs making is that political and economic resources and goals are likely to be inextricably mixed in a political system and to think they can be kept separate seems to me erroneous. In the end I think it hard to build a case for either one party systems or more than one party systems on the grounds of relative economic efficiency.

Pye's views on another argument against democracy in developing areas -- that it brings the possibility of extreme disruption to already unstable states -- carry more weight. He observes that the central cause of political instability in transitional societies is the lack of an effective relation between the ruling elites and their peoples. In transitional societies he sees a frequent lack of any means for the government to determine citizen and group interests and preferences and he finds also a frequent inability to carry out public policy once it is determined. These conditions themselves promote instability. Put perhaps too simply Pye appears to argue that far from creating even more instability, increasing citizen participation and the development of representative institutions may in fact lessen the inherent instability of transitional societies. No doubt evidence could be found to support

either view; the processes of modernization are so varied that an example or two can be found to illustrate almost anything. Yet the argument Pye puts forth is worth attention by those who view democracy as a luxury and indeed a danger. In some states and at some times democracy may indeed be the result of political stability, but who is to say that it can never be a cause?

In "Personality and Changing Values" Pye turns to the question of the relative importance of changing objective conditions and changing individual attitudes in the furtherance of modernization. Both officials and scholars could be found who would argue that if economic conditions -- the standards of living -- can just be improved then attitudes will change. Others could be found who would argue with equal force that attitudes must change before the economy can develop. In brief, while many are sure, no one knows. Pye performs a useful service in sorting out the disagreements and pointing to the confusion.

Other chapters in Pye's book warrant attention--the chapter on the role of the military I found particularly interesting--but in this review there is no space to comment on all chapters individually. The overall impression that the book gives is certainly favorable. It is short on data and even on examples, as one might expect a collection of papers to be. It is often easy to think of exceptions to the generalizations made and one has the feeling that Pye might have been a bit more cautious in generalizing from his own experience. Still the book is insightful and provocative and it deals with important questions.

II

Anderson, von der Mehden and Young have written a book very different from that of Pye. The three authors bring a wider variety of experience and information to their task and their focus is narrower. They are interested in cultural pluralism and how developing states have dealt with it; they are interested in political violence, and they are interested in the political ideologies in the developing countries.

Their main mission is to describe the problems that so many developing nations have in common, and also to describe the diverse ways that these problems have been met. There are few prescriptions in this book, but political leaders, administrators, and expert advisors might all profit from reading it. Anyone who aspires to the manipulation of an economy, a society, a government, might read this book to see just how complex his task will be.

Cultural, or social or economic pluralism is a situation that confronts virtually all developing countries, and of course developed ones as well. Moreover, as the authors make clear, the lines of social cleavage may become more marked, the various social groups may become more cohesive, during the process of develop-

ment. As the state begins to assume a more active role, begins to make new decisions, begins to carry out new programs, choices must be made about who will be affected how--and latent groups may become real. In some countries decisions about official languages arouse different linguistic groups and touch off conflict. The country that is blessed with a single language avoids this battle, but inevitably confronts others. Resource allocation questions must be answered. How much will be spent on what? How much will be spent to benefit whom? What areas will get new hospitals, new schools, a university? Where will the new roads be built and what about the dam? Conflict between different geographic regions, between government organizations may precede such decisions and is likely to continue after the decisions are made. The coming of mass participation and the holding of elections may exacerbate social conflicts. (This is certainly true, but Pye's point--that under some conditions, at least, increased participation may lead to stability--still has merit.) Recruiting for the civil service may have to take into account class or race or religion or area quite as much as technical competence. Even admission procedures to a country's universities maybe affected by its pluralism.

How have developing and developed countries coped with pluralism? A classic method has of course been federalism, but there are a number of other techniques. Various groups can be officially represented in the decision making process. New York City has long had an ethnically balanced ticket and the President of the United States usually appoints Jews and Catholics to the Supreme Court as well as Protestants. President Johnson appointed a Negro to the Supreme Court. Various minorities may through the education process be socialized and assimilated into the larger society. (This may be hard to do if they stand out physically.) They may be put off by themselves, isolated--the Indian reservations in the United States come to mind. Expatriation is another alternative. Minority group members may be sent to where they came from or to somewhere else. And finally there is Hitler's ultimate solution for cultural pluralism--genocide. Which of these is selected or which combination may depend on anything and everything from the apparent similarity of the groups (their mixability) to what men in power think they can get away with.

The part of the book devoted to violence begins with an interesting discussion of the possible reasons for resorting to violence. They range, according to the authors, from such unideological reasons as boredom and the romanticism of guerilla life to "simple indignation, frustration, or fury at injustice, stupidity and tyranny." Three case studies of violence--in Burma, Columbia, and the Congo are also included. In these case studies the authors try to explain why violence occurred in these very different contexts. The discussion of violence concludes with an analysis of the failures of government and their relationship to violence. Inability of the

existing government to achieve promised social and political goals, inability of the existing government to cope with ethnic, religious, or ideological disunity inability of the existing government to cope with external enemies—all these may lead to revolutionary violence.

What is not included in this part of the book is any systematic review of the means that governments have used to cope with violence. There is nothing in the discussion of violence that is analogous to the author's treatment of the ways governments have coped with cultural pluralism. After one reads the chapters on violence in Anderson, von der Mehden, and Young one may want to read the chapter in Pye's book titled "Insurgency and the Suppression of Rebellions."

In the final section of *Issues of Political Development* the authors turn to the subject of ideology in the developing nations and early make clear their view that ideology in this context is more real, more meaningful, than in the developed countries. Why is this so? Because an ideology may provide answers to questions that have not yet been resolved in the developing countries, and an ideology may serve to integrate the nations. In their discussion of ideology the authors focus their attention on revolution and on socialism and, in their words, "consider why many of the leaders of these nations choose to think as revolutionaries, why they so often employ the symbols, and ideals of Western radicalism." Their discussion of revolutionary symbolism is insightful and might well be read in conjunction with Murray Edelman's *The Symbolic Uses of Politics*.

A few pages of this last section are rather disconcerting. In trying to explain why revolutions come about the authors suggest that under some conditions governmental failures after independence may lead to coup or revolution. Their list of possible failures is *identical* to the list provided earlier in discussing factors that lead to violence. No doubt this is simply poor editing or poor proof reading, but it is as though the authors could not decide where to include these particular thoughts, and so included them in two relevant places.

In the last chapter of their book the authors take up the question of socialism and ask why socialism has seemed so plausible to so many leaders of developing countries. Most importantly, they look at the relationship between political ideology and government policy, and they conclude that socialism as an ideology does not lead in the developing countries to distinctive policy differences. What one country does on ideological grounds another may do simply in the name of development.

III

A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization by Dankwart Rustow seems more learned historically than the preceding two books, but it pre-

sents less current information about the developing countries than Anderson, von der Mehden, and Young. In the first part of his book Rustow deals with what he calls the essentials of the modern nation state. National identity is one of these and how it comes about is a question of interest to Rustow. He brings up geography and history, but thinks these less important than language. Linguistic unity he thinks can be a country's most precious possession, but using one language is not sufficient to create a feeling of national identity. In the end he turns to the work of Karl Deutsch. "Deutsch's major premise would be obvious if it had not been so consistently disregarded by the classic nationalist writers and by earlier scholars. Nationality is not an inborn characteristic but the result of a process of social learning and habit forming. Such learning typically resulted from a marked increase of social communication (that is of trade, travel, correspondence, and the like) within a network linking a number of cities and each of these with its rural hinterland." An obvious conclusion from this is that such things as highways, railroads, air fields, and regular dependable mail service—prosaic as they sound—may all contribute importantly to nation building.

The creation of national identity is one aspect of political modernization. Another aspect of political modernization "is the immense broadening of the scope of public functions undertaken by the government." Surely we can see this as clearly in the West as in the developing countries. But if we look at the West we see that some functions developed before other (courts, a revenue system, a budget system, a civil service and so on) and it is clear that Rustow thinks that some government functions must logically come before others. In the developing countries, he says: "Governments feel impelled to proclaim ambitious schemes of economic planning and social welfare before they have ensured an orderly flow of tax revenue, instituted effective systems of judicature, or tabulated a reliable census." In Rustow's view the developing countries have great ambitions—combined with weak authority. In Pye's language, they have not solved the problem of penetration, yet they have grandiose programs.

A diversion is warranted here. If it is true that the developing countries (at least some of them) have plans and dreams that they cannot possibly carry out it is important to remember the role of appearances and the role of symbols in politics. Statements of intent may carry one a long way in politics. Dreams may make reality endurable. But having said this it is necessary to remember also a point made by Anderson, von der Mehden and Young. Violence may be resorted to, revolt may occur, when political and social goals are not met, when expectations are unfulfilled. What this means for leaders in new states is clear. Setting goals that cannot be met may result not only in disappointment, but in political instability. It would appear that political leaders in developing countries must walk a narrow

path between promising so little as to make development seem an eternity away (and thus risking revolution because evolution seems too slow) and promising so much that disappointment is inevitable (and thus risking revolution because they failed to meet their goals.)

Perhaps the most interesting and debatable chapter in the first part of Rustow's book is the one titled "The Rhythm of Political Modernization." Here he takes up three critically important concepts -- identity, authority, equality -- and analyzes the sequences in which they may appear. It is clear in his discussion that he places great importance on authority, governmental authority. "A successful quest for identity presupposes authority just as does any successful quest for equality." He thinks that the most common sequence of appearance of these nation state characteristics is authority, identity (or unity) and finally equality. He emphasizes that these three characteristics cannot appear all at once. "It seems clear, then, that the three political ingredients of the modern nation state are more effectively assembled one by one than all at once, and that political participation and equality should be the last, crowning achievement in the total process." This may seem clear to Rustow, but what about to Pye. On a related matter his position was that "public administration cannot be greatly improved without a parallel strengthening of the representative political processes." The language of Pye is different than the language of Rustow, but Pye seems to be saying that authority and equality must develop simultaneously. Rustow would take the position (and this is a common one) that public administration can be improved first. What is really clear is not the rightness of either position, but simply that able scholars disagree, a not uncommon event.

Disagreement may also exist, though be concealed in different language, in Pye's notion that lack of participation may contribute to political instability and Rustow's certainty that authority must precede equality. Could it be that Rustow has been blinded by history rather than enlightened by it. The sequences of political development that occurred in times past may not be at all appropriate or possible today, given the fact that developing nations can constantly observe citizens in Western countries participating in politics. The demonstration effect may force an alteration in our thinking about the probable sequences of political development.

In Part Two of his book Rustow considers political leadership and political parties in the new states. Like so many other students of political development Rustow pays particular attention to military leadership. He sees a military coup as possible where ever distinct civilian and military organizations exist, and probable whenever the civilian structure is weak and appears unable to function. When civilian government appears to lack legitimate legitimacy or when it appears unable to cope with the problems of the country then the military may intervene and take over. What is the outcome of military intervention? According to Rustow the soldiers may

stay in power a very short time, they may stay in power permanently, there may be a series of coups, or there may be what he calls a twilight between civilian and military rule. What this last phenomena is and how it can be identified seems to me quite unclear.

In the end Rustow reaches conclusions that are not surprising and not uncommon. There are diverse routes to modernization and neither Western democracy nor communism has proved to be readily transferable to late modernizing countries. He ends by recalling his chapter on the rhythm of political modernization: "A future theory of political modernization might therefore distinguish among (1) those countries where the immediate need is for the building up of responsible authority and dedicated public service (2) those countries that have, in their bureaucracies or party organizations (or both) an effective instrument of national unification but have not yet arrived at an accepted definition of their geographic identity, and (3) those that have solved the problems of identity and unity and are therefore free to concentrate on matters of political and social equality." The difficulty with this formulation is that in practice countries may have coped with all these needs at once; citizens may not be willing to wait to participate until everything else is done. And as Pye suggests everything may not be done, unless the citizens do participate.

IV

It may be useful now to consider in the light of the foregoing books the meaning or content of political development. There may be several ways to do this, but one way is simply to list the topics that these books have focused on.

- Nation building, national integration
- extension of government authority
- improvement of public administration
- mass participation in politics, party systems
- citizen equality
- relevance of democratic model
- citizen attitudes
- ideology
- violence and insurgency
- military government

These particular topics can be connected (at least the existing connections can be made clearer) and perhaps the subject of political development made more understandable if the above list of topics is reduced to a more limited and simpler vocabulary. First, it seems useful to dispense with the word development and adopt the word change. Development has a positive connotation; change is more neutral

and does not imply direction. Students of political development are thus students of political change. But what does this mean? Here I think it helpful to adopt the word decision. Using this word students of political change can be understood as interested in describing and explaining changes in who makes decisions; changes in the way decision makers are chosen; changes in the substance of official decisions; changes in how decisions are reached; changes in the acceptability of decisions; and changes in how decisions are enforced. Each of the particular topics in the first list can be classified into one or another on several of these decision topics. For example, improvement of public administration may involve changes in the way decision makers are chosen (recruitment by merit instead of by friends) and it may also involve changes in the way decisions are made.

Is anything to be gained from this kind of translation, or as some might say, this kind of abstraction? I think so. It may make studies of political development easier to compare with one another. Translation or reduction to a common vocabulary may make obvious agreements and disagreements that are concealed when individual vocabularies are used. More important, there is in the social sciences a substantial literature on decision making and it may be useful to relate studies of political development to it. For example, in the organizational decision making literature there are a number of studies which suggest that 1) decisions may be more acceptable if those affected by them have participated in making them and 2) that it may be easier to bring about change in an organization if those to be affected are consulted and can participate in shaping the changes. This seems to be what Pye is suggesting when he notes that lack of participation may lead to political instability. If what Pye says means anything it means that when citizens feel they have no voice in government decision making they may not feel like accepting the decisions of the government. Indeed, they may feel like rejecting them.

I realize of course that it is difficult to go back and forth between studies in very different contexts. Conclusions from one study may not be at all valid in another context and this is as true between national states as it is between particular bureaucratic organizations and national states. Still, bureaucratic organizations and national states are both social organizations. It may have at least heuristic value to view studies of political development as particular examples of the study of change and decision making in social organization. Doing this may allow us to enlarge the body of material on which we can draw in designing studies of political development and may also allow us to relate our findings to phenomena in other contexts. (The coup may have its bureaucratic counterpart in the corporate takeover.) I realize of course that a common vocabulary may suggest a false similarity between quite different phenomena. But if this is a danger it is also true that there is little to be

gained in concealing similarities with distinctive vocabularies. In my view the latter danger is a greater one in the social sciences. Many of us would like to think that what we study is unique.

V

The three books discussed here approach political development in very different ways; Pye is an essayist, Anderson, von der Mehden and Young are analysts of contemporary data on the developing countries, and Rustow appears as a historian and philosopher. These different approaches to the subject have all resulted in interesting books, but the ones by Pye and Rustow demand more caution from the reader. Their speculations and generalizations are surely interesting and stimulating, but they may not always be accurate. At the least, exceptions may not be specified and qualification left only implicit. Anderson, von der Mehden and Young make their data more explicit and stay closer to it. They also look much more clearly at particular countries. Rustow says plainly that he intends to avoid the myopic extreme of regarding every society and every historical situation as unique and certainly he succeeds. But it is important to remember that how closely one looks may affect what one sees and what one reports as present. A man with unaided vision may describe as identical two tubes of water; microscopic examination (the myopic extreme?) may reveal all kinds of bugs in one, and none in the other. Now of course for some purposes the presence of the bugs may make no difference. It may be enough that the water in the tubes looks alike. Nevertheless when one reaches for "an intermediate level of generality" as Rustow does, I wonder if it is possible to avoid an intermediate level of inaccuracy. And if inaccuracy is inevitable do the benefits outweigh the costs? The answer to this question may be largely subjective, but the question is an important one.

A reading of these books raises two final questions: 1) Why study political change and 2) How might it be studied in the future. The first question has many answers. It is clear that development is something like a seamless web; the problems and events of the real world do not neatly follow disciplinary lines. Although we speak of economic development, political development, and social change we must recognize that these subjects blend into one another. Anyone who is interested in any one of these must perforce be interested in them all.

A second reason for studying political change is that the more we know about it the more likely it is that we can make accurate predictions. At least we may have some notion of what the possibilities are. If we can make predictions (at least reasoned judgments) about future political changes and if we understand the consequences of political change for the economy this would seem relevant in development planning. Knowledge gained from the study of political change may

allow us to build accurate political assumptions as well as economic assumptions into development plans. And even if this is not possible knowledge gained from studies of political change may aid us in evaluating the feasibility of development plans.

An additional benefit that might come from the careful study of political change is a greater appreciation of a leader's inability to manipulate a political system and at the same time, paradoxically, a greater understanding of how he can. As we find out what can't be done and why, we may also find out what can be done under particular conditions. I should add for the sake of clarity that ability to predict events by no means implies the ability to alter them. That may be a concomitant, but it is not necessary. We are increasingly able to predict earthquakes and other sorts of natural events, but we cannot stop them. (Advance knowledge does of course allow us to take protective measures.)

I come finally to the question of research strategy. From what I have said already it is clear that I think historical analysis has its limits. Just as economic development in the developing areas may follow different sequences and a different pace than economic development in Western Europe, Great Britain, and North America, so may the sequences and pace of political development be different. Historical study may provide hypotheses, but obviously important is the careful collection and analysis of contemporary data, the careful reporting of events, careful case studies. These are platitudes, but these practices are not yet common place—especially in the universities and research institutes in the developing areas.

There is one more specific suggestion to be made. Anderson, von der Mehden, and Young make good use of case studies in their book and I think this practice worth carrying further. A useful model might be Frederick Mosher's recent book, *Governmental Reorganizations: Cases and Commentary*. This book is a collection of cases all focused on a single topic and written by researchers working under common instructions. But it is more than a collection of cases. Mosher used the cases as the basis for an extended analysis of government agency reorganization. The cases, in other words, besides being useful studies in themselves provided a large reservoir of data for analysis. It may be worth while to think about the utility of a case book (or case books) that focussed on a single topic of political development, such as the appearance of parties, or the promulgation of constitution, or the treatment of minority groups. This tactic would have the merit of avoiding the problems inherent in exporting western research techniques to foreign cultures and it also would avoid the difficulties of the single large case study. Such a multi-researcher project might also more easily avoid the flaws of superficiality and inaccuracy.

Whether this case analysis suggestion has merit or not it is clear that more research on political development is in order.

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